

For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAEASIS



BRUCE PEEL SPECIAL COLLECTIONS LIBRARY

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY

REQUEST FOR DUPLICATION

I wish a photocopy of the thesis by

Gereluk _____ (author)

entitled Alienation and its supersession

The copy is for the sole purpose of private scholarly or scientific study and research. I will not reproduce, sell or distribute the copy I request, and I will not copy any substantial part of it in my own work without permission of the copyright owner. I understand that the Library performs the service of copying at my request, and I assume all copyright responsibility for the item requested.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ALIENATION AND ITS SUPERCESSION: THE VIEWS OF MARX, FROMM
AND GOODMAN

by



WINSTON GERELUK

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF EDUCATION

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1971

UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

The undersigned certify that they have read, and
recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies for acceptance,
a thesis entitled "Alienation and Its Supercession: The
Views of Marx, Fromm, and Goodman" submitted by Winston
Gereluk in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Education.

1990-1991 Academic Year

GRADUATE STUDENT FELLOWSHIPS

Graduate student fellowships are available for the 1990-1991 academic year.

Graduate student fellowship applications are due by January 15, 1990.

For more information

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter		Page
I	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II	THE CONCEPT OF MAN.....	12
	Karl Marx.....	13
	Erich Fromm.....	37
	Paul Goodman.....	52
III	THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION.....	64
	Introduction.....	64
	Alienation As A General Abstraction..	64
	Alienation: Description of Capitalism	68
	Alienation Under Capitalism.....	75
IV	THE SUPERCESSION OF ALIENATION.....	117
	Karl Marx.....	117
	Erich Fromm:.....	137
	Paul Goodman.....	157
V	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY....	170
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	192

ABSTRACT

The alienation of man in modern technological society emerged as a social issue for North Americans in the 1960's. Though the specific objects of this concern are modern, the theme itself is a traditional one, reaching at least as far back as the Old Testament and the concern that people had at that time for their separation from God and Salvation due to their fixation with objects of their own creation. Alienation has surfaced in secular form in psychological form, concerned with the confusion of identity; in political terms expressing the claims which a society makes on the lives of its individual members; and in philosophy as questions raised as a result of becoming aware of one's human condition, including one's place in the Universe.

In the last decade in North American society, alienation was appropriated as a watchword by groups who wished to express in political, sociological, and psychological terms their perceived separation from the mainstream of society. Young people, the poor, ethnic and racial minorities, and residents of disadvantaged regions all used the term to describe their separation from their society and its destiny.

Karl Marx, Erich Fromm, and Paul Goodman were not by any means the only social critics to have articulated a fairly consistent theory of alienation. They were chosen as the objects of this study for the specific contributions that they have made to the debate on this topic. The Marx of the Early Manuscripts,¹ the Grundrisse, and The Capital treats alienation as the central concept that describes the condition of man under capitalism. Erich Fromm adds, with sometimes dubious connections, a psychoanalytic account to Marx's primarily socio-economic enquiry. Paul Goodman, unequalled in his power of polemic, is particularly valuable to this study for his description

of modern American society and its educational system.

Unless the writer is committed to a defeatist attitude towards society, any discussion of alienation should conclude with a study of the possibilities for its supercession, for the freeing of man from those forces that estrange him from his birthright. It is in this part of the study that Marx is most clearly distinguished from the two other critics. While Fromm and Goodman offer recommendations that are clearly unequal to the problem that they describe, Marxism provides a theoretical basis for revolution - the complete overthrow of an obsolete and alienating social system and a movement towards socialist society.

Applying the study of alienation and its supercession to a study of education in capitalist society implies a whole new study. Though it is not integrally connected to the main body of this study, the last chapter explores the possibilities for such an enquiry and concludes with a set of possible areas into which a study on the place of education in capitalist society can move.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to Dr. N.C. Bhattacharyya who was able and willing to apply his wealth of political knowledge to the problem of getting me through my Master of Education program when, in the final analysis, that was all that really mattered. As well, I wish to thank Dr. A. Pearson and Dr. T.C. Pocklington for displaying the greatest of patience with one who, by any standards, could not be classed a model graduate student.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1

Popular modern discourse holds that man in North American society is alienated, and moreover, that this alienation is at the root of many of his modern day crises. As can be expected in a society where popularity is almost directly translatable into profits, this idea soon received the consecration of the publishers and found its way onto the bookshelves of most of North America, where its presence was taken as a priori proof of its reality and significance. Consider this benediction in the introduction to Man Alone, a popular anthology of writings on the subject:

Ours is a self-conscious age. Perhaps never before in history has man been so much of a problem to himself. Rocketing through space and on the point of conquering the heavens, he is fast losing touch with his own world. Growing numbers of writers describe him in various ways as 'alienated'. What forces have made him so?

However, alienation has not been a concern reserved solely for those who can afford the luxury of bourgeois anxiety. Many have seen it as the basis of other, more serious threats, and for them it has been the cause of considerable alarm.

Some have pointed to modern man's apparent suicidal tendencies, or more specifically, to his lack of interest in abolishing the threats which he has created to his physical survival.

¹ Eric and Mary Josephson (ed.), Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962) p. 9

Rachel Carson, author of the Silent Spring, was the first to declare that man is actually destroying the ecology that his life depends on.² But, decades later, the devastation continues. Even though books by Neville Shute and E. Burdick on the topics of nuclear disaster created widespread panics at the time of their publication, nuclear testing and the armaments race have not abated.³ Dr. Paul Erlich, author of The Population Bomb, was only one of the many modern day scientists who have shown that Malthus was neither a dreamer nor a scaremonger, but the population curve continues to rise.⁴

L.J. Zimmerman in Poor Lands Rich Lands: The Widening Gap has pointed to many of the dangers we are ignoring as we continue our present exploitative economic course.⁵ And, G.R. Taylor has only been one of the few to sum up in his Doomsday Book the many interlocking, mutually reinforcing threats to our physical survival.⁶ If alienation is "man losing touch with himself", then it must have reached gigantic proportions indeed when man will not act even in the face of the prospect for global suicide.

² R. Carson, The Silent Spring (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1962)

³ E. Burdick, Fail-Safe (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962) and Neville Shute, On The Beach (New York: Bantam Books, 1965)

⁴ P. Erlich, The Population Bomb (New York: Ballantine Books, Inc., 1968)

⁵ L.J. Zimmerman, Poor Lands, Rich Lands: The Widening Gap (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965)

⁶ G.R. Taylor, The Doomsday Book (London: Thames and Hudson, Ltd., 1970)

Others, while not ignoring the above, see alienation as epitomized in the unhappy states of existence which man imposes upon himself on his way to his doom. In many ways, man is effectively entombing himself in a tightly-knit social order of the type described either by George Orwell in 1984⁷, or by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World.⁸ Or, not exclusive of the above, he is fast going insane on a mass scale, along the lines made classic by Emile Durkheim in Suicide.⁹ Alienation is evident, not only in the fact of man-made threats, but in the fact that even those with the external attributes of power are unwilling to exercise it in an attempt to find remedies.

Finally, it is significant for this study that alienation as a topic of widespread concern has provided academics in higher educational institutions with the public support necessary to finance intensive researching, theorizing, writing, and lecturing. A few have obtained the point of offering remedies, but on the whole, the problem of alienation has retained its safe academic character. Of those who have not been satisfied with vacuous speculation, most have injected the benefit of their knowledge into social practice, but unhappily in the employ of those in power, quite naturally in the interests of the preservation of the status quo.

⁷C. Orwell, 1984, (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1948).

⁸A. Huxley, Brave New World (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1932)

⁹E. Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (trans. by J.A. Spaulding), (New York: The Free Press, 1951)

Aldous Huxley wrote in honour of these academics:

Let us build a Pantheon for professors. It should be located among the ruins of one of the gutted cities of Europe or Japan, and over the entrance of the Ossuary, I would inscribe in letters six or seven feet high the simple words: Sacred to the Memory of the World's Educators. SI MONUMENTUM REQUIRIS CIRCUMSPICE.¹⁰

II

If there is any characteristic besides the name that unites social theorists who call themselves Marxists, it would be their disdain for social theory that either treats society as a hodge-podge of isolated problematics, or is not directly correlated with social practice that seeks an active solution to these problems.

C.W. Mills summarizes this contempt for bourgeois social theory and the method of study it supports:

The social scientists study the details of small-scale milieus; Marx studied such details too, but always within the structure of a total society. The social scientists, knowing little history, study at most shortrun trends; Marx, using historical materials with superb mastery, takes as his unit of study entire epochs. The values of the social scientists generally lead them to accept their society pretty much as it is; the values of Marx lead him to condemn his society -- root, stock, and branch. The social scientists see society's problems as matters only of "disorganization"; Marx sees problems as inherent contradictions in the existing structure. The social scientists see their society as continuing in an evolutionary way without qualitative breaks in its structure; Marx sees in the future of this society a qualitative break: a new form of society -- in fact a new epoch -- is going to come about by means of revolution.

¹⁰ A. Huxley, Brave New World, op. cit., p. 8

¹¹ C. Mills, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962) pp. 10-11

In the 1960's in North America, coincidental with the rise in social activism and heightened concern, and partially as a consequence of the translation of Marx's Paris Manuscripts (the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts which he wrote in 1844), Marxian theory has become the focus of increased attention among scholars. The renewed interest has made possible this study; the author has chosen Marxism because it offers, to his mind, the best, all-embracing explanation of our problem-ridden society, and of alienation in particular. In fact, it is the point of view of this study that alienation provides a key to a clear understanding of the whole Marxian system, often distorted up to now either directly or indirectly by ideologues and cold-war propagandists.

This study will not examine the Marxian concept of alienation in any great detail nor will it make it a point to examine in any analytic way the role that the concept plays in Marx's total system. The most that this study is intended to achieve is a fairly consistent 'Marxist' account of a theory of alienation that comes to grips with a view of man, some of the manifold dimensions of alienation, and finally, the meaning of the supercession or positive abolition of alienation. In the process, this study will include only those aspects of the Marxian system that cast light directly on the problem,, primarily from his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and the German Ideology.

The emphasis in this study on alienation will be on Marx. Erich Fromm and Paul Goodman will be included in this study, not because either of them has ever successfully expounded Marx's theory,

but because they are modern-day writers who deal in a historical-specific, contemporary way with alienation. Their inclusion is intended to render the concept of alienation, and not necessarily Marxism, more intelligible. As a further limitation, this study will not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of the methods employed by Marx, Fromm, and Goodman, in the explication of their theories. Though complete avoidance of the task is both impossible and undesirable, a proper study of method could only be produced in a work far more extended than this one, and, in the case of Marx, the task has been very admirably attempted in I. Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation¹², the completeness and intellectual rigour of which I wish to accede to completely for the moment.

III

Erich Fromm explains that basic to the many usages of the term 'alienation' is the necessary distinction between essence and existence; "the fact that man's existence is alienated from his essence. Modern man 'is not what he ought to be', and 'he ought to be that which he could be'."¹³ To apply Marx's categories, man is not what he 'could be' because he is alienated from himself, from his fellow man, from the nature of which he is a part, and from his own species-life, with the key to all of these 'alienations' being alienated labour, the separation of man from his life-activity by various mediations or reified aspects of his existence.

¹² I. Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: The Merlin Press Ltd., 1970) Chapter III, pp. 93-122

¹³ E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961, 1966) p. 47

Accepting that man's existence is the sum-total of his life-activity, the total process whereby man produces himself, the distinction that Fromm points out can be seen as the basis of a radical criticism which subjects the whole of actuality to standards which are not its own. Even in its most modest application, such a concept that transcends the limits of existence has radical overtones, suggesting a going beyond or supercession, the very point to Marxian theory.

It is clear that coming to grips with the meaning of such a concept could be an extremely complex, if not impossible, undertaking, as long as one attempts to employ the conceptual frameworks offered by most established academic disciplines. Some Marxists, for instance, have wrongly attempted to reduce it to a study of political economy. That is, if alienation is a construct that describes what is essentially wrong with the dominant manner in which people live, act, produce their lives through self-activity, then a study which is economic, analyzing the structure of production, and political, analyzing its formal organization, would seem to suffice. However, Marx's own objections provide the clue as to the meaning of alienation. Political economy cannot completely explain alienation, because it cannot include what is vital to such a concept, i.e., the supercession of the alienated existence. It would not allow the working out in concrete terms the actual overcoming or transcendence of alienation and would thus leave us with only two alternatives; piecemeal reformism which accepts the essentials of the socio-economic form, as the boundaries of legitimate change, or utopian proposals which

have no basis in fact (concrete reality). According to Marx, political economy precludes radical enquiry, by accepting certain "legendary primordial conditions" that invalidate at the outset the posing of certain questions. In Marx's view:

Such a primordial condition does not explain anything; it merely removes the question into a grey and nebulous distance. It asserts as a fact or event what it should deduce, namely the necessary relation between two things; for example, between the division of labour and exchange. In the same way, theology explains the origin of evil by the fall of man; that is, it asserts as a historical fact what it should explain.¹⁴

The form and purposes of an enquiry determine the essential meaning of the concepts it employs, and a concept of alienation that purports to be Marxian cannot be properly defined in the context of established sociology, psychology, history, et cetera. Marxian concepts, including alienation, have a dialectical context, and, as Meszaros explains,

must sound extremely odd, if not altogether meaningless or self-contradictory, to all those who are used to the misleading "common-sense simplicity" of positivistic empiricism or to the neat schematic straightforwardness of philosophical formalism, or both. The difficulties of understanding due to this condition, cannot be sufficiently stressed. For, in view of the fact that the whole structure of Marx's theory is dialectical, his key concepts simply cannot be understood at all except in their dialectical-- and often apparently self-contradictory-- interrelatedness. "Transcendence", for instance, is not a transference into another realm, nor is it either "suppression" or "preservation" alone, but both at the same time.¹⁵

¹⁴ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963) p. 121

¹⁵ I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, op. cit., p. 13

This study of alienation will recognize that Marxism is a method of study that attempts to avoid the 'alienated universality' of speculative philosophy, and, at the same time, the reified fragmentariness of the established nature and social sciences. As a study of man, it will accept the synthesizing idea that when human labour is alienated, all other manifestations of life including the 'accepted' modes of inquiry, will portray this. Furthermore, it accepts as a premise that any study of man must be able to answer directly questions pertaining to the activity of overcoming. Therefore, although this study will include a description of present-day existence, it does so only by way of providing a background to the practical questions related to overcoming its limitations. It alludes to empirically-based inquiry, largely economic, only to gain the necessary intellectual mastery over a complex socio-economic organization, with the view to transcending it. The act of transcending itself must be a political action, emancipation "within the framework of the prevailing social order" as the prerequisite to "real, practical emancipation within the area of production."¹⁶

Not the least of the problems encountered in doing this study was due to the fact that a systematic presentation of a large body of thought demands fragmentation and categorization, some attempt to isolate parts of the theory from each other in order to render them manageable. But the Marxian system was itself a reaction to

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 129

the many disciplines or 'measuring rods' with which the study of man was fragmented, and therefore lends itself reluctantly to an orderly, and "neatly parcelled" exegesis.

Chapters II, III, and IV will beg the above consideration in order to present Marx's theory of alienation in three parts; an analysis of human nature or "human-ness", a discussion of alienation, and, finally, a consideration of the problem of supercession. The understanding that unites the three chapters will have to be that the fundamental dimension of "human-ness" is history of which alienation is one phase, and supercession is the affirmation that denies the eternal necessity of any one such stage. In other words, the three chapters constitute one discussion, Marx's view of man, or human history, in which alienation and supercession are implied.

Goodman's and Fromm's social theories are not by themselves explications of Marxian theory, they can only be justifiably included as modern-day extensions of Marxian theory. At different points in this study they will provide illustrations of points Marx has raised, extensions of his theory into new areas, or exploration of some of the implications of his thought.

Chapter I will be an attempt to provide a faithful reproduction of the view of man held by the three theorists upon which a conception of alienated man can arise. Even though the emphasis in this chapter will be on similarities, important differences prevent the conflation of the three views into one; hence that chapter will contain separate discussions for each theory.

Chapter III, on the other hand, will not be divided according to author. The view of alienation presented in that chapter will be Marx's, and the contributions to this view made by Fromm and Goodman will be given meaning within the frame of reference provided by my analysis of Marx.

Chapter IV will again separate the three authors. Marx's theory will be presented first, and then Fromm's and Goodman's solutions to the problems of supercession will be presented in the light of Marxist theory.

Chapter V will be connected to the preceding three chapters only by a brief summary of their contents. Its main task will be to explore the possibilities for further study, and will contain a recommendation for an empirical study that will make that chapter in many ways completely separate from the task of the rest of this work.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONCEPT OF MAN

If a consistent account of man's alienation in modern society is to be presented, it must begin with a conception of the unalienated, authentic man or "human nature". To point out similarities between the concepts of man held by Marx, Fromm and Goodman would not be an end in itself, but would only provide necessary basis from which to criticize modern, capitalist society for its debilitating effects on man. The plan of this chapter is consistent with that of the whole study; to present Fromm and Goodman as two of the many modern day commentators who have explored some of the considerations raised by Marxian theory. It is hoped, then, that this chapter will produce evidence of the following similarities:

(1) Human nature is understandable -- Even though it is not absolute, it is possible to refer to a human nature which people realize or live to a greater or lesser degree. Human nature is a concept that changes with historical circumstances, as a result of human (i.e. social) action.

(2) Human nature as a potential -- History can be seen as the continual process of man redefining himself through social action. It is possible, from a study of history and present-day circumstances, to formulate certain hypothesis as to what man might become. History has been, and can yet be, a positive movement, i.e. progress.

(3) Materialism -- Any serious study of human nature must begin from the material base according to which man builds the terms of his existence, his culture. This Marxian contribution to social science, has been often misinterpreted as "narrow economic determinism".

(4) Consciousness -- This faculty makes a human existence not only possible but necessary. It is at once a derivative of a social existence based on material infrastructure, and the key to the transcendence of this existence and production of a higher one.

(5) A human relationship to the world -- "Human nature" rather than referring to an internal attribute of man, signifies a certain mode of relationship between man and his world. Man not only exists in, and uses his surroundings, but through social action, humanizes his world, recreating it in a form which corresponds to his own developing idea of what it should be.

(6) The unity of thought and action -- "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it." (Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach). Man not only contemplates his existence, but actively recreates it, and in the process produces history.

I. KARL MARX:

Before launching into an account of Marx's view of man or human nature it seems necessary to present a preface of general comments that would make clearer the nature of his theory, and pre-empt some of the misconceptions that ordinarily arise. Hence Part I of this chapter will contain first a brief description of Marx's general method, the substance of his study, then a summary of his differences

with Hegel, and finally, an analysis of his concept of man.

A. Historical Materialism.

The method by which Marx studied man, historical materialism, can only be properly understood within the context of his general philosophical method, which commentators have come to call 'dialectical materialism'. Briefly, the task of philosophy is not speculation, the articulation of absolute definitions or immutable axioms. Its task is just the opposite; to supply a radical critique of "conventional wisdom" that exposes the ephemeral nature of existing reality at the same time as it attacks the presumptions to eternity of theoretical claims that distort man's view of himself by reifying aspects of his existence. It does so only by denying the right of status quo theoreticians to defend the system by declaring all opposition invalid, using as their criteria of validity the standards of the status quo itself. By exploding distortions, philosophy clears the way for a scientific study that provides the "head" for practical-theoretical activity by which man can overcome present circumstances and realize a new existence.¹

In dialectical materialism, the task of historical materialism, or theory applied to history, is to provide a scientific-historical basis for human activity.

¹ J.A. Brook, Marx: Essence and the Problem of Social Determinism, M.A. Thesis, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1966, p. 7. For an astute and sympathetic analysis of Marx's historicism read M.M. Bober, Karl Marx's Interpretation of History: A Study of the Central Theses of the Marx-Engels Doctrine of Social Evolution (2nd Ed.) (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1927)

It has not as its task the definition of man; man defines himself only when he engages in practical activity in history.² Radical criticism can thus serve man's purpose only by advancing social action, the radical activity of "going beyond" or overcoming present conditions. The synthesizing of practical action and theoretical knowledge is in the final analysis the task of dialectical materialism and its historical method.

The danger in attempting to explore the meaning Marx attached to 'man', 'man's essence', or 'human-species-characteristic' lies in the general nature of definitions as we implement them. With their general, absolute overtones, they can be seen as contradictory to the intention of Marxist philosophy. In historical materialism, the ontological basis of man is not metaphysical, but concrete and historical; therefore the correct analysis of man is open-ended, changing with the course of history. In order to study man, it is sometimes necessary to "freeze" history by obtaining a "general result" that sums up development to a certain point. In Marxian theory, these abstractions only have meaning insofar as it is understood that,

²This is the interpretation of Lefebvre that contradicts many commonly-held views on historicism, particularly those of Karl Popper. See Henri Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx (New York: Random House, Inc., 1969) Chapter 1; and Karl Popper's anti-Marxist writings, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. 2 (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1945) and The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957) which are answered in Maurice Cornforth, The Open Philosophy and the Open Society (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968).

In themselves and detached from real history these abstractions have not the least value. They only facilitate the arrangement of historical material to indicate the sequence of its separate strata.³

Therefore, unlike many of his contemporary political economists and speculative philosophers who began with a fixed definition of man, Marx began his study in reality, "from which abstractions can only be made in the imagination".

They are the real individuals, their life-activity, and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing, and those produced by their activity.⁴

This statement provides the core of Marxist inquiry, which in its commitment to studying man in the process of becoming, i.e., historical change, shuns philosophical and theological abstraction in favour of a human science with its emphasis on the empirically-obtainable solutions to human problems. Mészáros explains that what Marx means by a "human science" is:

a science of concrete synthesis, integrated with real life. Its standpoint is the ideal of non-alienated man whose actual human -- as opposed to both "speculatively invented" and to "abstractly material" -- needs determine the lines of research in every particular field. The achievements of the particular fields -- guided right from the beginning by the common frame

³K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I and III (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1947) pp. 15-16. General truths may be described as having algebraic significance; their concrete content changes from era to era.

⁴Ibid., pp. 6-7.

of reference of a non-fragmented "human science" -- are then brought together into a higher synthesis which in its turn determines the subsequent lines of investigation in the various fields.⁵

B. Marx and Hegel:

Marx arrives at general historical conclusions that bear on the surface, a strong resemblance to those of his predecessor, Hegel. This similarity is due primarily to the fact that in his science he retained the essentials of the dialectical method as explained by Hegel. The phenomenal world, from the standpoint of human society, appears as a unified 'subject' emerging through time to reveal its real content or essence. The dynamism for this emergence is the subject itself; it presents a bundle of potentiality. Time is the prophet; as each stage in history reveals a higher truth, a heightened realization of the Idea of history. And, each realization is transformed into the next stage by the force of conflicting, contradictory elements within itself.

Reality is the constantly renewed result of the process of existence -- the process . . . in which 'that which is' becomes 'other than itself', and identity is only the continuous negation of inadequate existence, the subject maintaining itself in being other than itself.⁶

⁵ I. Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: The Merlin Press, 1970) p. 101. Among contemporary philosophers of science there could very likely be found differences with Marx's conception of a science. In any case, Marxists very often, and openly reject the view of science espoused by many involved in "alienated" scientific enquiry.

⁶ H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960) from "Preface: A Note on Dialectic", p. viii.

If a particular realization represents a "thesis", its emerging contradiction is its "antithesis", and the result of the necessary conflict, the resolution of the self-contradiction would then be the "synthesis", a higher realization (the unity of opposites). In the Hegelian system, history is such a dialectical process through which Reason, the Universal Spirit or Idea, is realized in human consciousness by human society; man becomes the universal being.

History is progress, and Marx is in fundamental agreement with Hegel's analysis of the nature of this progress.⁷ For Hegel, each dialectical stage moved human society closer to the embodiment of Reason, i.e., the role reason played in the life of man was becoming progressively greater, and man's action on the world would one day produce a world conforming to the standards of his reason.

However the similarity is more apparent than real; Marx has basic difference with Hegel's system. Hegel saw his philosophy as the culmination of the historical realization, as the final synthesis in which the Idea became manifest in human thought, and the Prussian state as the manifestation of Reason or "philosophy" in political and social reality.

⁷ A bias that Bertrand Russell disagrees with. Marx, he claims, was limited by the cosmic importance that he attached to men. "There goes with this limitation to terrestrial affairs a readiness to believe in progress as a universal law. . . . Marx professed himself an atheist, but retained a cosmic optimism which only theism could justify." See B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946) p. 140

Marx was diametrically opposed to this closed ideological system. The working class of his time was radically challenging the "built-in rationality" of the status quo thus contradicting Hegel's unity. Furthermore, Marx was opposed to the manner in which natural human activity is reduced in Hegel's system to the role of predicate, the object the Idea of philosophy or of the State in reality.⁸ Man is the subject and 'prime mover', not the predicate of history.

Marx's criticism of Hegel, contained primarily in his "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right", and "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic" is a critique of an "alienated philosophy corresponding to an alienated existence. It is first a transformative criticism, that brings out the truth in Hegel's essentially speculative system by substituting subject for predicate, "standing it on its head", placing the finite before the infinite, material truth, before the Idea, man before the Spirit, et cetera. Secondly, his criticism is textual analysis, that reveals contradictions in Hegel's account, corresponding to contradictions in the status quo he was rationalizing. Finally, it is an historical-political criticism, criticizing Hegel's doctrine, and through it the socio-political system, the "non-philosophical alienated existence," its genesis and present practice.

⁸ For a more complete explanation of the nature of Marx's disagreements with Hegel, see Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1968) Chapter II.

As such, the purpose of Marx's philosophy was to assist in overcoming the alienated existence, and indeed, to abolish itself.⁹

The philosophical consciousness is merely the consciousness of the alienated world . . . the philosopher (who is himself an abstract version of alienated man) sets himself up as the measuring rod of the alienated world.¹⁰

Marx thus inverts the intention of Hegel's philosophy to include the materialist conception of history. "Man is not only a subject . . . he is also an objective natural being."¹¹ Marx's materialism is not a reduction of everything to physical (corporeal) matter, but merely a determination to study man by observing the dominant material conditions of his existence. Men must be studied "in their actual empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions."¹²

⁹ T.B. Bottomore (trans. & ed.) Karl Marx: Early Writings (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963) pp. 50-51. The categorization of Marx's disagreement was gained from D. O'Malley, "Methodology in Karl Marx," Review of Politics, 32:219-30, April 1970. L. Althusser, For Marx (trans. by R. Brewster) (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1965) devotes a whole essay to expounding his disagreement with the popular view that Marx "stood Hegel on his head."

¹⁰ H. Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, op. cit., p. 12 from Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, 1844. For an example of such a 'philosophy' read Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (New York: New American Library, 1946). Alienated philosophers present the relationships between ideological "truths" that are related to socio-economic processes only in an indirect distorted way. History becomes, then, the development of philosophy, and has, in this context, very little relation to the activities of people.

¹¹ L. Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Brace & World, 1966) p. 122 from Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Dialectic.

¹² Karl Marx, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 14. A summation of the 'philosophy of materialism' is offered in Charles E. Seeley, Modern Materialism, (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960).

Further, Hegel misunderstood the status of social relationships that the objective, natural man produced. "The human essence is . . . the ensemble of social relations."¹³ The social relations are basic, to describe man in any historical period is to describe his sociality, and history is the development of these relations. Critical philosophy becomes critical political economy, a study that attempts to produce a synthesized statement of the terms of existence of modern man.

However, having rescued man from the supernatural systems of religion, mythology, and bourgeois philosophy, Marx is not about to abandon him to abstract economic forces. Economic determinism is not the result of the transformation of Hegelianism. Instead, the whole of world history is nothing but the creation of man by labour.¹⁴ Barring the intervention of a transcendent being, it is historical man, defined naturally and socially, that is the subjective force in history. It is man working or labouring through the social relations that define his existence who produces his life by creating new conditions. This is, at the same time, the basis of Marx's disagreement with materialism.

¹³Ibid., p. 198. The intent of this statement obviously goes beyond the oft-repeated platitude that man is a "social being" to introduce what is referred to as "sociality" as a primary characteristic. As Brooks points out, this statement may be seen as one of the tautologies or insightful falsehoods that Marx employs in order to point up the shortcomings of conventional wisdom.

¹⁴T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 139

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator must himself be educated The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can only be grasped and rationally understood as revolutionary practice.¹⁵

This is a critique of political economy which has materialist and determinist premises, and, at the same time, a critique of a society in which political economy is possible, i.e., in which the human being is an economic unit, analyzable and predictable, a fixed predicate of an economically-determined social class.

Theoretically, both Hegel's critical theology and materialism's duality render futile human efforts to recreate their social conditions. In identifying realization with self-consciousness, Hegel's idealism, attached a negative alienating meaning to objective, natural activity, the very level on which man distinguishes himself from nature and affirms himself in history. The materialist negation of revolutionary practice is a result of their alienation of theory from practice.

C. The Human Essence:

Only when Marx's historical materialism and its differences with Hegelianism is understood, is it possible to render intelligible Marx's view of man or the human essence. Human essence, as a general result of historical development, can be defined as the tendency or

¹⁵ Third Thesis on Feuerbach who had brought philosophy to the point of studying natural, objective man, but not beyond. Karl Marx, German Ideology, op. cit., p. 198

ability that man has displayed to transcend, annual, or supersede the social and material relations peculiar to his own historical existence. Periphrased, man's essence is for productivity, to produce the terms of his existence, i.e. to produce history.

I. Production of Nature: Productivity

What Marx calls "productivity" refers not only to the creation of terms of existence, but a creation with certain features. These features are not absolute, but only keys that "render more intelligible the mass of historical evidence".

Because man is a natural being, a part of nature, his productivity must be viewed, at least from one perspective, as natural or objective activity, nature acting on itself. As a natural object, man is inseparable from his natural, organic environment; he must labour with it in order to remain in existence. It is crucial that nature, or more specifically, "man's sensuous nature" be understood as all of those objective conditions with which he, as an integral part, must mediate in order to exist, and whose operations occur with the necessity of natural law. It includes, therefore, what is commonly termed natural environment, but also people, social phenomena such as laws and institutions which altogether make up the cluster of circumstances which define the conditions of existence or historical form that determines the character of man's activity. With this understanding, labour can be explained as

a process in which both man and nature participate and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and controls the material reactions between himself

and nature. He opposes himself to nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate nature's production in a form adapted to his own wants.¹⁶

From the standpoint of man as a part of nature, labour is self-mediation, the basis of man's distinctiveness from the rest of nature.

The wants for which man must seek satisfaction develop in history to correspond to the historical level of his capability for productivity. "The first historical act is the production of new needs."¹⁷ Constant wants, commonly called needs, including the sex urge and hunger, are what man must under any circumstances satisfy in some way if he is to remain in existence. The facility with and the manner in which their satiation is made possible by material conditions determines, to a large extent, man's "relative wants", often adaptations of needs which "owe their origin to a certain social structure and certain conditions of production and communication."¹⁸ More simply, humans due to their natural-biological constitutions have natural needs that become transformed and added to as human needs, and thus attain an historical character.

¹⁶ K. Marx, The Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Condensed by S.L. Levitsky) (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967) p. 144

¹⁷ K. Marx, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 40. Marx makes no apparent distinction between "needs" and "wants" in his discussion of historical needs.

¹⁸ E. Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966) p. 25.

Because man is a natural, objective being, his labour must be objective; i.e., his interaction with nature reproduces it in the form of objects. Marx explains:

An objective being acts objectively, and it would not act objectively if objectivity were not part of its essential being. It creates and establishes only objects because it is established by objects and because it is fundamentally natural.¹⁹

In the objective natural of man's production, we have the basis for his existence as a suffering being, and his commonality with the rest of nature. His human distinctiveness is based in his productivity or industry that reproduces nature in a human form, thereby making it anthropological nature. Thus, no study of man should ever assume him to be independent of the nature that is his world; man can become only as "human" as the nature that he must interact objectively with. In this sense, man's "human nature" exists outside of him. Marx explains:

On the one hand, endowed with natural powers and faculties which exist in him as tendencies and abilities, as drives. On the other hand, as a natural, embodied, sentient, objective being, he is a suffering, conditioned and limited being like plants and animals. The objects of his drives exist outside himself as objects independent of him, yet they are objects

¹⁹ K. Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic" in T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 206. I. Mészáros explains man's mediation with nature as ontologically fundamental to "humanness". Then, whatever labour becomes in any historical period is man's mediation with nature. And, critics of capitalism must bear this in mind, that alienated labour is one historically-specific stage of labour's development.

of his needs, essential objects which are indispensable to the exercise and confirmation of his faculties.²⁰

It is clear that Marx does not intend that labour refer merely to the production of physical subsistence. Rather as the sum of man's natural activity, it determines for people the totality of their human existence.

It is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are.²¹

Besides referring to man's suffering, the above refers to his recreation of himself, the fact that he affirms his humanity at the same time as he produces nature. Until man acts upon the world guided by his thinking, his human faculty for thought exists only as abstract potentiality. Likewise, the eye becomes a "human eye" only when "its object has become a human social object created by him."²²

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 206-7. Here is introduced the whole field of theory that deals with the historicization of epistemology; briefly summarized in the statement by Avineri, "The attributes of objects derive from the objects' standing in human social context, and their meaning derives from the modes of the concrete human consciousness that relates to them." The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 75.

²¹ This is Marcuse's translation from Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. See Reason and Revolution, op. cit., p. 274.

²² T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 161.

In fact, the ideal of Marxian human science is that man should be affirmed in the world through all of his senses, i.e., that all of nature become human.

2. Man's Subjectivity

Man, the objective and natural entity, is from another perspective when he controls or produces the very natural conditions with which he must interact objectively. This is what Marx refers to as the development of "productive forces", which are essentially all of those forces which man uses in his interaction with nature. These may include all tools of production, intelligent methods of production, and even social forces such as increased cooperation or division of labour. Productive forces are not objective facts external to human consciousness and social activity. Rather they represent the organization of social consciousness and activity. A natural object (e.g. Niagara Falls) is only a productive force, then, if surrounding society views it as such and harnesses it to purposive human action. Subjectivity, as manifest in the development of productive forces isolates man from other animals.

Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion, or by anything one likes. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence . . .²³

The result of man's labour is the humanization of nature, nature corresponding to man's historical idea of what it should be. Man's ability to humanize the nature he must interact with is the key to

²³K. Marx, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 10

his freedom; not a freedom from nature but a freedom to interact with it. Nature itself must always remain in part a realm of necessity:

Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature in order to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce his life, so also must civilized man, and he must do it in all forms of society, and under any possible mode of production.

Freedom in this field cannot consist of anything else but the fact that socialized mankind, the associated producers, regulate their interchange with Nature rationally, bring it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by some blind power . . . Nevertheless this always remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins the development of human potentiality for its own sake, the true realm of freedom.²⁴

3. Consciousness:

If man is able to recreate the historical conditions through which he must labour, and thereby shape his own development, it is because in mediating with his existence, he becomes aware of it, and can desire to subject its terms to his own idea of what they should be:

A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst of architects from the best of bees is this, that

²⁴ From Capital, Vol. III in T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. iii. Again, what is being referred to here is not crude, primitive nature, but "anthropological nature" developed by social industry. Thus, if nature is a "realm of necessity", it is a disappearing, changing necessity.

the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality . . . He realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his modus operandi and to which he must subordinate his will.²⁵

Knowledge is power, insofar as gaining knowledge of one's terms of existence and the laws whereby they operate enables one to change them. Using this principle man has exerted control over certain aspects of his physical existence, but is still bound by social conditions.

4. Universality:

A derivative of man's consciousness is his universality, a feature of highly developed human labour that distinguishes it from mere biological activity. Man is not a "being for himself" but is "a being who treats the species as his own being or himself as a species-being."²⁶ To be a species-being means, among other things, to identify oneself with the rest of the human race; a sentiment or disposition towards seeing as the object of one's activity the whole of humanity. In practice, man's universality "makes the whole of nature into his inorganic body."²⁷

²⁵ K. Marx, The Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1906) Vol. I, p. 780.

²⁶ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., pp. 127-8.

²⁷ "Inorganic" as distinguished from "organic", the latter referring to that part of nature with which man interacts directly, his own body and those things the body is directly dependent on. Ibid., p. 126.

To universalize one's labour is to give world-wide or infinite meaning to whatever one does. It gives an ultimately universal direction to man's development; as a conscious species-being, every way in which one furthers one's own development is his unique contribution to the development of the whole of humanity. Further, as a unit of universal mankind, each individual who shoulders the responsibility for self-creation helps to bear the responsibility which consciousness has placed on man's shoulders.²⁸

5. Sociality:

For the purposes of Marxist theory, anything that might be said about man's interaction with his nature must include the understanding that, at the same time as he produces his life, he sets up definite and objective social relations. Historically, therefore, human production of life has not been individual, but social:

a certain mode of production, an industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation or social stage, and this mode of cooperation is itself a 'productive' force.²⁹

²⁸ An interpretation of this aspect of Marxian theory appears in Julian Huxley, "The Crisis in Man's Destiny" in Playboy Magazine, Vol. XIV, No. 1; June 1967, pp. 93-217.

²⁹ K. Marx, German Ideology, op. cit., p. 17. To choose a completely isolated, individualistic mode of production is to imply a certain 'mode of cooperation'.

Man's labour, then, besides producing objects, produces a certain type of social man with a social consciousness, and a social nature or society. Marx's most inclusive statement to this effect is from the Preface to the Critique:

In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of the development of the material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structures of society -- the real foundations on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond.³⁰

A host of critics have lighted on the difficulties that are encountered when one attempts to define exactly the manner in which modes of cooperative labour yield or cause a certain social consciousness. However for the purposes of this study, it is necessary to recognize that Marx has isolated four levels of social production (1) production, (2) relations of production, (3) laws and political institutions and (4) consciousness.³¹

³⁰ L. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959) p. 43.

³¹ John Plamenatz draws out these four 'levels' and attempts to analyze the nature of their relationship to each other. His simple conclusion is that 'yield' would be a better term than 'determine' to describe the relationship of production to consciousness. See Plamenatz, Man and Society, Vol. II (London: Longman's, Green and Company Ltd., 1963) pp. 272-4.

Marx himself provides this rhetorical question regarding the causation:

Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness changes with every change in the condition of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?³²

Further, a distinction can be made here between the real base of a society and what is apparently a superstructure arising out of this base. The real base is the existing mode of production, including relations of production; or, more simply, the production of the material necessities of life and the arrangements that make it possible. The superstructure is the composite of legal, political, and religious arrangements in society, related but not directly implicated in production. Societal institutions like government, churches, and schools, all part of this superstructure, are the breeding grounds of a social consciousness that sustains the mode of production. The relationship between base and superstructure, including forms of thought are thus dialectically, not linearly related. Consciousness is both historical and social. Because

³²K. Marx, Communist Manifesto (trans. by Samuel Moore) (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954) pp. 51-2. For a deliberate analysis of this problem see "Karl Marx's Concept of Ideology" in R. Cox (ed.) Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Ltd., 1969) Chapter II, pp. 38-64, and J. Shklar (ed.) Political Theory and Ideology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966) especially Chapter V "The Conservative Utopia and Marxism: The Lost Sociology". The Marxist, Karl Mannheim discusses 'class consciousness' and generally the sociology of ideas in his book, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1936)

"consciousness can never be more than conscious existence . . . " it must be seen as dependent in a dialectical way on actual historical circumstances, i.e. the social relations that man labours through at any one period in history.

True consciousness is related directly to social being the real material relations of people involved in production. False consciousness, on the other hand, describes the forms of thought arising out of the superstructure which may remain in existence long after the material relations which brought it into existence have changed. Social analysts then, are wise to examine objectively the social relations in which people are organized rather than attempting to ask the people themselves, as what these people express could very likely be false consciousness.

6. The Dialectics of Social Relations:

It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.³³

Dialectical thought often appears tautological. For, if "social being" means, in Marxist thought, the purposive action through which man shapes nature, this 'action' implies at the outset, a consciousness.

The important understanding is that man's productivity is determined by the social relations that he himself has produced, and continually recreates. These social relations correspond to a certain mode of production of life. However, man is constantly producing new forces of production that facilitate his expression

³³K. Marx, The German Ideology, op. cit., p.13.

of life that the existing social relations have become inadequate to. Recreation thus becomes destruction; emerging social relations, corresponding to the new level of production, come into conflict with the old, and man's essence for productivity is manifested in revolution.

There is a constant movement of growth of the productive forces, of destruction of social relations, of formation of ideas; nothing is immutable, but the abstract movement mors mortalis.³⁴

7. Class Conflict:

In Marxist theory, social change is not a smoothly flowing process of creation and transcendence of social relations. In the history of civil society, the conflict between existing and emerging relations takes the form of class struggle between the class with vested interest in the old relations and that which embodies the new. Class conflict as the dynamism of social change has always been the feature of civil society. That is, man's universal and social essence has always been contradicted by the fact that every individual in society has been a member of a class, separated from other classes by a division in social production.

³⁴ From K. Marx, Poverty of Philosophy in D. Caute, Essential Writings of Karl Marx (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967) p. 97.

Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests, and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class.³⁵

The class achieves an existence that subsumes under it the existence of all of its members. All the constituent properties that define an individual become those that define other members of his class.

Class distinctions are real only insofar as they correspond to differences in people's relationship to the means of production.

Corresponding to real differences in the mode of production, determined by a class's relation to production, distinct class consciousness should arise. However, in all hitherto existing societies,

The ideas of the ruling class are . . . the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is, at the same time, its ruling intellectual force, . . . The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations grasped as ideas.³⁶

If this is so, class consciousness has almost always been supplanted by false consciousness. The ruling class, through its control of the means of production of ideology has always been able to generate ideas and ways of thinking that explain away its privileged status on society. The disadvantaged classes also indulge in these ideas

³⁵ H.J. Koren, Marx and Authentic Man (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967) p. 83.

³⁶ K. Marx, German Ideology op. cit., p. 39.

(collective self-deception) and accept their relation to production as legitimate within the framework of those ideas. Class consciousness, on the other hand would be the basis of class struggle.

II. ERICH FROMM:

A. Social Character:

Like Marx, Fromm derives a view of man from a historical study. Unlike Marx, however, he claims to use social psychoanalysis aimed at understanding not individuals but whole societies that have emerged in history, resulting therefore, not in individual, but "social characters". An analysis of Fromm's definition of social character would reveal that his study probably has much the same ends as historical materialism. He defines social character as:

The essential nucleus of the character structure of members of a group which has developed as a result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group.³⁷

The "man" of Fromm's study is this abstraction, a composite of the dominant character traits common to members of a society. Man develops as a result of his historical struggle to adapt himself to the terms of his existence, the objective natural and social conditions that define the possibility for activity. Human nature for Fromm has very little to do with popular psychological formulations. It means a culturally-defined kind of relationship of the individual towards his world, his society, and to himself. Because man creates culture, he creates human nature.

Besides referring to a "general man", Fromm's abstraction explains why a society of people almost unanimously desires to do

³⁷ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1941) p. 305.

those things which they have to. The growing child, and his society, in the process of adapting to objective forces of compulsion, canalizes his desires and energy, in effect internalizing external compulsion. Social character serves to "mold and channel human energy within a given society for the purpose of the continued functioning of that society.³⁸

It is Fromm's view that the above constitutes one explanation of the manner in which the economic substructure of Marx's theory gives rise to a superstructure. Social character is an intermediary.³⁹ As members of a society are socialized to become functional in terms of the dominant economic activity of a society, they acquire a consciousness that contains a desire to act in certain ways; hence the expression of a culture by a people. Social character is the form human energy takes when it becomes molded as a productive force for that society.

³⁸ E. Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1955) p. 77. See also his explanation of this process in "Individual and Social Origins of Neuroses," American Sociological Review, Vol. LX, No. 24, 1944.

³⁹ See E. Fromm, "The Application of Humanist Psychoanalysis to Marx's Theory" in E. Fromm (ed.), Socialist Humanism (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1965) pp. 228-244. Also, see J.A.C. Brown Freud and the Post Freudians (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1961) p. 155.

Once a society has succeeded in molding the character structure of the average person in such a way that he likes to do that which he has to do, he is satisfied with the conditions that society imposes upon him.⁴⁰

It is questionable whether Fromm's contention that the peculiarity of an economic system is the primary factor in formation of social character is very much of an addition to Marx's model of substructure and superstructure.

B. Psychoanalysis and the Emergence of Man:

After psychoanalyzing the social characters that have appeared in different periods of history, Fromm comes to general conclusions about the direction that man's emergence has taken. In his earlier books, primarily Escape From Freedom, written in 1941, he concludes that history, like the growth of an individual child, is man's progression from a natural state of harmony with his environment, to a state of disharmony, and then to a new harmony (or subservience) with his world. The process is dialectical. Casting aside one form of harmony with his world places man in a position of uncertainty and loneliness. The weight of loneliness causes man to establish a new relationship with the world, thereby perpetuating a dialectical progression that can only be resolved when man acquires complete control over himself and nature.

What is essential in the existence of man is the fact that he has emerged from the animal kingdom, from instinctive adaptation, that he has transcended nature -- although he never leaves it; he is part of it -- and yet once torn away from nature, he

⁴⁰E. Fromm, Socialist Humanism, op. cit., p. 223.

cannot return to it . . . Man can only go forward by developing his reason, by finding a new harmony, a human one, instead of the pre-human harmony which is irretrievably lost.⁴¹

Besides analyzing the characters of specific historical societies, and illustrating man's dialectical emergence in that way, Fromm uses two illuminating analogies to man's social emergence.

(a) The Biblical Analogy -- Man's historical emergence is compared to the story told in the Book of Genesis of man's eviction from the Garden of Eden. Man's eviction was cruel in that he was forever turned out of the comfort and security, the absolutely idyllic existence that life in the Garden afforded, into an environment where he would have to make his own decisions and produce his material life under unfriendly, harsh conditions. The value of drawing this analogy comes in the realization that the Fall, though cruel, was at the same time fortunate. It was the necessary precondition to man's becoming or realizing his humanity. (Defined later in the chapter). The fault of Fromm's analogy is essentially the assumption that man must relate to his world as a harsh, unfriendly, and external environment, and in the alienation of the world's "goodness" in an irretrievable Garden. Such a view leaves only the possibility for mastery or subjugation of his world by man, and the impending ecological world disaster is a testimony to this orientation.

⁴¹ E. Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1956) p. 6.

(b) The Birth Analogy -- Phylogenically, man's emergence is relived in the birth of every human child. At birth, the child is evicted from the absolute warmth and security of the womb and must, from that moment on, progressively cease to be a part of his mother. We say that the child has attained maturity when he has exchanged all his primary or childhood ties for the bonds of a new relationship to his mother. The chief value of this analogy is that it points to the meaning of maturity for man. Man's emergence from the natural and pre-human state will be realized when he has given up all natural ties to his environment and taken on altogether new, human relationships.

During the historical period of man's emergence, before his human readaptation to the world, man struggles with the conditions of human existence. Fromm sums up these conditions.

Man is born a freak of nature, being within nature and still transcending it. He has to find principles of action and decision-making which replace the principles of instinct.⁴²

Fromm psychoanalyzes this freak of nature in much the same way as a psychiatrist would psychoanalyze a young man who is having trouble finding himself in the world.

(1) Primary and Secondary ties:

Historically, man has as yet advanced no further than to lose some of the primary ties which are characterized by an animal's

⁴²E. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope Toward a Humanized Technology (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1968) p. 63.

relationship to his world. In man's case, primary ties were those "that connect the child with the mother, the member of the primitive community with his clan and nature, or the medieval man with church and state."⁴³ For example, man in the middle ages enjoyed a distinct, unchangeable, and unquestionable place in the social world from the moment of birth, man was rooted in a structuralized whole, and thus life had a meaning which left no place, and no need, for doubt.⁴³

Man's new-found mastery over nature had freed him from it, but he could still find security in the control exerted over him by the medieval church and the guilds.

Once lost, primary ties cannot be regained; in the Biblical analogy, 'cherubim with flaming swords' bar the way.⁴⁴ To discard these ties is to gain freedom, of course, for they block man's growth by standing "in the way of the development of his reason and critical capacities."⁴⁵ But, insofar as he is unable to utilize his freedom

⁴³ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 40. It is, of course, questionable whether man was more "secure" then than he is now, or whether he has since that time developed even stronger ties that bind him to his social structure and lend security. Fromm's writings contain "evidence" that the former is the case; that modern man is very insecure.

⁴⁴ E. Fromm, Art of Loving, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴⁵ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 51.

in developing a new orientation to the world, man is "overwhelmed by anxiety, doubt, and a feeling of helplessness".⁴⁶ It is understandable, then, why history is replete with examples of man's attempts to return to his primary relationship with the world, creating secondary ties in substitution for the primary ones. It has appeared as

the tendency to give up the independence of one's own individual self and to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside of oneself in order to acquire the strength which the individual self is lacking.⁴⁷

Man, at different times, has rushed headlong into such inventions as state, bureaucracy, Fate or God, for the peculiar security they have offered.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 178.

⁴⁷ E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 30. The difference between primary and secondary ties is that the latter are resorted to after a period of independence whereas the former were gained as a birthright. Furthermore, the latter do not, according to Fromm's argument, offer the security they appear to promise.

⁴⁸ This is the theme of Escape From Freedom which appears also under the title, The Fear of Freedom, a study of the psychology of authoritarianism. For a further study see Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1941).

The effect is always the same, he finds a 'neurotic' security, and his progress towards humanity is suspended.⁴⁹

(2) Awareness:

Metaphorically, the sin that resulted in man's eviction from the Garden of Eden, was his development of awareness or self-consciousness. It put an end to his life in the animal state. Instinctually-determined organisms evolve in a smooth process, there being nothing to impede their evolution and produce conflict in their development towards a realization of their potential. Because man became aware, he has attempted an active part, has interfered in what would have been a smooth process, with the effect of alternately retarding or accelerating his evolution.

Human existence is different in this respect from that of all other natural organisms; it is in a state of constant and unavoidable disequilibrium. Man's life cannot 'be lived' by repeating the pattern of his species; he must live.⁵⁰

Man begins to free himself at the moment that he begins to submit the world to his questioning, when he first decides to change the

⁴⁹This is the theme of much of "left-wing Freudianism". For further analysis see Paul A. Robinson, The Freudian Left: Wilhelm Reich, Geza Roheim, Herbert Marcuse (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969) and Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization. The Classic in this field is S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (ed. and trans. by J. Strachey) (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1961)

⁵⁰E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 30

order of his life to make it correspond with a desired order. It was the scientific questioning of a seemingly absolute nature which has led to man's present technological mastery over it. He will realize his human potential, however, when he acts in such a way as to submit his whole world to his expectations.

Man's awareness has had negative aspects; despair, boredom, and a sense of aloneness.

Self-awareness, reason and imagination disrupts the "harmony" which characterizes animal existence.

. . . Being aware of himself, he realizes his powerlessness and the limitations of his existence.

. . . Man is the only animal that can be bored, that can be discontented, that can feel evicted from paradise.⁵¹

(3) Human Needs:

When discussing need-satisfaction, man's reasons for readaptation to his environment, Fromm distinguishes between survival and trans-survival needs. Survival needs are those related to physical existence

Inasmuch as man has a body and bodily needs essentially the same as those of the animal, he has a built-in striving for physical survival, even though the methods he uses do not have the instinctive, reflex-like character which are more developed in the animal.⁵²

Trans-survival needs result from man's consciousness and transcend the demands of survival. They come from man's desire to express himself in other than routine, animal activities.

⁵¹ E. Fromm, Man For Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1947) pp. 48-9.

⁵² E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 70

Man's drives, inasmuch as they are trans-utilitarian, are an expression of a fundamental and specifically human need; the need to be related to man and nature and to confirm himself in this relatedness.⁵³

Therefore, superimposed upon man's need to sustain his physical existence is the qualification that the relationship to nature which the satisfaction of physical needs entails be a meaningful, and satisfying, i.e. a human one.

C. A Human Relationship To The World

(1) Creativity and Freedom

Fromm devotes much more of his explanation to clarifying what a human relationship of the world is not, than what it is. To summarize his negative analysis, the human relationship is composed of neither primary or secondary ties; the first pre-condition to the establishment of a human relationship is man's acceptance of a creative role. The acquisition of freedom from the guidance and dominance of primary ties, is accompanied by the injunction that man be his own creator, that he make the decisions as to the essential terms of his existence.

This freedom also forces upon man the responsibility for deciding on the future of his species. For at the same time as he chooses the terms of his own existence, man is determining the conditions of future development; he is creating history. In this aspect of his theory, Fromm would most closely resemble some

⁵³ Ibid., p. 72.

existentialists, if he were not deliberately analyzing societal reactions to freedom.⁵⁴ However, when Fromm speaks of man creating himself, he does not imply that man understood before the act of creation what it was that he was trying to become. Rather, it has been the case that as man indulged in specific acts of creation, his actions formed a composite or principle of action and produced a certain type of man.

Man's historical response to the obligations of creation has been to deny responsibility for his actions and their products. Fromm's comment here resembles Marx's. As long as man does not recognize his creative role in history, he will flounder in a

⁵⁴ For a comparison to one existentialist analysis of this problem see Jean Paul Sartre, "Existentialism and Humanism" (an excerpt) in M. White, The Age of Analysis (New York: The New American Library, 1955). Particularly:

man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world -- and defines himself afterwards. Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. (p. 124)

and:

when a man commits himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind -- in such a moment men cannot escape from a sense of complete and profound responsibility. (p. 126)

For a discussion of the meeting-ground of Marxism and Sartrian existentialism, read W. Desan, The Marxian of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965).

turbulent, pre-human state; his only hope for a harmonious reorientation to his world lies in his decision to take historical development in hand. The development of man being planned, social action would become more than a patching up of serious breaches. Humanistic planning, based on a solid body of knowledge about man, "universally accepted conditions",⁵⁵ would result in what men approve of being realized in their existence.

(2) Productivity:

Society, and 'man', grow because the social character developed by any one set of historical conditions itself becomes a productive force, interacting and changing the terms of existence. That is, a social character is not only a product of history; man endowed with a certain social character acts on (produces) the natural and social terms of existence, changing as he does, the very basis of his character.

This is the essence of what Fromm terms "productivity", the historically-demonstrated capacity of man to change the terms of his existence and thus recreate new forms of man. However, he conjoins this historical definition with one that refers to a potential humanity rather less empirically attainable.

⁵⁵F. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 101. For an analysis of these "conditions" see Chapter V, "Steps to the Humanization of Technological Society," pp. 97-146.

Productiveness is man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him. If we say he must use his powers, we imply that he must be free and not dependent on someone who controls his powers.⁵⁶

Productivity is the resolution of the disequilibrium and disharmony which typifies the human condition. Man neither suffers from the insecurity of freedom nor chooses submission when he is actively producing the terms of his existence. However, to be effective, man's action must be an integrated one, combining intellectual and practical activity. Echoing Marx's Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach, Fromm, says of man:

Since he is an entity endowed with a body as well as a mind, he has to react to the dichotomy of his existence not only in thinking, but also in the process of living, in his feelings and actions. He has to strive for the experience of unity and oneness in all spheres of his being in order to find a new equilibrium.⁵⁷

Productive activity is creative, active, spontaneous, and conscious. Fromm offers an illustration of productive thought.

In the realm of thought, this productive orientation is expressed in the proper grasp of the world by reason . . . under the condition of retaining one's sense of integrity and independence.⁵⁸

And contrasts it with passive thought:

⁵⁶ E. Fromm, Man For Himself, op. cit., p. 91.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 55.

⁵⁸ E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 37.

In productive thinking, the subject is not indifferent to his object, but is affected by and concerned with it. The object is not experienced as something dead and divorced from oneself, . . . on the contrary, the subject is intensely interested in the object, and the more intimate this relation is, the more fruitful is his thinking.⁵⁹

Further resembling Marxian theory, Fromm explains that when productive man relates to his environment, acting on it with his faculties, he not only humanizes it, but in the process affirms his own humanity, Such activity is spontaneous, stemming from man himself. As such:

it affirms the individuality of the self and at the same time it unites the self with man and nature.⁶⁰

It is the type of activity which is necessary to a sense of an identity. Man achieves an identity as he becomes aware that he is the organizing center of his activity:

Identity is the experience which permits a person to say legitimately "I" as an organizing active center of the structure of all my actual potential activities.⁶¹

The epitome of a productive and spontaneous relationship is that of an artist or craftsman to his work. The ideal is that all of man's material and social world should be likewise humanized making it possible for all aspects of his existence to be human.

⁵⁹ E. Fromm, Man For Himself, op. cit., p. 109.

⁶⁰ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 287.

⁶¹ E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 86.

(3) Productive Human Relationships:

Observation of the manner in which people relate to their world is the only way in which we can arrive at the concept of human nature. Social relationships, the manner in which humans relate to each other is, according to Fromm, a good indication of how far they have progressed towards a productive relationship to their world.

A major theme of Fromm's writings is concerning with love, the productive relationship between humans. Love is felt not only for the object, the beloved person, but for oneself, that person, and ultimately for the whole world. Love exists, as a 'tendency to love', a faculty which only needs an object towards which to express itself. Then, the beloved person is only the objectification of love needed to affirm this faculty, and insofar as the beloved responds with love, he becomes for the initiator, a part of himself.

In the Art of Loving, a whole book devoted to precisely this topic, Fromm writes:

Love is not primarily a relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one "object" of love.⁶²

Fromm is very explicit in his refusal to recognize any other form of relationships between individuals as human. They are all perversions, and he discusses the different forms they take at length, some of which will be mentioned in Chapter III of this paper.

⁶² E. Fromm, Art of Loving, op. cit., p. 38.

III. PAUL GOODMAN:

A. Human Nature:

Much of the difficulty encountered in defining Goodman's view of man may be attributed to his tempestuous nature which reveals itself in a large part of his writings, making them forceful but unstructured. Very much of what one has to base an analysis of Goodman's view of man are outbursts such as the following:

I am estranged from human beings, their tiny little faces on their bodies like planaria, the flatworm; or I see them as bundles of tubes. Reading in Hume's history, I am disgusted at their petty violence, idiotic, ruinous, repeating . . . What do I want? The natural human disgusts me, the artificial human is pointless . . .⁶³

As well, difficulty in analysis is due to Goodman's making little apparent attempt to arrive at a meaningful characterization of man, be it historical, sociological, or absolutist. His concern is specifically with the people who compose today's North American society. Therefore, rather than concerning himself with any broad definitions of human nature, Goodman deals specifically with the people in American schools, jobs, hierarchies, and the like.

Goodman does refer, albeit negatively, to some broader or more absolute idea of man in his polemics against American society when he uses such terms as "anti-human" or "out of human proportions". However, instead of clarifying his criticism by defining words like "man", "human", et cetera, he denies outright any necessity of providing such a key to social criticism, stating that:

⁶³P. Goodman, Five Years: Thoughts During a Useless Time (New York: Random House, 1969) p. 38.

We do not need to be able to say what 'human nature' is in order to be able to say that some training is against 'human nature' and you persist in it at peril.⁶⁴

The content of human nature or man only reveals itself when it is interfered with in specific cases. And, the process of training children could very easily be one such case.⁶⁵

Even though he denies having to define it, Goodman makes it clear that he believes, along with other "experts who deal with people in small groups" that there is a human nature, and that all those who would 'tamper' with people's lives should, therefore, pay attention to it if they wish to be successful. Further, he believes that this human nature should be allowed to assert itself in a natural way and describes this aspect of human nature in a negative way, by noting the penalty that is paid if the natural process of growth is hindered.

A loss of force, grace, and feeling seems to be evidence that somehow the acquired cultural habits do not draw on impeded outgoing energy, they are against the grain, they do not fill the child's needs or appetites; therefore, that they have been ill-adapted and not assimilated.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956) p. 6.

⁶⁵ Rousseau's theory of education appears to be based on such a view. A child's natural development can be best facilitated by not allowing any obstructions, except 'natural' ones, to interfere.

⁶⁶ P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 6.

Goodman illustrates, but does not make clear what terms such as 'grace', 'force', 'feeling' mean; nor does he indicate why the reader cannot take them to mean almost anything at all. The point he does make is that results which are commonly recognized as undesirable are produced when human nature is tampered with. Qualities such as stupidity, laziness, belligerence and intemperance may all be seen in this light as typical and predictable reactions to obstructed human development. Goodman's account of man then, is a moral and aesthetic one that comes from an analysis of all of the qualities he feels man ought to portray, in contrast mostly to those he does portray in North American society.

Noticeable in his description of members of North American society is Goodman's lack of concern for the usual individual-society dichotomy that American social critics have paid so much lip-service to. Human nature in North America is so thoroughly enmeshed in existing social relations and conventions that to describe one is to include the other. Therefore at the base of Goodman's criticism is the bit of common knowledge; that the growth of the human being is very largely dependent on the society into which he is born.

Growing up as a human being, a 'human nature' assimilates a culture, just as other animals grow up in strength and habits in the environments that are for them and that complete their natures.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ P. Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Random House, Inc., 1951) p. III.

Growing up in North America is largely socialization, adapting to the demands of the cultural environment. In fact, growing up "is becoming a cultural entity". Men are inherently social, share action and sentiment and affect one another. It is not the individual, but the cultural man that Goodman describes in his writings. If this method of describing man is accepted, then it only remains to observe members of a certain culture to ascertain what cultural characteristics they exhibit, as these would be the description of man. If, upon observation, it becomes obvious that many people in a society exhibit a differing group of cultural characteristics, it is only necessary to say that they belong to a different culture, and are, therefore, a different type of man. Different cultures found within the context of American Society may be the cultures of Poverty, Youth, or Affluence, all exhibiting corresponding characteristics.⁶⁸

In much the same way as he ignores the society-individual dichotomy, Goodman does not feel it necessary to split our conception of man up into components before discussing him. Man is a unity, and as such, we talk of a man, not a part of him, growing, being affected, or acting. Goodman illustrates with this analogy:

The dog's foot is the dog. If it's stepped on, the dog yips and tries, including her foot, to get out from under. It is by a figure of speech that we say the dog lifts her

⁶⁸ For an example of sociological study that has proceeded from this understanding see Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in which he looks at the poor of the United States as a separate culture.

foot. Yet, if her foot is amputated, she . . . immediately adjusts and compensates and is in the world running on three feet.⁶⁹

B. Man and Culture:

In order to arrive at Goodman's view of man, we must analyze "culture", a term that for Goodman refers to much the same phenomenon as Fromm's "social character". Culture refers to, among other things, the physical setting that people have produced out of nature. The North American city, for instance, is

short on farm work, swimming holes, and animals to trap; but it has docks, freight-car yards, labyrinth basements, pavements to chalk up, and subway trains to play tag on. The streets are littered with the remarkable junk of a thousand trades.⁷⁰

Culture also refers to the universe of discourse or a climate of communication that a people have developed and sustained, the phenomenon which Goodman is concerned with when he says:

Let us now consider the interaction of school and the general culture as a climate of communication, and ask: What happens to the language and thought of young Americans as they grow up towards and through adolescence?⁷¹

⁶⁹P. Goodman, Five Years, op. cit., p. 186.

⁷⁰P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 74.

⁷¹P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, and The Community of Scholars (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962) p. 64.

In Goodman's theory, it is important to understand that the physical aspects of a society and its universe of discourse is what people grow into and acquire as a part of themselves, for if it is not what we decide is "human", then the people acquiring it do not become human. Dependent on the two sides of culture, is the possibility for activity which a society affords its children. In the first instance a society grants opportunity for the activity so necessary to growth insofar as it provides objects for the children to be active towards.

Growth, like any ongoing function, requires adequate objects in the environment to meet the needs and capacities of the growing child, boy, youth, and young man.⁷²

Here Goodman may be seen to be echoing the Marxist idea; that our environment provides, or denies, us an affirmation of our humanity, as if human nature is an essence which proper setting can realize. Such an assumption is what makes sense of his overall criticism of American culture, that it composed of a physical setting which is "out of human proportion",⁷³ and a universe of discourse, which "fails to make any sense".⁷⁴

⁷²P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 12.

⁷³Ibid., p. 73.

⁷⁴P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, op. cit., p. 67.

Besides being a consequence of the existence of objects in the environment through which it can be affirmed, human nature obviously depends for its development on the capacity of a society to allow activity towards these objects in a natural, personal way.

Goodman has this recommendation:

We must provide the child a 'structured permissiveness' to grow in: permissiveness so that he can act without fear, shame and resentment, and learn by his mistakes; and a structure of firm parental morals and culture -- "how we behave", not "how you must behave" -- with which he can identify when in his anxiety and confusion, he needs security and guidance.⁷⁵

One important facet of humanity which will have a change to develop through natural activity in a rich and sensible culture is a sense of identity. Identity is developed when the person experiences himself as the organizing center of his universe, doing things for reasons found within himself. In line with this, the school can facilitate the development of the child's confidence in the authenticity of his identity by assuring him

that he can, that he is adequate to the nature of things, can proceed on his own initiative, and ultimately strike out on an unknown path where there is no program and assign his own tasks to himself.⁷⁶

⁷⁵ P. Goodman, Utopian Essays, op. cit., p. 51.

⁷⁶ P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, op. cit., p. 86.

The brainwashed person is one who has no consciousness of himself as an entity with authentic feelings and experiences at all. In lieu of a feeling of self-sufficiency, this person must gain what confidence he can by clinging desperately to what he has been taught. Goodman adds this cryptic statement:

Of course, in all societies and periods of history children are subject to brainwashing, for they are weak, ignorant, economically dependent, and subject to bullying.⁷⁷

C. Schooling and the World of Work:

The pre-occupation in Goodman's writings with the schools and jobs of American society is predictable, as they are the major areas of activity in this society. Other activities, notably those connected with leisure time, are shown by Goodman to be closely connected with these serious activities. People are as they express their lives, and since most of their life-activity in North America is in school or 'on the job', it is true to say that they are just as human as these institutions allow them to be. Jobs, according to Goodman, are human insofar as they correspond to his definition of vocation.

Vocation is the way that a man recognizes himself as belonging, or appoints himself, in the community of life and work. . . . A good community has, for the most part, positions and callings that facilitate a man's activity and background.⁷⁸

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁸ P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 142.

Likewise, schools must be judged on the basis of whether or not they allow the child to develop by providing the objects and the freedom for growth.⁷⁹

One standard against which we can judge the humanity of these two major institutions is whether or not they allow spontaneity in their members. Spontaneous action is that which arises in a particular situation and requires a spur-of-the-moment decision. It is in essence, creative. If an institution becomes too tightly integrated, if it legislates for the whole of individuals, then

it is failing to provide for just that margin of formlessness, real risk, novelty, spontaneity, that makes growth possible.⁸⁰

Besides the criteria of creativity, an activity can be judged as spontaneous if it is self-justifying. A mother's work is spontaneous, for instance, because she needs no extrinsic reason for pursuing it; raising children is an activity she pursues for its own sake.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Goodman repeatedly expresses his approval for progressive education in Compulsory Mis-education, particularly in Chapter V.

⁸⁰ P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 129.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 13.

Such activity is "useful and necessary, requiring human energy and capacity", and for these reasons, it "can be done with honour and dignity".⁸² Further, the element of freedom is present in spontaneous activity. When an activity is pursued for its own sake, when a person does not have to subdue his real interests in order to fulfill a task, he can be said to be acting freely. Also,

Personal freedom goes with unquestioned moral utility of the job, for at the level of simple physical effort or personal service, the fraudulent conformity of the organized system sometimes does not yet operate; the job speaks for itself.⁸³

As well as the above standards, any human activity may be judged on the ends which it is meant to achieve. After analyzing the activity prescribed by the school system, for instance, it should be clear whether or not its end is the welfare of its members. According to Goodman, humanity, not economy, efficiency, or the like must be the ends of any institution if it is to be called human. Many technocrats, in their organizational planning, have completely forgotten this moral criterion, according to Paul Goodman.

The moral question is not whether men are 'good enough' for a type of social organization, but whether the type of organization is useful to develop the potentialities

⁸² Ibid., p. 26.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 68.

of intelligence, grace, and freedom in men.⁸⁴

Of the existing schools of educational practice, the one which Goodman regards most favourably is Progressive education, and, more specifically the educational methodology expounded by John Dewey.⁸⁵ Progressive education, according to him, is one of the many unfinished revolutions in the United States.

These thinkers wanted to train, teach -- perhaps accustom is the better word -- the new generation to the actualities of industrial and technical life, working practically with the machinery, learning by doing. People could then be at home in the modern world, and possibly become free.⁸⁶

Corresponding to Goodman's view of man, progressive education has recognized two important assumptions; that a person's growth is dependent upon the social environment with which he is provided, and that a person can only grow through activity that he chooses for himself.

D. People in Control

Closely following from the above is the understanding that not only must any organization in society have the good of its individual members as its end, but also that people must realize that they are in control and conduct themselves accordingly. Human

⁸⁴ P. Goodman, People or Personnel and Like a Conquered Province (New York: Random House, Inc., 1968) p. 19.

⁸⁵ P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, op. cit., Chapter V.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 42.

inventions, be they physical inventions or group processes, must never overshadow man's individual or group life.⁸⁷ It is not human to be powerless, and one gains in humanity as his power over his own life increases. This was the supposed justification for technological advance. For example,

the promise of technological advance was the simplification of relations with the environment and the enrichment of the quality of life; but instead it has given us complication of the environment and the confusion of life.⁸⁸

It is not only an anomaly, but a direct contradiction, that man should lose control of the technology he has created to serve him.

It has also happened that American people have, to a large extent, lost control of the complex social and political processes they have created. The relationship between individuals and their society must at all times be that which exists between creator and creation. That is, society must have no existence besides that which people have wanted it to have. Goodman claims that to the founders of American society,

"citizen" meant society-maker, not one "participating in" or "adjusted to" society. It is clear that they regarded themselves and their friends as citizens existentially, so to speak; to make society was their breath of life. But obviously such conceptions are worlds removed from, and diametrically opposed to our present political reality, where the ground rules and often the score are pre-determined.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ P. Goodman, Utopian Essays, op. cit., p. III.

⁸⁸ P. Goodman, "Objective Values," in David Cooper (ed.) The Dialectics of Liberation (Middlesex, Eng: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968) p. 118.

⁸⁹ P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, op. cit., p. 19.

Humanity, for Paul Goodman, carries with it the political responsibility of creating and governing society. "To be political, to govern, is an ordinary human act".⁹⁰ To claim to be politically naive, or to want to be politically inactive, is to be, therefore, inhuman, and this is a status to which the majority of the American people, according to Goodman, are all too willing to subscribe.

⁹⁰P. Goodman, People or Personnel, op. cit., p. 34.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONCEPT OF ALIENATION

A. Introduction:

This chapter will attempt to explore the problem of alienation in modern capitalist society with reference to the concept of man or "human-ness" explained in Chapter II. Instead of treating the three main authors separately, this chapter will emphasize the Marxian approach to alienation. In line with Marx's analysis of civil society, the discussion of alienation will center around:

- (1) a study of the manifestations of alienation in social reality, both at the level of social production and at the level of its superstructural institutionalizations.
- (2) a study of ideological reflections of alienation both in real life and, in modern forms of inquiry, i.e., the many "measuring rods" by which the academics in the various disciplines study man.

Specifically, to keep the discussion attuned to the Marxian concept, as distinct from the many other concepts referred to by the same term¹, alienation will be discussed in terms of the reified relations of production that have grown up under capitalism and their effects on human productive activity.²

¹For an overview of the many different uses to which the term has been put, see Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation", in the American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 6, pp. 355-361.

²Daniel Bell points out the need for this approach to the Marxian concept surprisingly well in "The Rediscovery of Alienation" in the American Sociological Review, Vol. LVI, No. 24, pp. 933-952.

Aside from references to the theories of Fromm and Goodman, very little reference will be made to other critics who have employed the term in a manner similar to Marx. Fromm and Goodman themselves will only be employed where they offer some relevant insight into modern technological society that extend or illustrate considerations raised by Marx. Finally, no attempt will be made in this chapter to isolate the school from the rest of capitalism's institutions.

The general plan of this chapter will be to present first a general treatment of alienation, then a brief description of capitalism, and, finally, discuss the various aspects of alienation under capitalism.

B. Alienation As A General Abstraction

Marx's definition of alienation as a general abstraction can only be understood in the light of the cautions he has provided concerning the place of abstractions in historical materialism. As pointed out earlier, they can only provide a summing-up:

In themselves, and detached from real history, these abstractions have not the least value. They only serve to facilitate the arrangement of historical material and to indicate the sequence of its separate layers.³

Marx's theory of alienation recognizes a distinction between historical existence and essence. Generally, as man produces himself in history, he becomes progressively more alienated from his essence. He not only realizes himself through his creations, but loses himself

³K. Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology (ed. by R. Pascal) (New York: International Publishers, Co., Inc., 1947) p. 15.

in them as well. He creates social relations, politics and the state only to become overwhelmed by them; the history he has created increasingly determines the life of its creator with Man becoming the object, history the subject.

Man's essence has been defined by the ensemble of social relations through which he produces his life at any point in history. But not only does man produce through the relations of any period; in order to realize his essence he must engage in the practical recreation of those relations themselves. "Praxis", the practical-theoretical activity by which these relations are overcome, is thus the creation of historical man himself.⁴

In fact, man's essence is most clearly defined in terms of those periods of history when recreation of social relations becomes most necessary, when revolutionary activity is necessitated by conflict between the level of development of productive forces and the objective social relations which would restrict them.

At a certain stage in their development, the productive forces of a society come into conflict with the existing relations of production (social relations) . . . From the form of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into

⁴"Praxis" as indicating the characteristic mode of species-activity can be taken as the essential definition of human nature. For further interpretation see G. Petrovlc, Marx in the Mid-twentieth Century (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967) pp. 90-115 and A.G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 1963)

their fetters.⁵

During these periods of history when social relations become obviously inadequate to contain the productive forces fostered under them we can say that man's essence is being contradicted by the conditions of his actual life, i.e., if man's essence is for productivity, alienation can be generally defined as the negation of productivity by historical circumstances.

Alienation as the negative aspect of the dialectical historical process clearly has the positive feature of characterizing history as a forward-moving process. It indicates that man has developed, and is forced to resolve this development with social reality thereby producing a higher form of social existence, which itself must eventually succumb. If this dialectical process is resolvable, it can only be under conditions where social relations are completely subordinated to production, i.e., where man is never restricted by any social existence. Marx has defined communism as the movement towards such a resolution.⁶ The alienation that Marx ascribed to capitalism could then be seen in the very positive historical perspective. The unprecedented rate of development of productive forces in this historical form, while necessitating the

⁵K. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy," from L. Fever (ed.) Marx & Engels: Basic Writings (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959) pp. 43-4.

⁶T.B. Bottomore (ed.) Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963) p. 155.

extremes of alienation, have created the economic and technical infrastructure that makes possible a society in which every person can develop freely.

C. Alienation: A Description of Capitalism

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven.

It was the intent of Marx to strip the study of man of all metaphysical or supernatural speculation in order to see him as he really is, the subject and object of his natural, social activity. Thus a Marxist analysis should not deal with alienation in general, but rather in terms of the specific historical conditions under which man has been, and is now, producing. An account of alienation under capitalism is a practical, scientific description of the historical form at a specific stage of its development with an analysis of the manner in which it negates man's productivity.

I. The Production of the Historical Form

Marx's description of capitalism is of an economic system that is logically based on a certain set of premises, e.g. definition of classes, mode of exchange, role of money, etc.⁸ As a model or a paradigm, it is never fully realized in any one society as each would most probably contain several different forms in different stages of

⁷ K. Marx, German Ideology, op. cit., p. 13.

⁸ For an article that explores the logical rigour of the Marxian system see D. McLellan, "Marx's View of Unalienated Society," Review of Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 9, pp. 459-65.

development. Recognizing the above, it is still possible to examine the capitalism which emerged in England (and the West) in the Seventeenth Century as the dominant socio-economic form, its social relations, and the implications of these, without presuming them to be universally true for all parts of society.

Capitalism emerged in what was tantamount to a revolution of bourgeois productive forces against the social and political arrangements of feudalism (about the fifteenth century in England). The control which the feudal lords, the guilds, and of course, the Church exerted over the lives of people began to deteriorate in proportion to the rise of the Industrial form of production under the control of the new capitalists whose wealth stemmed from the arable land which, freed (expropriated) from the feudal arrangements, could be turned into sheep walks and owned as private property.⁹ With the land, the labour was freed; but the emancipation of propertyless men from feudalistic restriction was far from pleasant. Their lot was to be "suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence and hurled as free and unattached proletarians on the labour market."¹⁰ Fromm provides this summary description of the destruction of a way of life which occurred,

⁹K. Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954) p. 719. For a history of "bourgeois revolutions", see J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution,

¹⁰Ibid., p. 716.

The individual was no longer bound by a fixed social system, based on tradition and with a comparatively small margin for personal advancement . . . He was allowed and expected to succeed in personal economic gains as far as his diligence, intelligence, courage, thrift, or luck would lead him. His was the chance of success, his was the risk to lose and be one of those killed or wounded in the fierce economic battle in which one fought against everyone else.¹¹

2. The Two Essential Classes

With the transformation of the land into private property and the rise of industrial forms of production, a new social order was born which unlike the previous class society, tended towards a polarization of society into two essential classes depending on the objective relationship of people to the new means of production.

The modern bourgeois society that has sprouted from the ruins of feudal society, has not done away with class antagonisms. It has but established new classes, new conditions of oppression; new forms of

¹¹ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1941) p. 126. For a further discussion of Fromm's point, see R.H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1926) especially Chapter IV, Part III, "The Triumph of Economic Virtues," pp. 189-210. For a discussion of the persistence of capitalist structure today, see A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963) and A. A. Berle, Jr. The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1954)

struggle in place of the old ones.¹²

Under the feudal system, the means of production were not owned, but administered by divine right. This myth was destroyed by the takeover of these means as private property. At that time, the "divine miracle" of the lord or prince, became transformed into the title deed or last will and testament of the capitalist, and he alone, not God, would henceforth determine the use to which the means of production including those who laboured, would be put.

Marx defines class as "a group of people who are conscious of the fact that their economic conditions separate their interests from those of the other groups, and put them in opposition to each other".¹³ If this definition is accepted, bourgeois society has simplified the class antagonisms which existed in previous eras. For relative to the capitalist mode of production an essential opposition of interests occurs between two groups only, those with private property and those without, those with the economic wherewithal to employ labour, and those whose only bargaining power is that labour. All other classes would be subsumed under these two.

¹² K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto (1848) (trans. by S. Moore) (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965) p. 15.

¹³ H.J. Koren, Marx and Authentic Man (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967) p. 83.

Society as a whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeois and Proletariat.¹⁴

3. The Role of Money (Capital) :

The transformation of the means of production into private property was paralleled by the transformation of money or currency into capital, the motive force or reason for production. If previous to capitalism, money (m) facilitated exchange between commodities (c) in the manner $c-m-c$, its use was completely inverted under capitalism where its primary use is to buy (or produce) commodities with the purpose of transforming them into more money (m'). Investment,

" $m-c-m'$ " [buying in order to sell dearer] is the general formula of capital as it appears *prima facie* within the sphere of circulation.¹⁵

Industrial production, as Marx defined it, is given a new end, in the final analysis not the production of objects corresponding to human needs (ostensibly commodities), but the production of more money, or capital. Commodities become the medium whereby money is exchanged for more money. And, the process is facilitated when

¹⁴ Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 15. In Volume III of Capital, Marx includes landowners as the 'third great class'. See T.B. Bottomore, (trans.) Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956) p. 178.

¹⁵ K. Marx: Das Kapital: A Critique of Political Economy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967) p. 126. (condensed by S.L. Levitsky)

everything involved in production of capital, including the labour-power expended, becomes itself a commodity.¹⁶

4. Exchange-value under Capitalism

It follows from the capitalist's legal ownership over the labour he has bargained and paid for, that the products of this labour (the commodities) should be owned by him as private property. For the purposes of the capitalist, it is incidental that these products have use-value, that they have potential for satisfying concrete human wants. As a capitalist, he is only concerned that they can be exchanged for a profit, and therefore their only real value is their exchange-value; they are only commodities.

The exchange value of a commodity, its capacity to command profit or "surplus-value", is decided on the exchange market, ultimately the world market, where that commodity appears as the potential equivalent of everything else.

As exchange-value, one kind of use-value, is worth as much as another kind, if taken in the right proportion. The exchange-value of a palace can be expressed in a certain number of boxes of shoe blacking.¹⁷

¹⁶This was the meaning of the "Fetishism of Commodities," that all products of human endeavour, and people themselves would bear the trademarks of commodities. Works of art, extraordinary human powers, athletics, scholarship, and even scenic bits of nature have all become equitable in terms of money.

¹⁷H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1941) p. 296.

The evaluation that a commodity, the product of labour, receives on the market is therefore only a quantitative one, only indirectly related to its qualities.

5. Labour as a Commodity

If labour fits into this scheme, is bought and sold on the exchange market, it can only be as a quantitative, i.e. exchangeable entity itself; abstract general labour-power stripped of all its qualitative distinctions. It is only perfectly exchangeable if it has lost all of its individual and personal qualities and has become abstract and universe, expressible in quantums of labour-time. But the exact monetary (or exchange) value of this labour-time can only be established after the commodities produced are placed on the market. The market adjudges how much was "socially necessary labour-time"; whether the production was necessary in the first place can only be decided after it has taken place. What determines how "socially necessary" production was is the law of supply and demand, "a relation which hovers over the Earth like the Fate of the Ancients, and with invisible hand allot[s] fortune and misfortune to men. . ."¹⁸ Thus labour becomes a commodity, and subject, like everything else, to the dictates of man's largest objective relation, the world market.

¹⁸K. Marx, German Ideology, op. cit., p. 25. The executives of multinational corporations with the help of economists and social scientists are perhaps eroding the power of the 'invisible hand' with depth-advertising, systems management, monopoly control, etc. For an analysis of their power read Baran & Sweezy, Monopoly Capitalism, op. cit., and Robert Heilbroner, "Multinational Corporation and the Nation State" in The New York Review of Books, Vol. XVI, No. 2, pp. 20-25.

It is understandable how money comes to assume supreme importance under capitalism, for besides being used as capital, it can be used to express the immediate value (exchange-value) of any commodity. Because it can only fulfill this function once everything is expressible in its terms, the effect of money is to reduce every entity to its own abstraction and to reduce "itself in its own development to a quantitative entity."¹⁹ When the abstraction is complete, all production of life, becomes the production of commodities exchangeable for money.

Money, since it has the property of purchasing everything, of appropriating objects to itself, is therefore the object par excellence. The universal character of this property corresponds to the omnipotence of money, which is regarded as an omnipotent being . . . money is the pander between need and object, between human life and the means of subsistence.²⁰

D. Alienation Under Capitalism

Having analyzed some of the essential features of the capitalist historical form, it is now possible to explore the meaning of alienation, and, the many forms it takes, in such a society. It has been shown how, under capitalism, social production has capital (or bourgeois wealth) as an end, the manifold products of labour

¹⁹ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 168.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 189-90. Fromm discusses this phenomenon at length under the term "abstractification". See Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1955) pp. 104-6. Ideas, actions, products, certificates, etc. all become abstractions of reality, money value.

become commodities, human labour becomes abstracted to share the exchangeable features of all commodities, and money, in the process, comes to assume universal importance. It is now necessary to explain exactly how the social relations implied by the above description fetter the productivity of modern man, how capitalistic existence alienates man from his essence. The categories or subdivisions which are employed toward this end, are not those of the author, but are rather taken from Marx's Paris manuscript, "Alienated Labour".²¹

Because Marx's attack was specifically directly against the dominant economic system of his day, nineteenth century manufacturing capitalism, it would seem that much of what he said about the alienation of man under that system would be rendered at least partially obsolete by such subsequent changes as the transformation from family to corporate capitalism or from manufacturing to automation.²² However, it will be shown that the fundamentals of capitalist production, and the social relations, still remain. The managerial revolution, for example, merely resulted in the control of the means of production changing hands, and, if anything, merely heightens the alienation as those in control are now separated from productive activity, an evolution which was bound to occur with the centralizing of control in a few hands.²³

²¹ Ibid., pp. 120-134.

²² Beside the studies mentioned above (see footnote 11) see G.W. Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1967)

Automation, though promising to free men from drudgery, has only served the ends of production of capital, and has only further alienated the labourer from his labour. Thanks to the advances known as cybernation, labourers are now being relieved of the need to engage in productive activity altogether, or, being reduced to a most specialized and routine activity in an intensified division of labour and are subject to a greater degree of manipulation by those in control.²⁴ The social relations remain; alienation has only been intensified by innovations in productive technique.

Finally, Marx's description of the alienation of labour would seem incomplete for all of society as he refers continually to the alienation of the industrial worker from his activity. However, he intends that his observations of this class be universalized:

All human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production, and all types of servitude are only modifications or consequences of this relation.²⁵

²⁴ Many good studies have been done on the manner in which cybernation is transforming society. Read Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964); and Frederich J. Crosson and K.M. Sayre (ed.), Philosophy and Cybernetics (New York: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

²⁵ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., pp. 132-3. For a further study of this phenomenon see Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory and Industry (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). This quote also refers to the factory-workers labour being mediated by wages, the symbol of labour's self-alienation under capitalism. What is referred to is the historical stage in the development of labour, in which the degradation of the worker is only one phenomenon. Alienated industrial activity is one alienated form of mans mediation with [alienated] nature.

It is the alienation of the proletarian from his labour which is so obvious and inescapable. Even though they had the most reason to tremble at the prospects of its dissolution, the capitalists were not themselves the subject of Marx's attack on capitalism. Alienation is being caused by an economic system that alienates people from their production and makes them victims rather than subjects of historical circumstances.

I. The Objectification of Labour

Labour is the central reference point in Marx's definition of man. Productive labour is life, the process of producing nature in the form of objects whereby man asserts his existence in the world. Under capitalist relations, labour is alienated, because man's productivity is negated when the labourer is separated from the product of his labour. Instead of affirming his humanity

the object produced by labour now stands opposed to it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labour is labour which has been embodied in an object and turned into a physical thing; this product is an objectification of labour.²⁶

Commodity production negates man's humanity. (a) Due to his relation to the means of production the worker is forced to sell his labour to the capitalist in return for his physical subsistence. The labour is no longer his, neither are the products which are (legally) expropriated by the capitalist. Instead of producing the affirmation of his humanity, humanized nature, the worker produces objects alien to him. Neither can the capitalist achieve humanity through these objects as they have one use for him, the production of capital.

²⁶T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 122.

(b) The proletarian not only produces alien objects, but in the act of production produces wealth which negates his class existence.

Proletariat and wealth are antimonies.

Private property, as private property and wealth is forced to maintain itself and consequently to maintain its opposite, the proletariat
The proletariat, on the contrary, is forced as proletariat, to work for its own abolition, and thus for the abolition of the condition which makes it a proletariat -- private property.²⁷

Private property, or bourgeois wealth, is the pole of the dialectical relationship which depends on the labour of the proletariat. The proletariat is alienated, then, insofar as through their labour they produce their own negation, private property.

This material, directly perceptible private property is the material and sensuous expression of alienated human life.²⁸

(c) Under capitalism labour produces directly the emiseration of the labourer. It follows from the fact of human labour as saleable commodity that a worker's livelihood and well-being depend on exchange-value his labour can command. But exchange value itself only expresses the relationship between commodities. Therefore, by producing commodities, the worker as commodity is adding to the hostile world of objects against which he must wage the war of value.

²⁷ Karl Marx, The Holy Family (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956) p. 51. Wealth here refers not to social or community wealth, but to the "surplus-value" produced by labour and expropriated by the capitalist, i.e., "bourgeois wealth."

²⁸ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit.,

Man "becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more goods he creates".²⁹

This Law of Increasing Misery needs explanation.³⁰ It can be understood as the strictly economic fact of the reduction of labour's aggregate real income, and in the non-economic sense as decreasing job security, mental degradation, lack of fulfillment, etc.³¹ Very simply, with the continued expropriation of the surplus value produced by labour for profit, the workers must eventually be left with less than is needed to purchase those very commodities they have produced, thus a truth that emerges with the maturation of the system, that workers impoverishment is in direct proportion to the wealth that is produced.³² This inherent contradiction not only leads to the misery of the worker, but barring such stop-gap measures as imperialism, to the eventual demise of the capitalist system.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 121. As one example, a university professor's value as a commodity decreases with every graduate student that he coaxes to professorial status (all things being equal).

³⁰ The "Law of Increasing Misery" is mentioned in Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955) p. xix and also in "The Wages of Labour" in Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit.

³¹ These interpretations are found in Vincent Massaro, Divergent Views on Marx's Increasing Misery Doctrine, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 1963.

³² T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 120.

Goodman raises an interesting possibility that can be resorted to, that capitalists assume complete control and keep workers alive at the subsistence level for political, not financial reasons. Using devices such as a guaranteed annual income, they would thereby replace worker's exploitation with their complete exclusion from production.³³ (d) Alien objectifications must not only be understood as the material commodities which industry produces. When objectification of labour (*Entausserange*) becomes a mode of labour, society abounds with the 'alien entities' which alienated labour produces. Technological innovations like computers and jumbo jets, technological processes like large bureaucracies, and even works of art like paintings and theatre, become examples of alien creations which man must serve.

The all-encompassing and most significant objectification of labour which man serves is capital to which all commodity-labour is subordinated. Fromm explains:

Capital, the deadpast, employs labour . . . the living vitality and power of the present. In the capitalist hierarchy of values, capital stands

³³P. Goodman, People or Personnel and Like a Conquered Province (New York: Random House, 1968) p. 265. The emiseration of labour is one of the central contradictions in capitalist production. Marcuse makes a notable contribution to Marx's analysis when he explains 'pacification of existence', the organization of technological society in such a way that contradictions do not develop to the point of conflict. See H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 16.

higher than labour, amassed things higher than the manifestation of life.³⁴

(e) Because the reason for labour is found in the satisfaction of needs, it would seem that all reason would be absent when labour only produces alien objects. However, money provides the key to this system of production; as an abstraction of everything else it becomes the "only real need" created under capitalism, a "universal mediator" or pander between the labourer's needs and the objects. The connexion between the production of alien objects and the needs of the labourer is the system of money; as the labourer who works for money is really labouring for the potential satisfaction of his needs.³⁵

(f) Instead of affirming his existence in alien objects, man only confuses and negates himself in them. This externalization of oneself in products of labour is the essence of the objective existence which Marx accuses Hegel of postulating.³⁶ A fitting analogy to the alienated existence is the religious practice of idolatry. Man through his labour produces an idol and then proceeds to experience himself through it.

³⁴ Capital can take the form of money, certificates, prestige, etc. See E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 90.

³⁵ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 121. As well, see "money", pp. 189-194.

³⁶ Shlomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1968) Chapter I. Alienation is obviously not synonymous with externalization, per se, but, to man's objectification in a form not adequate to human needs.

The more of himself man attributes to God, the less he has left to himself. The worker puts his life into the object, and his life then belongs no longer to himself but to the object. . . . The greater this product is, therefore, the more he is diminished.³⁷

Feuerbach, whose transformative critical method Marx borrowed, explained worship as the activity by which one becomes the object of a supreme being. After man has dehumanized himself by attributing his human qualities; love, creativity, etc. to an alien being, after he has discriminated against himself in favour of the god he has created, he has no alternative but to worship. The crime of Christianity is that it attributes control of all things, man's own control and responsibility, to God, leaving man with nothing but the right to serve God in a passive role.³⁸

The truth about religious idolatry is laid bare by philosophical analysis; philosophy was born in a radical critique of theology, in the very real task of "plucking the flowers from the chains".

The immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history is to unmask human self-alienation in its secular form now that it has been unmasked in its sacred form.³⁹

³⁷ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 122.

³⁸ H. Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, op. cit., p. 267.

³⁹ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 44. Theology is seen in this sense as referring to both religious dogma and to secular "wisdom", of the sort that binds men to their particular "lot" in life. "Philosophy" means critical, Marxian analysis. (See Chapter II, Part I)

Feuerbach had transformed Hegel's idea of the Subjective Idea by making it natural. Marx completed the inversion by making nature "human".⁴⁰ That is, philosophy had to complete its task by applying the critical technique employed by Feuerbach against religion to a criticism of earthly things, as after all, religion is only "the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of the soulless condition".

the criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into the criticism of politics!⁴¹

Paul Goodman saw idolatry as a social psychological phenomenon, the total submission of the American to the social system he has created. A widespread psychology of introjection exists, which causes people who are defeated or oppressed by some facet of their social system to seek strength by identifying with what has defeated them, and, in fact, to defend it with every rationalization.⁴²

⁴⁰ S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, op. cit.

⁴¹ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 44. See also Vittorio Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of Modern Messianic Cults (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963)

⁴² P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars (New York: Random House 1962) p. 76. Goodman's concept of "introjection" is at the basis of Marcuse's "One-Dimensional Society" in which . . . ". . . the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. . . the subject which is alienated becomes swallowed up by its alienated existence. There is only one dimension and it is everywhere and in all forms". H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. cit., p. 11.

Erich Fromm's concept of idolatry is also a psychological explanation of man's submission to elements of the social system he has created. Idolatry is a secondary tie, and as such is resorted to by man who is still incapable of accepting the freedom and responsibility of the human condition. He externalizes and objectifies his humanity with the result that

His life forces have flown into a "thing" and this thing having become an idol is not experienced as a result of his own productive effort but as something apart from himself, over and against him which he worships and to which he submits.⁴³

Idolatry is then willful dehumanization. The essence of man is to produce and be the conscious master of his existence, but he chooses the idolatrous character, passivity and slavery and thus alienates his existence from his essence. Having impoverished himself in the creation of idols, gods, politicians, institutions, and cars, modern man engages in appropriate submissive behaviour, worship, in an attempt to gain back that which he has given up.

2. Man Is Alienated From the Activity of His Labour

Capitalist production not only separates the labourer from the fruits of his labour, but from the activity of labour itself.

The product is, indeed, only the resume of the activity of production. Consequently, if the product of labour is alienation, production itself must be active alienation. . . . The alienation of the object of labour merely summarizes the alienation in the work activity itself.⁴⁴

⁴³ E. Fromm, Sane Society, op. cit., p. 112.

⁴⁴ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 124.

Alienated labour is the active negation of the labourer's humanity.

In the labour process, the worker does not fulfill himself by recreating nature, but "denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being," and at the conclusion of activity, finds himself "physically exhausted and mentally debased".⁴⁵

As capitalism matures, the truth emerges; that capitalist production is based on the separation of the worker from his life activity. The alienation of modern man is complete, because he has undergone the extreme of proletarianization, the need to exchange his life-activity, his labour power because of a clear relationship to the means of production . The very act of selling labour as abstract general labour-power negates its productivity. Thus, the only reason for which the alienated labourer should agree to engage in a labour-process which means nothing to him can be found in the system of wages, the quest for money. Goodman provides this illustration:

Gone are the days of keeping the jalopies in good shape, the artist-work of a proud mechanic . . . the whole thing is a sell. It is not surprising if he quickly becomes cynical and time-serving, interested in a fast buck.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 125.

⁴⁶ P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (New York: Random House, Inc.) p. 20. Alienation from the act of labour is consequent upon the inability of abstract labour to produce need satisfaction except by selling the product of labour.

It is incredible that people can be successfully alienated from their life-activity to the point of denying that it belongs to them. For that makes it possible to see in capitalist society a population of Eichmann's, all successfully assured that they are not themselves the real doers of their activities.

First-rate scientists are today working apparently indifferently, on fantastically harmful projects that ordinary mortals would shy away from; and with no sign of extraordinary moral suffering, skilled mathematicians estimate that 50 million sudden American corpses would not set back the "economy" more than ten years.⁴⁷

Alienated activity is essential to, caused by and causing, the large modern-day bureaucratic institutions into which so much of the economic activity of modern society is organized. The alienation of the bureaucrat, the manager of the institution follows from the nature of business and government bureaucracies. He is a specialist

⁴⁷ P. Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Random House, Inc., 1951) p. 42. The jurors at Nuremberg after the Second World War established the precedent that 'doing one's job' when it involved a crime against humanity was indictable. For a fictional account of American military-industrial production see Leonard Lewin, Report From Iron Mountain On the Possibility and Desirability of Peace (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967). The objective of 'Iron Mountain' Conference was to

determine accurately and realistically the nature of the problems that would confront the United States if and when a condition of 'permanent peace' should arrive . . ." (p. viii)

in the administration of things and people; "he relates himself to the world as a mere object of his activity".⁴⁸ Fromm points out,

It is true that he manages the whole and not a part, but he too is alienated from his product as something concrete and useful. His aim is to employ profitably the capital invested by others . . .⁴⁹

With the progressive centralization of capital increasingly human labour is organized into large corporations, whose end, if they are to serve a function in capitalist society, ultimately the production of capital. But, as objective entities, these corporations also have other ends, self-perpetuation and maximal efficiency and output.⁵⁰ Human productivity is effectively stemmed when labour serves the ends of a corporation. Labourers become personnel, a class of commodity that Goodman defines as,

the body of persons employed in public service as the army and navy, as opposed to the material . . . the persons are part of its means along with the material means.⁵¹

⁴⁸ H. Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx (trans. by N. Guterman) (New York: Random House Inc., 1969) p. 147.

⁴⁹ E. Fromm, Sane Society, op. cit., p. 115. For an analysis of the manner in which large organizations pervade all aspects of social life in the United States, see A. Etzioni, Modern Organizations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964) and M. Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964)

⁵⁰ E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., pp. 33-4.

⁵¹ P. Goodman, People or Personnel, op. cit., p. 126. For further interesting reading on this topic see N. Weiner, The Human Use of Human Beings (New York: Avon Books, 1950, 1954).

He adds the illustration,

In the New York Public School System, teachers are personnel, are examined, hired, and fired by the associate superintendent for personnel.⁵²

The implementation of the division of labour in the manufacturing stage of capitalism was a major innovation in the freeing of labour for purposes of increased production. According to Marx, this mode of production was employed at the outset to facilitate the manufacturing of handicrafts by uniting formerly independent crafts, and independent members of the same craft into one unit of production.⁵³ Profits are enhanced through the greater efficiency possible through division of labour, when human labour employed in production is made as much like an appendage of a machine as possible.

Within the capitalist system all methods for raising social productiveness of labour are brought about at the expense of the individual labourer, all means for the development of production transforms themselves into means of domination over and the exploitation of the producers; they mutilate the labourers into fragments of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm in his work, and turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power.⁵⁴

⁵² Ibid., p. 127.

⁵³ I. Zeittin, Marxism: A Re-Examination (Princeton: D. Von Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967) p. 49.

⁵⁴ K. Marx, The Capital, Volume I, op. cit., p. 708.

Besides contributing to division in society, the specialization of labour precludes any possibility of individuality or creativity on the part of the labourer; each worker is made to feel like an "automatic specialized implement of that operation".⁵⁵ Machine-like processes in production as a "force of production" holds the promise of greater control over nature. The contradiction is that with the fulfillment of this promise man is enslaved to the process as in modern technological society. All work tends to be governed by the goal of maximum efficiency and technique. Consider Fromm's description of the scientific contribution of the efficiency expert to the productive activity of the industrial worker.

The person becomes an economic atom that dances to the tune of atomistic management. Your place is just here, you will sit in this fashion, your arms will move X inches in a course of Y radius and the time of movement will be .000 minutes. Work is becoming more repetitive and thoughtless as the planners and micromotionists further strip the worker of his right to think and move freely.⁵⁶

The high degree of organization in American society is the theme of many of Paul Goodman's polemics. It presents the aspects of an apparently closed room.

At present, the organization of American society is an interlocking system of semi-monopolies notoriously venal, an electorate notoriously unenlightened misled by mass media notoriously

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 339.

⁵⁶ E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 115. See also C.R. Walker and A.G. Walker, (ed.) Technology, Industry and Man: The Age of Acceleration (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1968).

phony, and a baroque state waging cold war against another baroque State.⁵⁷

When technological organization becomes the end, not only is human labour alienated, but apparent absurdities become commonplace. For his example, Goodman points to the inversion in procedures of big business where "they have the organization and the technology, and then they try to dream up a use for it".⁵⁸

It is now a rule that books are written to keep the presses running, and the more radio channels we tap, the more drivel will be invented to broadcast.⁵⁹

After a certain point, advances in organization do not result in greater efficiency, but in what is by any standards, and certainly in human terms, inefficiency. In highly complex organizations, "it becomes extraordinarily difficult, and sometimes impossible to do a simple thing directly, even though the doing is common sense and would meet with approval."⁶⁰

⁵⁷ P. Goodman, The Community of Scholars (New York: Random House 1962) p. 7.

⁵⁸ P. Goodman, Like A Conquered Province, op. cit., p. 260. For a discussion of similar inversions which occur in the large school system, see P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, op. cit., Chapter 1.

⁵⁹ P. Goodman, Utopian Essays, op. cit., p. 33.

⁶⁰ P. Goodman, People or Personnel, op. cit., p. 88. For extensive, and at times humorous studies that illustrate the truth of Goodman's statement see L. Peter & R. Hall, The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go Wrong (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969), C.N. Parkinson, Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration (New York: Ballantine Books, 1964), R. Townsend, Up The Organization (New York: Alfred H. Knopf, Inc., 1970). For a study that probes the chaotic nature of the whole American system of production, read M. Harrington, The Accidental Century (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966).

Fromm sums up much of what has been said on the irrationality of Modern Bureaucracies this way:

The rationality of the system of production in its technical aspects is accompanied by the rationality . . . in its social aspects. Economic crises, unemployment, war, govern man's fate. Man has built his world; he has built factories and houses, he produces cars and clothes, he grows grain and fruit. But he has become estranged from the product of his own hands, . . . this man-made world has become his master, before whom he bows down, whom he tries to placate or manipulate as best he can. The work of his own hands has become his God.⁶¹

3. Man Is Alienated From His Species

Under capitalism, the alienated labourer is forced to produce his life in such a way as to negate his essence as species-being.

Since alienated labour (1) alienates nature from man; and (2) alienates man from himself, from his own active function, his life activity, so it alienates him from the species. It makes species life into a means of individual life. In the first place, it alienates species life and individual life, and secondly, it turns the latter, as an abstraction into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and alienated form.⁶²

(a) Man's universality, that characteristic of human labour whereby each man exists for all men, is negated first by the possessive individualistic premise of capitalism,⁶³ and secondly, by its class divisions. The worker engages in labour only as a means towards

⁶¹ E. Fromm, Sane Society, op. cit., p. 145.

⁶² T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 127.

⁶³ For a discussion of this premise which has pervaded the writings of political economists and forms the basis of marketing society, see C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

physical subsistence, necessarily an individual end, and experiences the bulk of the products of his labour going to serve the individual ends of the capitalist for whom he works. In light of both considerations, production of "social goods" seems to become an alien ideological end, with no reference to the dominant social practice. Class division further negates universality. Here Marx is indeed as his critics accuse, guilty of seeing man as an economic pawn,⁶⁴ whose existence is subsumed under that of his class, in conflict with the economic interests of other classes. Class division and antagonism which has been a feature of all civil society, is aggravated by the maturing of capitalism which places people more and more into two hostile camps.

(b) The overriding characteristic of the species, productive, natural activity, is contradicted by the alienation of man from the activity and produce of his labour. Labour is life; the practice whereby a worker sells his labour does not just make that labour, but the worker himself into a commodity to be bought, sold, used, etc. This provides another consequence of the division of labour in social production. When doctoring, teaching, or farming become commodities, a doctor, teacher, or farmer, and as such is expected to fulfill that function, negating the possibility of many-sided development. The reason for existence of the commodity man is found in the production of capital.

⁶⁴ See K. Popper, The Open Society, Vol. II, op. cit., Chapter 13, for an account of Marx's 'determinism'.

Production does not only produce man as a commodity, the human commodity, men in the form of a commodity, in conformity with this situation, it produces him as a mentally and physically dehumanized being . . . Its product is the self-acting and self-conscious commodity.⁶⁵

(c) The self-acting, self-conscious commodity-man has one main reason for engaging in activity, it is to become as valuable, i.e., command as much money relative to other commodities, as possible. To embrace fully his function as commodity-man, he must measure his life, not in how much he has lived, but in how much money-value he has accumulated.

The less you eat, drink, buy books, go to the theatre or to balls, or to the public house, and the less you think, love, theorize, sing, paint, fence, etc. the more you will be able to save, and the greater will become your treasure which neither moth nor rust will corrupt . . . your capital.⁶⁶

And Fromm adds:

The whole process of living is experienced analogously to the profitable investment of capital, my life, and my person being the capital which is invested.⁶⁷

Alienated labour, when it is engaged in for the above capitalist end, being only extrinsically motivated, is actually unpleasant in itself

⁶⁵ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 138.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 171. This statement, as it stands, has perhaps been rendered obsolete by modern crises of over-production and underconsumption that if anything, have made it particularly necessary that commodity-man consume as much as possible. The intent of the statement, however, is unchanged, its "hoarding" content has.

⁶⁷ E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 134.

and to be "shunned like the plague" whenever possible. The alienated labourer, cut off from the activity which would develop his humanity

feels himself acting freely only in his animal functions like eating, drinking, and begetting . . . whereas in his human functions he is nothing but an animal.⁶⁸

(d) Humanity has been defined by man's productive relationship to sensuous organic nature.⁶⁹ When labour becomes a commodity, and productivity negated, the whole nature of man's relationship to his nature is changed. Instead of producing his world, man consumes it, acquiring, possessing, and gaining power over it, firstly for reasons of personal, physical existence, but with the added reason of enhancing his value as a commodity. This ego-enhancement is what lends force to the obvious advantage which private property bestows on its owner and to gain property is to experience an increase in value. Marx comments,

Private property has made us so stupid and partial that an object is only ours when we have it, when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly eaten, drunk, work, inhabited, etc.; utilized in some way.⁷⁰

⁶⁸T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 125.

⁶⁹See Chapter II, p. 23-7.

⁷⁰T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 159. For a further discussion of this phenomenon, read R.H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (London: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1921 & 1961)

The need for ego-enhancement, while it would seem to lead to man's mastery over the objects he incorporates, really increases his objectivity or "suffering" by making him more than ever dependent on the world of things, and less on his own powers as a producing creature.

(e) Obviously, the ambitious entrepreneur can operate successfully in such a social context. Man is made into an even more avid consumer, and therefore more dependent on the world of things, with the acquisition of artificially-stimulated needs. It is not necessary to specify man's real needs in order to point out that many of the needs he acquires are due to the fact that in this social setting

every man speculates on creating a new need in another in order to force him to a new sacrifice, to place him in a new dependence and to entice him into a new kind of pleasure and thereby into economic ruin. Everyone tries to establish over others an alien power in order to find there the satisfaction of his own egoistic need.⁷¹

.

The entrepreneur accedes to the most depraved fancies of his neighbours, plays the role of pander between him and his needs, awakens unhealthy appetites in him, and watches for every weakness so that later on he may claim the remuneration for this labour of love.⁷²

In light of the above, it is possible to see how many of the vices which political economists have attributed to human nature arise instead out of the perversions of humanity under capitalism. Greed, miserliness, envy, and lust for power may merely be the description of people's motives once they are reduced to the level of commodity.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 168.

⁷² Ibid., p. 169.

Erich Fromm describes at length the phenomenon of commodity man, bundle of egoistic and artificially stimulated needs, and total consumer. Because of his inflated ego, modern man has completely exchanged an active, productive for a passive role in his world, and this is a change that is increasingly recognized and encouraged by commercial retail corporations who very simply classify man as consumer. The model for modern man is

Homo Consumens, the total consumer, whose only aim is to have more and use more . . . He is the eternal suckling with an open mouth, taking in without effort . . . without inner activeness.⁷³

The more that his life-activity is organized in a system which presupposes passivity on his part, the more is man susceptible to suggestion and creation of artificially-stimulated needs. The whole world of advertising serves this system of production well, capitalizing on the egoistical fancy of man and in turn strengthening it. Fromm explains:

Industry, in its need for increased production does not rely on the consumer's needs and wants, but to a considerable extent on advertising, which is the most important offensive against

⁷³ E. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope Toward a Humanized Technology (Toronto: Bantam Books of Canada, Ltd., 1968) pp. 39-40. See also Sane Society, op. cit., pp. 121-5.

the consumer's right to know what he wants.⁷⁴

Not just the extent, but the methods employed by modern day advertising are criticized by Fromm. The appeal to emotion, the hypnotic suggestion, the stimulation of daydream are all essentially irrational methods that have very little to do with the use-value of the merchandise.

They smother and kill the critical capacities of the customer like an opiate or outright hypnosis. They give him a certain satisfaction by their day-dreaming qualities . . . at the same time, they increase his feeling of helplessness and powerlessness.⁷⁵

The helplessness of the consumer is due to the fact that the satisfaction of his newly-found needs lie in the world of alien objects.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 38-9. These pages contain the information that 16.5 billion dollars was spent in 1966 on direct advertising (in newspapers, magazines, radio and T.V.). For a further description of the "offensive against the consumer", see Vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: Pocket Books, 1958) where a survey of persuasion methods employed by the multi-million dollar advertising industry is presented. This method of creating needs under capitalism is juxtaposed against man's historical practice of creating his own needs. However, both Fromm and Packard make need-creation appear as the task of the individual, which is in contrast to the conclusions of historical materialism.

⁷⁵ E. Fromm, The Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 149.

The classic device of modern day advertisers is the stimulation of the sex urge. Its exploitation by the entrepreneur is not to be puzzled at; as with all advertising, it is done to maximize sales and increase profit.

Existing lust is exploited and as far as possible there is created an artificial stimulation, with the justified confidence that the kind of partial satisfaction obtainable will involve buying something.⁷⁶

We have here, analyzable in real economic terms, an alternative to the Calvinist view of man as one naturally given over to sexual deviation, debauchery and excess.

The stimulation of needs through exploitive advertising methods does not just exist for large retail outlets, but is used extensively, and apparently with great success by the large political machines. Their sloganizing and avoidance of issues numbs the voter's critical capacities. The dear and rational appeal to his thinking is the exception rather than the rule.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 68. Vance Packard deals specifically with the methods by which sex is systematically exploited in "The Built-In Sexual Overtone" in The Hidden Persuaders, op. cit., pp. 71-82. See also, M. Moyer, Madison Avenue, U.S.A.: The Inside Story of American Advertising (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1958)

⁷⁷ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 155. See also H. Eulau The Behavioral Persuasion In Politics (New York: Random House, Inc., 1963), R.D. Casey and Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda and Promotional Activities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961)

Artificially stimulated, alienated man must struggle for satisfaction against an increasingly large world of alien objects. Towards this end money, the abstraction of all objects, becomes the object par excellence in the capitalist system. The role of human powers is subordinated to the role of money in obtaining whatever man desires. "Man becomes increasingly poor as man; he has increasing need of money in order to take possession of the hostile being."⁷⁸ In capitalist society, money becomes the "alienated power of humanity" when it takes the place of the faculties with which man affirms his humanity in the natural world. Since man's essence is precisely this capacity to relate to his world, money becomes the essence of the man who has become alienated under capitalism.

In capitalist society, then, the very rich man is also the all-powerful one, the one who can become, with the power of his money, anything he wishes. Thus Marx's description of money as, "the universal confusion and transposition of all things, the inverted world, the confusion and transposition of all natural and human qualities."

Let us assume man to be man, and his relation to the world to be a human one. Then love can only be exchanged for love, trust for trust, etc. . . .⁷⁹

Within the system of money, however, no appropriate human power or activity is necessary; the man "who can purchase bravery is brave

⁷⁸ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 168.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 193.

even though a coward",⁸⁰ and he who can purchase love is a lover, even though he hates mankind.

4. Alienated Identity

Both Fromm and Goodman, in considering the psychological effects of capitalism comment on the devastating effects that arise from man's estrangement from his species-life; man's loss of identity, that sense which man has of himself when he is the subject of his activity.⁸¹ Productive man has the capacity to evaluate his existence (his reality) according to his standards and expectations in order to recreate it according to his will. But the relationship of the self-acting, self-conscious commodity-man to capitalist society is the same as that of all commodities, to serve the production of capital, i.e., to identify with the causes of profitable production and maximal consumption.. When the purposes of commodity-man are those of the system, he can only judge the system by the criteria

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ E. Fromm, Sane Society, op. cit., pp. 62-3. In pursuing their discussions on identity, Fromm and Goodman clearly deviate from Marxian theory. However, their account is provided here in an effort to show just how a large field of socio-psychological criticism can be rendered more intelligible by the Marxist analysis of capitalist society.

which it itself has furnished.⁸²

Fromm reinterprets the above description of alienated identity in modern man:

His sense of self does not stem from his activity as a loving and thinking individual, but from his socio-economic activity . . . If you ask a man, "Who are you?", he answers, "I am a manufacturer . . . a clerk . . . a doctor . . . a married man" . . . and his answer has pretty much the same meaning as that of the speaking thing would have.⁸³

It is ironical that people should have criticized Marx of defining man as an economic pawn when it was precisely the basis of his protest that alienated man does see the cause for his activity (and ultimately his whole existence) in the capitalist process. When man expresses his identity as a complex commodity with many uses, i.e., roles, his actions are those of the economic pawn, totally "determined by the laws of the market and of the economic machine."⁸⁴

⁸²This is the central theme of the Marcusian nightmare One-Dimensional Man, op. cit. K. Leavitt, Silent Surrender (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), notes that the Canadian capitalist system provides the following criteria of 'rationality'

"Rational" was . . . defined as behavior directed towards the satisfaction of economic wants, postulated to be without limit and . . . rational behavior acquired normative connotations implying a social optimum. Hunger and gain were defined as economic motives and man was supposed to act on them in everyday life". pp. 20-21.

Finally see, E.G. Schachtel, "On Alienated Concepts of Identity", in Eric & Mary Josephson (ed.) Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962) pp. 73-85.

⁸³E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 129.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 85

In modern society, people find their identity in the economy, a specific corporation, an occupation or organization.⁸⁵

Fromm sees the above as the basis for an all-pervasive conformity, a secondary identity. In this case, cause and effect become inseparable, man finds his identity in conformity, because he is deprived of the activity necessary to develop authentic identity.

He explains:

the individual ceases to be himself, he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he, therefore, becomes exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be.⁸⁶

The conforming individual gains a security and feeling of power when "the discrepancy between the 'I' and the world disappears, and with it the conscious fear of aloneness and powerlessness. But, having no individual identity, the person can only continue to conform, and is, therefore, constantly subject to doubts, "since being essentially a reflex of other people's expectations of him, he has . . . lost all identity . . . and is compelled to seek his identity by continuous approval and recognition of others".⁸⁷ When conformity becomes all-pervasive, creativity and spontaneity are deemed queer, the domain of those artists, actors, scholars, and others who

⁸⁵ For further discussion of the organization identity read W. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man (New York: Doubleday & Co., Ltd., 1956); C.W. Mills, White Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), Chapters 2 and 3; J.R. Royce, The Encapsulated Man (Princeton; N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc. 1964).

⁸⁶ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., pp. 208-9.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 230.

have from time-to-time successfully placed themselves outside of the mainstream of capitalism. Goodman attributed wholesale loss of identity among Americans to the job situation. It is bound to occur in labourers whose only choice of work for the best part of their lives is a job which must mean nothing, e.g. making disposable pop bottles, composing nonsensical advertisement jingles. It is hard to preserve identity, for

if there is nothing worthwhile, it is hard to do anything at all. When one does nothing, one is threatened by the question, is one nothing.⁸⁸

However, most modern day Americans have lost their identity long before they come to take a job. In their formative childhood years, largely spent in the schools, they are subjected to a 'brain-washing' that should make them all willing producers and consumers. The components of this education appear to be (1) the presentation of a uniform world view, (2) the absence of any viable alternative, (3) confusion about the relevance of ones own experiences and feelings, and (4) a chronic anxiety, so that one clings to the world view as the only security.⁸⁹

5. Social Alienation . . . The Separation of Man From Man

That capitalism alienates men from his essence is especially well revealed in its devastation of social life. Man's existence under capitalism contradicts his essence because its social relations contradict sociality; pre-supposing complete individualism, and

⁸⁸P. Goodman, Growing Up Absurd, op. cit., p. 4.

⁸⁹P. Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, op. cit., p. 67.

penalizing, in capitalist penalties, any socialism.

A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labour, from his life activity and from his species-life is that man is alienated from other men. When man confronts himself, he also confronts other men. What is true of man's relationship to his work, to the product of work, and to himself, is also true of his relationship to other men, to their labour, and to the objects of their labour.⁹⁰

What occurs is not simply breakdown of relations between people, but the development of social relations (human relationships) that correspond to the basic economic activity. That is, man will relate to other men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds himself placed as a worker. When capitalism has converted labour (and the labourer) into a commodity, human interaction becomes the interaction of commodities. With human powers underdeveloped, the only features that commodity-man can distinguish in himself and others are those that add to value, commodities and valuable personal qualities.

More fundamentally when the sociality of production is completely negated, a Fetishism of Commodities arises. Though forced into close proximity with one another, workers produce for individual reasons only. They work independently, fulfilling social needs through the market where humans relate as properties of objects.

Since the producers do not come into contact with each other until they exchange their products, the specific social character of each producer's labour does not show itself except in the act of exchange. In other words, the labour of the individual asserts itself as a part of the labour of society, only by

⁹⁰ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 129.

means of the relations which the act of exchange establishes directly between the products and indirectly, through them, between the producers. To the latter, therefore, the relations connecting the labour of one individual with that of the rest appear, not as direct social relations between individuals at work, but as what they really are, material relations between persons, and social relations between things.⁹¹

In contradistinction to many political economists who base the "need to exchange" in human nature, Marx has his based in capitalist production. It is a social need, arising out of the division of labour among independent producers. Fromm adds that exchange has become more than a means to an economic end. It has become an end in itself, even in traditionally non-economic areas.

The drive for exchange operates in the realm of interpersonal relations. Love is often nothing but a favourable exchange between two people who get the most of what they can expect, considering their value on the personality market.⁹²

Above the market relations governing the exchange of all commodities, commodity-man adds consciousness; he acts deliberately to increase his personal value in the sphere of social relations at the expense of other commodity-men.

⁹¹ K. Marx, Das Kapital, op. cit., pp. 53-4. See also, F. Pappenheim, The Alienation of Modern Man: An Interpretation Based On Marx (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959).

⁹² E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 134. For further reading in the 'personality market', see Vance Packard, The Status Seekers (New York: Pocket Books, 1959 and 1964); and The Pyramid Climbers (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1962).

The paradigm capitalist relationship becomes one of mutual use or advantage, of which the best example is the friendship of the employee and employer. Fromm explains:

They both use each other for the pursuit of their economic interests; their relationship is one in which both are means to an end, both are instrumental to each other.⁹³

Marx further explains that when human relationship becomes primarily a matter of use, then mutual exploitation is the mark of friendship, and "universal exploitation of human communal life" the mark of community.⁹⁴ Relationships are sought specifically to "entice the essence of the other person, his money".⁹⁵ The model of the capitalist relationship which Marx provides is that of the entrepreneur approaching his neighbour saying:

Dear friend, I will give you what you need, but you know the condition sine qua non. You know what ink you must use in signing yourself over to me.⁹⁶

⁹³ E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 139.

⁹⁴ T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p. 169.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

Because money dominates the relation between things, it comes to dominate the relationship between humans when they are things. Thus it is a universal mediator, mediating between men and his needs, and men and his fellow men. Money becomes "for each man, the other man". This 'marketing orientation' pervades all of the relations of capitalist society, forming even the bases of such traditional human relationships as marriage. It is customary that man should use his wife, that her value should increase with the number of ways in which she can be useful to him (of course, the 'use' is reciprocal). Marx raged in the Communist Manifesto:

The bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrument of production . . . to be exploited in common, and naturally can come to no other conclusion than that the lot of being common to all will likewise fall to the women.⁹⁷

Arising out of the economic base of independent competitive producers, are social institutions premised on mutual use. Besides the examples of employee-employer and man-wife relationships, other obvious ones are the buyer-seller one dominating the business world and the professor-graduate student symbiosis of the university.

Fromm adds the following clarification to Marx's analysis of marketing relationships.

The basic concept of use has nothing to do with cruel or not cruel ways of human treatment. Out of the fundamental fact that one man serves another for purposes which are not his own . . . a man, a living human being, ceases to be an end in himself, and becomes the means for the economic

⁹⁷ K. Marx, Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 28.

interests of another man, or himself, or of an impersonal grant, the economic machine.⁹⁸

When "personal value" as a concept in modern capitalist society is analyzed, it is seen to mean more than a person's money, or other private property. For instance, with the advent of large bureaucracies after the managerial revolution, a person's value has come to mean largely his personality, or, less euphemistically, his ability to relate to and manipulate other people which is the mark of the bureaucrat.⁹⁹ The market then is largely a personality market, in which a person's success depends upon

how well he gets his personality across, how nice a 'package' he is; whether he is 'cheerful', 'sound', 'aggressive', 'reliable', 'ambitious'; furthermore what his family background is, what clubs he belongs to, and whether he knows the right people.¹⁰⁰

Finally, Goodman adds the dimension of power, placing it at the base of human relationships. In marketing society, the pattern of dominance and submission has been internalized by most people and fills up the whole of social experience.

If man is not continually proving his potency, his mastery of others, and of himself, he becomes prey to a panic of being defeated and victimized. Every vital function must therefore be used as a means of proving, or it is felt as a symptom of weakness. Simply to enjoy, produce, learn, give or take, love or be angry 'rather than cool' is to be vulnerable.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 88.

⁹⁹C.W. Mills, White Collar, op. cit., p. 63. "... fewer individuals manipulate things; more handle people and symbols."

¹⁰⁰E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 278.

¹⁰¹P. Goodman, People or Personnel, op. cit., p. 184.

6. Political Alienation -- The Result of Social Alienation

At the basis of the Marxist political analysis is the recognition that the state cannot be discussed without simultaneous reference to the social context, the individuals whose role it organizes and the social relations it attempts to legitimize.

The state and the structure of society are not from the standpoint of politics two different things. The state is the structure of society.¹⁰²

Thus, the nature of the capitalist state can be understood as a part of man's social alienation; its form is premised upon the atomistic model of man, the egoistic individual of civil society, man separated from his social environment. The state is the alienated form of cohesion, social unity, and collective purpose; or rather it is the attempt to mediate between the individual commodity-man and these.

Marx explains:

The basis of modern state is civil society, and the individual of civil society, that is, the independent individual whose only link with the other individuals is private interest and unconscious, natural necessity, the slave of wage labour, of the selfish needs of himself and others.¹⁰³

Fromm points up this separation of our private life as individuals from the realm of our social life as citizens. The myth is that the state is the objective embodiment of our social existence; that in

¹⁰² T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, op. cit., p. 216.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 218.

that sphere we can prove the sociality we lack in economic life.

What clearer example could there be of the separation between private and public existence than the fact that the same men who would not think of spending one hundred dollars to relieve the need of a stranger does not hesitate to risk his life to save the same stranger when in war they both happen to be soldiers in uniform?¹⁰⁴

When social life is thus bifurcated into "private" and "public" spheres, it is not hard to see that the conditions of material individual life would stand in a derivative relationship to the political life; in fact, how the former comes to penetrate every aspect of the latter. Political institutions, in Marxist theory, only mask the particularistic, egoistic interests of civil society behind social terms.

Dialectically, being thus created, the state determines that all subsequent forms of sociality under it will only be masks. Because the state is the forum in which the ruling class asserts its common interests,¹⁰⁵ and in which the relations of civil society are epitomized,

It follows that in the formation of all communal institutions, the state acts as intermediary,

¹⁰⁴ E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., pp. 127-8.

¹⁰⁵ Not implying a simple plurality of capitalists, but rather a 'forum' in which the narrow 'economic' interests of the most powerful economic interest-groups are 'asserted'. It is a myth that the 'democratic compromise', the 'political agreement' operates to produce policy most beneficial to the bourgeois class.

that these institutions receive a political form.¹⁰⁶

Marx provides the reason for this. The origin of the state is not in the real material base, but in its derivative, ideology. He explains:

It is not the state which holds together the atoms of civil society; it is the fact that these atoms are only atoms in idea; in the heaven of the imagination, and that in reality they are beings very different from atoms. They are not god-like egoists, but egoistic men. Only political superstition believes at the present time that civil life must be held together by the State, when in reality the state is upheld by civil life.¹⁰⁷

In The German Ideology, Marx traces the development of the relationships between the political realm and the socio-economic activity of civil society, but civil society is completely emancipated from political considerations. The economic activity of private life could be carried on without any hindrances that would result from considerations relative to the public good. All real political restrictions on property -- and the activity of individuals who are a predicate of their property -- are chimerical. Political life is only a mask that hides the real politics of civil society, i.e., property relations.

¹⁰⁶ K. Marx, The German Ideology, p. 60. For a study of the manner in which the political structure of the U.S.A. 'legitimizes' different aspects of American life see A.M. Scott (ed.), Politics, U.S.A.: Cases On The American Democratic Process (Third Edition) (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1969).

¹⁰⁷ K. Marx, The Holy Family, op. cit., p. 163.

The significance of private property is its essential, its true significance . . . The political state is a true mirror of the various aspects of the concrete state. In its ultimate heights, the state turns to be private property, . . . and citizenship into a quality of property holding.¹⁰⁸

One of the largest objective manifestations of the political illusion is the state bureaucracy, ostensibly dedicated to administering the well-being of society, really dedicated to its own coarse materialistic interest. Marx gives us one of the best descriptions ever of the modern bureaucrats.

The bureaucracy has in its possession the affairs of the state, the spiritual being of society; it belongs to it as private property. The general spirit of bureaucracy is the official secret, the mystery . . . Conducting the affairs of state in public, even political consciousness, thus appear to the bureaucracy as high treason against its mystery . . . The bureaucrat sees the world as a mere object to be managed by him.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., For further study see, "Democracy and the Plurality of Elites," in T.B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1964), pp. 112-128. As well, it is interesting to see the exact relationship operational in the 'social democracy' of nations, the United Nations; in which 'anarchy of power', and more exactly, the rule of the 'super powers' is reflected in all decision-making bodies. Read J.G. Stoessinger, The United Nations and the Super-Powers: United States-Soviet Interaction at the United Nations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965)

¹⁰⁹ S. Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, op. cit., p. 24. For further study of the manner in which bureaucracy is government, read W. W. Boyer, Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Government Agencies (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964). A Russian counterpart to the above study is Derek J.R. Scott, Russian Political Institutions (Third Edition) (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965); and a Canadian Study, F.E. Rourke (ed.), Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

Furthermore, to be added to the complexity of the mystery of the state, is the result of the transformation of the interest of the state, by the bureaucrats, into their own, private interest. For, it then takes the form, in the machinations of civil society, of just another private interest to be opposed to the other private interests.¹¹⁰

Paul Goodman is certain that the people of the United States have long ago dispelled the myth of democracy as the standard of political life. Instead, political practice is now based on the assumption that politics is essentially a matter of "getting into power", and from that point, "deciding", directing, controlling, coercing the activities of society.

The model seems to be taken from corporations with top-management, and there is something prestigious about being a decision maker. It is taken for granted that a man wants "power" . . . even though this is directly contrary to the political ideal that the office and its duties seek the man rather than the man the office. It is axiomatic that a party's primary purpose is to get into power, although that was not the original idea of "factions" . . . More dangerously still, it is taken for granted that a nation wants to be a Great Power, and maintain it so at any cost, even though it may be disadvantageous to its culture and most of its citizens.¹¹¹

The age-old art of getting into power (Thucydides wrote about it¹¹²) becomes a technique with the use of technological tools in the hands

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 31

¹¹¹ P. Goodman, People or Personnel, op. cit., pp. 178-9.

¹¹² Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (trans. by R. Crawley) (London: J.M. Dent, 1910). Mao's dictum:

political scientists and sociologists who sell their skills and energies to the powerful. They ignore the 'public problems' and undertake the analyses and simulation of power struggles. Their knowledge is then applied to the only real 'political' problem that Marxism recognizes, how to get into power.

"All political power comes out of the barrel of a gun" is an effective description of the nature of politics. For further reference, see H.D. Casswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society (New Haven: 1950) and Charles E. Merriam, Political Power (London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1967). For a discussion of the 'ideology of heroic-folkish realism' which Marcuse claims supports the modern authoritarianism state see "The Struggle Against Liberalism in the Totalitarian view of the State" in H. Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 3-42.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SUPERCESSION OF ALIENATION

For Marx was above all else a revolutionist. His real mission in life was to contribute in one way or another to the overthrow of capitalist society, and of the state institutions which it had brought into being, to contribute to the liberation of the modern proletariat, which he was first to make conscious of its own position and its needs, conscious of the conditions of its emancipation. (Speech delivered by Engels at Highgate Cemetery, March 17, 1883)¹

Unlike many who call themselves Marxists, Karl Marx was not a utopia-builder. He was first and foremost a critic of capitalist society premised upon inhuman social relations, and the apologists for capitalism, contemporary political economists. Moreover, his criticism was at all times practical, a critical scientific description that attempted to render more intelligible the apparent muddle of social developments with the end of contributing to the overthrow of capitalism.

If Marx was at all an historical prophet, he was optimistic. Directly opposing the charges of his critics, the whole force of the Marxist view is that man need not be a pawn of economic circumstances in history. "The naturalistic doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and education, forgets that circumstances are changed

1. Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels: Basic Writings On Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959) p. 436.

by men".² Marx's optimism is based on his view that man, as the self-mediating being, is essentially a revolutionary being; this essence revealing itself best in periods of social upheaval when man has proved that he is able to transcend the social relations that appear to define his being. In such periods, man the revolutionary being, realizes his essence in the dialectical form of creation and revolution, each side being the necessary condition for the other. The self-conscious revolution thus regards itself as a struggle bent on destroying an old order in order to establish the new, under which a higher form of humanity can be produced.³

In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life, but life's prime want; after productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly - only then can the narrow horizons of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banner: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"⁴

To go into the vision of the higher stage that Marx has lapsed into

2. "Third Thesis on Feuerbach" in Karl Marx and F. Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I and III (ed. by R. Pascal, 1947) (New York: International Publishers Co. Inc., 1947) pp. 197-8.

3. For a fuller account of this interpretation, see Maxmilien Rubel, "Reflection on Utopia and Revolution" in E. Fromm (ed.), Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) pp. 211-19.

4. Lewis S. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, op. cit., p. 119. For one discussion on this higher form of humanity, read H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) Chapters I and II.

would be to pose problems relating to distribution, organization, etc. which are not real at the present time. No answers exist in the present world. It is probably better to accept for the present Marx's belief that "mankind only poses problems for which the material possibilities for solution exist".⁵

The real problem which is posed at present by history is the alienation of man under capitalism, and the answer for which Marx saw objective possibilities existing was revolution to upset the existing order of things. Reform of capitalism to render its social relations progressively less alienating was in Marx's view, possible only in the short term, in the intermediary stage. However;

- (a) Maturing material contradictions inherent in capitalism could only be resolved by changing the essential relations, i.e., property relations of capitalism.
- (b) Reformist or gradualist compromise cannot be ultimately effective in a society formed of class with non-conciliatory, in fact contradictory, interests. Conflict must settle the issue.
- (c) The problems of human alienation, and the subsequent conscious dissatisfaction of people are due not to incidental but essential features of the capitalist organization of pro-

5. L. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, op. cit., p.44. However, this did not preclude attempts being made to solve the problems of Communist society, both in theory and in practice. See D. McLellan, "Marx's View of the Unalienated Society" Review of Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 10, pp.459-65. The practice of communism is being attempted in countries like Russia, Red China, and Cuba, as well as in numerous communes in North America. The respect in which many problems are not real is that in which they are posed by speculative theorists, idealogues, philosophers, and not by social production. The parallel development of social needs & social powers in history would indicate that we could recognize real problems not only by the ability to solve them, but by the fact that a social need has arisen.

duction, e.g., the right of expropriation given the employer. The only final solution to capitalism would have to be its supercession, the overthrow of its social relations, the "expropriation of the expropriators".

A. The Communist Revolution: Essential Features

The best general definition of the mainspring for revolution in the context of historical materialism is the following from the Preface to the Critique of Political Economy.

At a certain stage in their development, the productive forces of a society come in conflict with the existing relations of production [social relations] . . . From the form of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters.⁶ Then begins an epoch of social revolution.⁷

Capitalist relations which at the outset represented the freeing of productive forces from feudal restraints, represent fetters under mature capitalism. One aspect of the communist revolution must then be the overturning or "bursting asunder" of these reified relations in favour of those which more realistically order modern productive activity. Communism, in this light, does not represent an ideal state or vision, but "a real movement which abolishes the present state of things".⁸ Moreover, it would be contrary to the essence of historical materialism to interpret this movement as inevitable in a mechanistic sense. Productive forces develop and come into conflict with social relations due to the action of people producing within the context of

6. Karl Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works in Two Volumes, Vol.I (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951) p. 329.

7. T.B. Bottomore(ed.), Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963) p. 98.

8. Karl Marx, The German Ideology, op.cit., p. 20.

outmoded capitalist relations.

(a) Universality:

Insofar as the revolutionary movement is a "human protest against an inhuman life",⁹ it has universal characteristics. It is successful, then, if it changes completely the inhuman order, changes the central terms of economic existence; private property, alienated labour, and capital. Anything contradictory to the essential features of capitalism is potentially revolutionary. Any action which refuses to recognize or contradicts the sanctity of private property threatens the system of property, just as ultimately, any two people relating to each other on the basis of mutual concern strikes at the very basis of marketing society.

But the movement to upset capitalism must be universal in another sense. It must be world-wide to counter the global expansion of capitalist relations.

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chooses the bourgeois over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country.¹⁰

9. T.B. Bottomore (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social Philosophy (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1956) p. 237.

10. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (1848) (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), p. 20. See also, Sholomo Avineri (ed.), Karl Marx: On Colonialism and Modernization (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969). The universalization of American capitalism, termed 'American global imperialism' is studied in Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969); P. Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World, (trans. Mary Klopper) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968); N. Chomsky, American Power & the New Mandarins: Historical & Political Essays (New York: Random House, Inc. 1969).

With the whole world a capitalist community, the alienation of man tends to be worldwide, and the movement to abolish this state of things is found in varying forms around the world, a world revolution.¹¹ Furthermore, because of the stranglehold on world trade by the market, once the whole world represents a capitalist system no isolated national revolution can be completely successful (barring, of course, its complete material self-sufficiency). The state capitalisms of Russia and Cuba testify to the fact that as long as the world-market dominates (ultimately) the relations of producers, vestiges of capitalism must remain.

Besides being worldwide, the universality of the revolution refers to the necessity that it pervade all spheres of capitalist society. Capitalist relations dominate potentially all areas of society stripping the halo off every mode of activity, "every occupation hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverence and awe", even going

11. For studies in world revolution, see Hans Kahn, Living In A World Revolution: My Encounter with History (ed. by R.N. Anshen) (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1964); Carl Leider and Karl M. Schmidt, The Politics of Violent Revolution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968); John H. Kautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1962); Richard A. Dodge with the Editors of Ramports, Divided We Stand (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970); David Cooper (ed.), The Dialectics of Liberation (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968) especially Chapter V, Paul Sweezy, "The Future of Capitalism," pp. 95-109; and F. Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963).

so far as to convert "the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science into its paid wage-labourers".¹² An initial stage of the movement must actually be the perfecting of capitalist relations, a completion of the bourgeois revolution.

Communism is the positive expression of the abolition of private property, and in the first place of universal private property. In taking this relation in its universal aspect, communism is, in its first form, only the generalization and fulfillment of this relation.¹³

Marx explains that the form or appearance the revolution takes is often reactionary, partly due to the necessity of perfecting the relations of the previous form, also due to the "tradition of all dead generations which weigh "like a nightmare on the brain of the living".

Precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis, they [revolutionaries] anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and borrowed language.¹⁴

12. K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, op.cit., p. 19. For a commentary on the roots of communist revolution in the U.S.A. see, E. Cleaver, Soul On Ice (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1968); Lee Lockwood, Conversation With Eldridge Cleaver (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1970).

13. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p. 152.

14. Karl Marx, The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, (1869) p. 15. The slogans of the Communist Revolution are those appropriate to social democracy, ultimately mirroring the demands made by the drafters of the Magna Carta, 1215. This is partly due to the fact that a large part of the revolution is simply the perfecting of capitalist relations.

It is understandable why, in its initial stages, the movement must appear many-sided, in fact, why the revolutionary groups may even view themselves as hostile to each other. Before the true nature of their struggle is recognized, the immediate aims of revolutionaires are specific to their groups, each of which is composed of people striking against their own perceived disadvantages in the capitalist order. In North American society alone, revolution is scattered among such apparently diverse groups as the negroes, the feminists, students, farmers, and construction workers, and the clashes between these groups are evidence that they have not yet achieved a universal class consciousness.¹⁵

(b) Political Appearnace:

The political side of the movement, the revolution which overthrows the state which formalizes bourgeois interests and ideology, is only one of the climaxes in the whole organic process whereby a new social order is brought into existence. If man is to reassert

15. An extensive but sketchy survey of the types of revolutions and revolutionary activities the world has encountered is contained in Chalmers Johnston, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964). He refers to the type of revolution referred to here as the "Jacobin Revolt" pp. 45-9. An extensive, but sketchy survey of the 'types' of revolutions and revolutionary movements in the world is contained in Chalmers Johnson, Revolutions and Social System, (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1964). He classes the type of revolution referred to in this paper as "Jacobin communist", "Made by masses under elite guidance" pp. 45-49.

himself in history, he must succeed in supplanting the "dictatorship of the bourgeois" with a "dictatorship of the proletariat", as the present form of government insures the perpetuation of bourgeois relations, a control that pervades all aspects of social activity.

Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man has absorbed in himself the abstract citizen, when . . . he has become a social being and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (*forces propres*) as social powers and consequently no longer separates this social power from himself as political power.¹⁶

The perpetuation of the bourgeois dictatorship, the ideal representative of alienated social life, indicates the existence of alienated social life and man's acceptance of himself as the egoistical atom of society. Political consciousness is false consciousness, obscuring the reality of social existence. A theory of revolution, then, which sees political overthrow as an important, prior condition to the revolution of social circumstances is wrongheaded.

Do away with capital, the appropriation of the whole means of production in the hands of the few, and the state will fall away of itself. . . . Without a previous social revolution, the abolition of capital is in itself the social revolution and involves a change in the whole mode of production.¹⁷

Since those in political power are understandably loathe to abdicate peacefully, it is true that the political overthrow is usually

16. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 31. Read also V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970).

17. Karl Marx and F. Engels, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1953) pp. 312-20.

sensational, bloody and violent. "Is it astonishing that a society founded on the opposition of classes should end in a brutal contradiction in a hand-to-hand struggle as its last act?"¹⁸ It is not astonishing, either, that the historical proof and prospects of violence has turned many Marxists into reformists.¹⁹ The political revolution would take place on as many fronts as political power is vested in, as those with no power (property rights) challenge the right of those in power to remain in power. The aim in all cases is the same, ". . . the movement of politically influential classes to end their exclusion from political life and power".²⁰

3. Revolution as Praxis:

The process whereby man produces history has not always been conscious. Communism is the first revolutionary movement in history to be conscious of itself:

18. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., p. 239. For further reading on the problem of violent struggle see Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1951); Bernard B. Fall (ed.), Ho Chi Minh on Revolution: Selected Writings, 1920-66 (New York: The American Library, Inc., 1967); Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1961); L. Trotsky, The Defense of Terrorism: A Reply to Karl Kautsky (London: The Labour Publishing Co., 1921).

19. One such 'revisionist' is L. Bernstein whose differences with Marxist-Leninism is studied in Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Edward Bernstein's Challenge to Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952 and 1962). Another, E. Fromm, will be studied later in this chapter.

20. T. B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, op. cit., p. 238.

It is. . .the return of man himself as a social, that is, really human being, a complete and conscious return that assimilates all the wealth of previous development. . . . It is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.²¹

A revolution which happens as a purely mechanical development of economic forces would be a denial, not an affirmation of man's productivity. But a communist revolution is a creation of men's wills, action on capitalist relations disciplined by theoretical knowledge gained through social practice.

Only part of what is implied by the term 'conscious' is that there is on the part of the communist an unwillingness to cloak his activity in myth, magic and religion. Consciousness here is rooted in a scientific analysis of the terms of existence, including class, as well as a disdain to conceal their ends and views from themselves and others. But more than that, conscious revolutionary activity marries action and theory into practical-theoretical activity made necessary by the obvious truth that

"men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, . . . but under circumstances directly encountered, given, transmitted from the past.²²

-
21. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p. 155.
 22. K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, op. cit., p. 15.

Thus revolutionary theory must be based on practice, a practical analysis of society's processes and capabilities that attempts to identify demonstrable tendencies which might lead beyond the existing state of affairs. Marx explains the marriage of critical social theory with 'real' revolutionary forces:

Just as philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy. . . .
Philosophy is the head of this emancipation, and the proletariat is its heart.²³

The Baconian aphorism, "Truth is power" holds true only if it is understood that the power is in the creative act of knowing; not in the contemplative knowledge of the academic philosopher, but in the active model of the scientist.

The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently, the point is, to change it.

(XI Thesis on Feuerbach)²⁴

4. The Proletariat As Revolutionary Class

Marx's message, then, was not one for academics to mull over, but one to be realized in action by the proletariat who would "inherit the earth". If Communism is to be understood as a historical movement, it is necessary to understand the historical significance which Marx attached to the proletarian class.

23. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 59.

24. Karl Marx, The German Ideology, op.cit., p. 199. The distinction between the "contemplative" philosopher and the "active" scientist takes into account that the one develops idealist relationships between ideological constructs, whereas the other studies social reality in a fragmented way.

(a) The proletariat are first of all to be understood as one of the productive forces produced under capitalism, that develop to become one of the main contradictions that threaten to tear the system of relations asunder. As a class, it has status only as the producer of bourgeois wealth, or, dialectically, as the proletariat produces bourgeois wealth it produces itself. The key to its misery is the same as the one central to the production of capital, the expropriation of the surplus value its labour attaches to nature by the capitalist whose right to it based upon his ownership of private property.²⁵

Thus, while the proletariat as a class exist as principles in capitalist production they are at the same time its negation. That they exist as the potential overthrow of the system of property emerges as the truth about their class as it becomes clarified by maturing capitalism.²⁶

Because the threat they pose is to the basis of capitalism, property, the proletariat as a class stand potentially opposed to the whole way of life thereon premised, i.e. the bourgeois institutions of family, religion and education.²⁷

25. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., pp. 70-71.

26. Karl Marx, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique (1844) (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956) pp. 51-52.

27. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto; op. cit., pp. 48-50. "The positive supersession of private property, as the appropriation of human life, is, therefore, the positive supersession of all alienation, and the return of men from religion, the family, the state, etc., to his human, i.e. social life."

T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p. 156.

It cannot abolish the conditions of its own life without abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life of society today which are summed up in its own situation.²⁸

Marx expresses his impatience with critics who would, as if to refute his whole analysis, would produce evidence to show that the proletariat are contented and anything but revolutionary.

The question is not what that proletarian or even the whole of the proletariat considers as its aim. The question is what the proletariat is, and what consequent on that being, it will be compelled to do.²⁹

When the negation to private property supplied by the proletariat appears as a vital issue, it is proof that they have developed sufficiently as a force to challenge the dominant class and its base in property. Potential conflict has become actual and "force decides the issue".³⁰

Since the proletariat exist as the negation of bourgeois wealth (private property), their coming to and maintaining power within the context of mature capitalist relations would be impossible. Rather, if the proletariat are to abolish the conditions of their own alienation, it must be by cancelling out the negative qualities of capitalism, by "a negation of the negation". Far from becoming triumphant as a

28. Karl Marx, The Holy Family, op. cit., p. 52.

29. Ibid., p. 53.

30. Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York; W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969) p. 45.

class, the proletariat by abolishing property would be negating the terms of its own existence. In the end, it can only be "victorious by abolishing itself as well as its opposite, . . . private property".³¹

In historical materialism, communism is literally the movement which sees an historical form destroyed by its own essential contradictions. Within the proletariat-property antithesis, the property is the conservative and the proletariat the radical pole; radical, that they stand not only as the negation of the bourgeois class, but of the basis in society of all classes.

If the proletariat is compelled by force of circumstances to organize itself as a class, if by means of a revolution it makes itself the ruling class and as such sweeps away, by force, the old conditions of production, then it will along with these conditions have swept away the conditions for the existence of class antagonisms, and of classes generally, and will thereby have abolished its own supremacy as a class.³²

Universality of the proletariat:

Marx does not present the suffering of the proletariat as just historical-specific, but a universal, representing the suffering of all humanity. Suffering here refers to the conditions of objective existence, the agonies of poverty, as well as the alienation described in Chapter III. Therefore, in answer to piece-meal reformists, the proletariat "does not claim a particular redress, because the wrong

31. Karl Marx, The Holy Family, op. cit., p. 53.

32. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 56.

which is done to it is. . . wrong in general",³³ the crime which is committed when man is separated from his own activity.

In historical materialism, the impetus for social change has always been a class that is 'wronged' and which achieves the popular base necessary for revolutionary status by becoming recognized as the general representatives of a society of people who are wronged. Its class aims and interests become genuinely the aims and interests of society itself, "of which it becomes in reality the social head and heart".³⁴ The class becomes accepted as the answer or antithesis to another class which is isolated as the embodiment of all the evils of a particular historical form. Historically the evil class has been at different times nobility, landowners, and small proprietors. In modern times, it may well be the corporate elite.³⁵

For a popular revolution and the emancipation of a particular class of civil society to coincide, for one class to represent the whole of society, a particular class must embody and represent a general obstacle and limitation . . . must be regarded as the notorious crime of the whole society . . . should be openly the oppressing class.³⁶

33. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p.58.

34. Ibid., p. 56.

35. A powerful case is presented for this by C. W. Mills, The Power Elite (London: Oxford University Press, 1956); G.W. Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967); and P.A. Baran and P.M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

36. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p.56.

Each succeeding revolution provides only a temporary historical answer, therefore each succeeding revolutionary class has had to gain a wider acceptance, i.e. has had to represent in reality a wider portion of society, and in the case of capitalism, the proletariat can only succeed in its revolutionary aims insofar as it gains society-wide hegemony.³⁷ The proletarian claim to such broad representative status is justified when capitalist relations spread to include all societies of the world and every aspect of each society, until, and more obviously justified when only two classes remain, all others disappearing as all who are not capitalists are proletarianized by modern Industry.³⁸ Then, all human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to production.

The industrial proletariat stand as the model of alienated, therefore wronged, man because he completely lacks control over production, and thus over his own existence, and cannot even harbour for long any illusions of control over the objects he produces. He produces his own destitution, and has vested interest in only the demise of the capitalist order. By being the real representative of alienated humanity and by freeing itself, the proletariat in effect emancipates

37. Ibid., p. 58.

38. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, op.cit., p. 34. Marx would exclude the 'lumpenproletariat' from his class division; referring to it as the "dangerous class", and "social scum". "its conditions of life. . . prepare it for more than the part of a bribed tool of reactionary intrigue." (p. 35).

the whole of humanity, a truth that can only emerge once capitalist fetters are burst. That is, if it does represent humanity, the freedom it obtains can only be that which humanity has shown historical potential for; the freedom to interact with nature with no alien or non-human restraint, or to be revolutionary, i.e. to transcend social relations whenever they limit productivity.³⁹

5. Vulgar Socialism:

A necessary stage of the communist movement which seems to have caught the interests of opponents of the revolution is "vulgar socialism. Marx explains this stage as the completion of capitalism, the perfection of relations of an historical form.⁴⁰ This would be the society resulting as an immediate aftermath of the upsetting of the forms of capitalism. Because it could only grow out of capitalism, it would be "in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges".⁴¹

Under vulgar socialism, capitalist alienated labour, one of those birthmarks, is made a universal characteristic of all social production. Strangely, critics have taken what Marx has said about

39. See Chapter II of this study.

40. See "Private Property and Communism" T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., pp. 152-167.

41. L. Feuer, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, op. cit., p. 117.

vulgar socialism as his definition of a "communist utopia", and then have criticized him on the basis of that definition. More than being unfair, such criticism must be understood to be the direct opposite of what he has expressly stated.

In vulgar socialism, production would not be of life, but of all facets of life in the form of commodities, and labour itself would be a commodity measurable in quantums, a perfection of the form it takes in capitalist society. The formula for distribution would then operate such that "the individual producer receives back from society - after deductions have been made - exactly what he gives to it.⁴² If equating needs to capacities results in an equitable distribution, then such a distribution is possible merely by extending the rank of wage-labourer or proletariat to everybody.⁴³ If production is organized in such a way as to guarantee proletarian rather than bourgeois rights, then the organ of political power, the state, would be in this period "nothing more than the dictatorship of the proletariat",⁴⁴ the direct antithesis of the present day dictatorship of the bourgeois.

42. Ibid., pp. 116-7. "Vulgar socialist" societies like the one in Soviet Russia have been raised to this status of Marx's Communist society in order to facilitate the attack on Marx. Also, communism, in the minds of many, has been paranoically related to all plans for nationalization of industry or resources, or "welfare statism" which does not even achieve the level of vulgar socialism.

43. T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings, op.cit., p. 153.

44. L. Fever, Marx and Engels: Basic Writings, op.cit., p.127.

Thus vulgar socialism, rather than being the emancipation, would be the extreme degradation of the human, and would result in a universal dissatisfaction that would lead to a liquidation of capitalist forms, and the establishment of a communist society that would liquefy itself rather than remain absolute.⁴⁵ The state, acting as the administrator of workers, would become the administrator of things only once the relations of this form of production are fulfilled and people realize the social nature of production.. Until this time, the state would remain as the ideal form of alienated social life, an organism separated from the society of self-interested individuals it administers. When man has achieved his social state (a historical potential) then vulgar socialist right, and the state as guarantor of this right would "wither away", i.e., lose all meaning, become anachronistic.

45. For an explantion of the "Withering Away of the State" see D. McLellan, "Marx's View of Unalienated Society", op. cit. Basically, his argument is that when private ownership, the real basis of power, is abolished, then the state will be transformed from the organism that maintains the power of exploiting minority to simple administrative functions. (p. 13). It is precisely during such a transitional period, when all property comes to be owned by the state, and proletariat universalized that alienation will be most acute, the problem to be overcome. See Predrag Vranicki, "Socialism Humanism, op. cit.,pp. 299-313. See also, Isaac Deutscher (ed.), The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1964).

Erich Fromm - Revolution Without Dialectics

In his many books, Erich Fromm does afford the reader many insights into the insanity of North American society. He essentially agrees with Marx's analysis of the nature of alienation under capitalism, and in fact proceeds to formulate general proposals which point the same cataclysmic changes as those Marx envisaged. However, at the point of formulating specific recommendations, he forsakes revolutionary theory, recommending instead piecemeal reforms thereby disavowing that alienation was due to systemic elements of capitalism.

Pervading Fromm's recommendations is a liberal commitment to peace and non-violence that rejects a conflict theory of social change, a commitment that treats conflict rather as one of the evils to be eradicated, not a basic mechanism which must be asserted. Fromm has defined human productivity as a striving for life, a definition that cannot include destruction and violence as positive forces. Hence, the theme of his recommendations is to avoid the disruption of revolution, and to distrust revolutionaries for the violence they seem to favour. A good illustration of this central aspect of Fromm's theory is given in his essay, "The Revolutionary Character",⁴⁷ in which he declares among other things that "a revolutionary character is not a person who participates in revolutions",⁴⁸ but is rather "a humanist in the sense

47. Erich Fromm, The Dogma of Christ (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1955, 1958, and 1963) pp. 149-172.

48. Ibid., p. 154. For further reading on this "type", read R.M. Lindner, Rebel Without a Cause: The Story of a Criminal Psychopath (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1944).

that he experiences in himself all humanity", and most importantly, "loves and respects life".⁴⁹

Obviously, if it were possible to dismiss Marx's analysis of the place of conflict, and consequent violence in capitalist society, it should be very tempting to accept a theory with Fromm's humanist, i.e., anti-violent, bias. Even so, a study of some of Fromm's reformist proposals provides a worthwhile exercise, if only to expose, from a Marxist perspective some of the weaknesses in reformist theory with which social criticism in North America abounds.

A. The Problem:

Fromm's presentation of the problem of alienation is not as systematic or unified as Marx. That is, at no time in any of his many books does he isolate the basic causes of alienated man, he merely produces a discursive account of different aspects of the problem. However, for purposes of this study, the problem as presented in the Revolution of Hope will be summarized. It is not only his most consistent account; being one of his latest books, there is reason to believe he would favour it most.

Fromm's proposals arise out of his psychoanalysis of man in modern North American society. Man is alienated because in his attempt to develop a better material life, he allowed himself to be enslaved by a composite of social and material creations that repress free and creative expression. In other words, if man's nature is to express life

49. Ibid., p. 70.

through productive behavior, the system which he has produced represents death, the negation of life. Under this system, man has found a freedom from the fear and isolation which accompanies the human condition. But it is a negative freedom, "free from" rather than a "freedom to live", and his society only allows the former.⁵⁰

In his earlier books, notably Escape From Freedom and The Sane Society, Fromm categorizes the defective social order as capitalistic; capitalism is the cause of competitiveness and alienated labour. However, in the Revolution of Hope he forsakes the term "capitalist" in favour of "technological" society, the ultimate result of man's quest for a better material life. Technological mass society is a cause; a social character is the result. Production and consumption bespeak inward passiveness or deadness. In the capacity of producer, man becomes a weak cog in a machine, as a consumer he is the homo consumes "whose only aim is to have and use more".⁵¹ Man no longer produces his life, he lives an existence that the technological order has prescribed for him. He has effectively found, in modern technological society, secondary ties which determine his life, to replace the

50. Here Fromm's view resembles that of Norman Brown, Life Against Death, The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History (New York: Random House, Inc., 1959) and, of course, Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) (ed. & trans. by James Strachey) (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1961). Civilization, necessarily represses man's free expression, therefore represents death.

51. Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope Toward a Humanized Technology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1968) pp. 39-40.

primary, instinctual ties which were lost as a requisite to gaining the human condition.

B. The General Proposal

Fromm's general proposal is the popular one; that society be made human and man returned to himself. The general condition under which this may be achieved is Marx's, that man and his society become as much the object of scientific inquiry as material nature has.

The irrational and planless character of society must be replaced by a planned economy that represents the planned and concerted effort of society as such. Society must master the social problem as rationally as it has mastered nature.⁵²

Fromm's major heresy in terms of Marxism is that he envisages a humanization of society while still retaining its capitalist base, i.e., private property and the profit-motive. Labour, the way man asserts himself in his world is not necessarily, only incidentally dehumanized by capitalism. Therefore reforms, not revolution, are sufficient to return labour to its rightful place in the economic order. Likewise, machines and machine-like processes are not intrinsically anti-human. Once returned to its rightful function as a means to a human end, technology will enhance man's chances for positive human freedom, "become a functional part in a life-oriented system, and not a cancer . . ."⁵³

52. Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1941) p. 299.

53. E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 100.

Capitalist processes now serve the abstract end of material progress, but they can be transformed to serve human ends, once these are clarified. Accordingly Fromm defines them as "any aim which furthers the growth, freedom and happiness of the self".⁵⁴ Specific ends to be implemented in social planning can be arrived at by finding out "which ends would be acceptable as preferable to their opposites by most people"⁵⁵ or, from knowledge we gain through scientific research of "man, his nature and the real possibilities of its manifestations".⁵⁶ Finally, as an illustration of a desirable norm for social planning, Fromm offers the following. Upon scientific enquiry, it is found that "man's one basic requirement for his well-being is to be active in the sense of the productive exercise of all his faculties".⁵⁷ Supposedly, it should be possible to compile a set of ends towards which the social order should be oriented, and with such a set of criteria, judge and change our present society.

C. Specific Proposals:

Fromm provides many specific proposals for the humanization of modern society, seven of which are chosen for this study because they

54. E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 294.

55. E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 100.

56. Ibid., p. 101.

57. Ibid., p. 103.

treat separate areas of social life in a more or less representative manner.

(1) If society is to be humanized, industry, the world of work, has to be altered to allow for the active participation of the worker. The worker must first be well-informed about the operation, then given the opportunity to translate his knowledge into active participation, something which is possible only if he can have influence on the major decisions which affect his individual work and the whole enterprise. Fromm points out that the important change would see the worker becoming "a responsible subject who employs capital. The principle point here is not the ownership of the means of production but participation in management and decision making".⁵⁸

Profit on invested capital as the end of humanized operation, could thus be retained. Only excess, or abuse of privilege would have to be curbed in something like the following manner:

The owner or owners of an enterprise would be entitled to a reasonable rate of interest on their capitalist investment, but not to the unrestricted command over men whom this capital can hire . . . the dividends should not exceed a relatively fixed and constant amount, and that profit exceeding this amount should be divided among the workers.⁵⁹

58. Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1955) p. 281.

59. Ibid., p. 282.

(2) Fromm subscribes to the efficacy of applying legal-political controls to production in order to humaize it. Government action could be taken to alter the rights of comapny ownership, "to substitute for shareholder's sole control, a constitution which explicitly defines the responsibilities of the firm to the worker, consumer and community".⁶⁰

(3) Following from the recognition of the dual producer-consumer role which man assumes in modern society, Fromm proposes a humanization of consumption to accompany reforms in production. At present, the consumer is caught up in the tangle of an industrial production which because it depends on an ever-widening market, increasingly stimulates his appetites, virtually making him a slave of egotistical needs, condemning him in the process to a life of work in order to obtain the wherewithal (money) to satisfy these needs.⁶¹ What is needed is a revolution in the role of the consumer. He must become "aware of his power over industry by turning around and forcing industry to produce what he wants or suffer considerable losses by producing what he rejects".⁶² Helping in this revolution would be the legal system, which would bring legal restrictions to bear on advertising.⁶³ Still another tactic would be in the area of production itself. By in-

60. Ibid., p. 251.

61. Supra, p. 86-7.

62. E. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, op.cit., p.127. It may be possible here to point to Ford's abortive attempt to market the Edsel..

63. Ibid., p. 128.

creasing investment in the public sphere, in parks, theatres, recreation centres, etc. man's desire for life and growth would be fulfilled, and a feeling of solidarity, negating the effects of possessive individualism, would result.⁶⁴

(4) Fromm blames much of the alienation of modern man on the economic coercion in our system which forces a man to accept work in order to subsist. To humanize society, therefore, it would be necessary to remove this necessity, upholding instead the principle that because every person has the right to live, a society premised upon something else is inhuman. Fromm explains that this right to life:

is a right to which no conditions are attached, and which implies the right to receive the basic commodities necessary for life, the right to be educated and to medicare . . . etc.⁶⁵

A guaranteed subsistence minimum, Fromm suggests, would be sufficient to strip of their powers those who would use their ownership of capital to force others to work. It would force employers to make their terms of work more satisfactory. "Freedom of contract," he points out, "is possible only if both parties are free to accept and reject it; in the present capitalist system, this is not the case".⁶⁶ Finally, the idea of guaranteed income is based upon a belief in

64. Ibid., p. 129.

65. Ibid., p. 131. Further, see "You're Damned Right You're Poor If you Con't Have An Income: Exploring the Concept of Guaranteed Income" in Chevron, University of Waterloo Student Press, Vol. XI, No. 46, pp.866-7.

66. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 293.

man's inherent tendency to be active, and looks upon the laziness of present man as a pathological symptom, closely related to forced and meaningless labour.⁶⁷

(5) Political alienation which, among other things, results in the manipulation of the citizen by a state bureaucracy, could be abolished in favour of a system which reinvests legislative power in the people. This ideal could be effected by introducing the principle of Town Meeting as the basis of politics, which would very simply bring people into personal, face-to-face contact with each other for the purpose of settling political problems. It is especially possible, Fromm sees, within the context which modern industrial society provides, to organize people into face-to-face groups of about 500 persons each. With the possibilities provided by modern computer technology, it would be a simple matter to keep these people informed, and to then achieve consensus on matters of general policy by posing 'yes-no' questions to them.⁶⁸

Through the discussion and voting in small face-to-face groups, a good deal of the irrationality and abstract character of decision making would disappear, and political problems would become in reality a concern for the citizen.⁶⁹

67. E. Fromm, The Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 133.

68. This, of course, poses the question of the legislator, the one who drafts plausible legislation in the form of general policy. J.J. Rousseau proposed much the same system of 'political participation' in his Social Contract.

69. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 298.

(6) The task that Fromm envisages for education is a cultural transformation that man must undergo in order to obtain the social character necessary for humanization. Since a political system can only be the means to further values and ideals that people have already, cultural impoverishment is a problem more basic than political alienation. We do not lack the possibility for a rich culture:

We today who have easy access to all of those ideas, who are still immediate heirs to the great humanistic teachings, we are not in need of new knowledge of how to live sanely.⁷⁰

What is lacking is a serious dedication to the ideals and knowledge we have. Education's task is clearly indicated; it is to impress upon modern man the guiding ideas and norms of traditional Western culture, to mold him into a social character based upon those.

The social function of education is to qualify the individual to function in the role he is to play later on in society; that is, to mold his character in such a way that it approximates the social character, that his desires coincide with the necessities of his social role.⁷¹

If social structures are humanized, the social character needed would be one that differs drastically from the one required by mass technological society. However, if schools are to provide the social character necessary for humanized society, they must themselves first be humanized. They must provide a productive educational experience, and this would

70. Ibid., p. 299.

71. E. Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 314.

include a productive relationship between teacher and student, one in which the teacher would stop being "bureaucratic dispensers of knowledge" and become 'co-disciples of their students'.⁷²

Most importantly, if education is to bring out the man in a person, it must embrace the totality of his existence. Life must become an education, a living and learning, because man can only find himself by continuously exercising his human faculties in a manysided and meaningful way in the world.

Social life must become educational. Man must bring back into his day-to-day existence ritual, collective art, and other collective expression. If man expresses his grasp of the world by his senses, he creates art and ritual, he creates song, dance, drama, painting and sculpture . . ."⁷³ Lifelong education depends heavily on the revival of shared artistic experience, on a "collective expression of our total experiences" on a non-clerical basis. It is "at least as important as literary and higher education", and is easily initiated "with children's games in kindergarten, to be continued in school, then in later life".⁷⁴

72. E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 120.

73. E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 302.

74. Ibid., p. 303.

(7) In the Sane Society⁷⁵ and in no other work, Fromm proposes the implementation of communitarian socialism as a method of achieving humanization of society by combining people into a Community of Work. His proposal is based on All Things Common,⁷⁶ a book that describes the approximately one hundred such communities in Europe, and particularly the watch-case factory commune at Boimandau, France. The original intent of the Boimandau experiment was to abolish the debilitating distinction between employer and employee. However, in the buoyant atmosphere that developed, enough areas of agreement were found to make possible a total community.

The workers discovered, for example, that it was surprisingly simple to arrive at a common ethical minimum, in effect a social contract that supplied the general ends towards which the community would function. The second discovery made by the group was that they craved to educate themselves, and this led to a plan whereby they used time saved in efficient production to develop self-education programs. The basic statement of principle upon which the community rested was this:

"We do not start from the plant, from the technical activity of men, but from man himself . . . In the Community of Work, the accent is not on acquiring together, but on working together for a collective and personal fulfillment." The aim is not increased productivity or higher wages, but a new style of life which "far from relinquishing the advantages of the industrial revolution, is adapted to them."⁷⁷

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., p. 267.

77. Ibid., p. 270.

Fromm's suggestion is not that such communities be established in North America, but that conditions similar to those created by the communitarians be adapted to the whole of our society.⁷⁸

D. Criticisms:

Even though Fromm disdains, in his later works, to apply the term 'capitalist' to North American society, this study will accept the intent of his earlier usage that this society is capitalist without speculating on his reasons for forsaking that term.

Marxist conflict theory establishes a dialectical relationship between revolution and creation, the destruction of the status quo and the creation of a new form more attuned to the level of production. The following criticisms of Fromm's proposals to humanize capitalism will have, as one theme, that he neglected, to prescribe the manner in which the existing social system will be deposed to make way for the new. The second source of criticism is the elitist manner in which he prescribes change; on the one hand, the abstract idealist solution to an abstract problem, and on the other, placing himself above society in order to direct change.⁷⁹ Finally, in prescribing humanization of technology, Fromm seems to ignore the dictum of property rights, that those who own technology as private property have the right to use and abuse it for their own profitable ends. For Marx property rights were at the basis of an alienating social relations. And, to decide to curb

78. Ibid., p. 279.

79. "Third Thesis on Feuerbach" in Karl Marx, The German Ideology, op. cit., p. 197.

these rights must be either to advocate revolution, or to imagine that those who own property will willingly give up the rights which ownership bestows on them.

Proposal One - That labour participate in management -

In capitalist production capital employs labour; it is the reason for which any production takes place at all. The relation of management to worker is essentially that of capital to labour. The proposal, in recommending a reversal of this order, or conjunction of the two poles, ignores this relation. To suggest that workers and managers, labour and capital, cooperate is to suggest that agreement is possible between two groups, who from the point of view of capitalist production have directly opposing interests.

Proposal Two - Legal - political control on capitalists -

If we agree with the Marxist analysis of society, that the legal-political structure arises out of material relations as a superstructure, as the form of these relations, we see how impossible this suggestion is. It is an attempt to circumvent the problem posed by the primary property relations, an attempt to use a derivative of a system to abolish basic faults in that system.

Proposal Three - Revolution of the consumer -

First, separating a revolution in consumption from one in production, Fromm is essentially separating man's motive for production from production itself, a fault indigenous to capitalism. Secondly, he is

confusing cause and effect. The stimulation of artificial needs is only the result of the demands for a wider market posed by a system of production of capital. A boycott of consumers would only indirectly affect the direction of production, as it would be aimed at the use-value of commodities, whereas they were produced and advertised for their exchange-value. Thirdly, he has begged the question relating to the manner in which consumers shall overcome a life-time of ego-stimulating advertising. The proposal for legal restrictions on advertising has the shortcoming that it ignores the vital importance of advertising to production an ever-widening market.

Finally, and most critically, Fromm has neglected to predict what would happen to the whole system of production once consumption is freed from vicious economic growth. To curb expansion of consumption is to raise the very serious problem which Fromm himself envisaged (but did not answer).

Is it technically and economically possible for the economy to remain strong and stable in the absence of higher and higher consumption levels?⁸⁰

Proposal Four - Guaranteed Annual Income -

By recommending that man's needs are satisfied by giving him money with which to purchase the necessities, Fromm is ignoring his own theory that man's basic need is for productive activity, not objects to consume. The Guaranteed Annual Income would only insure the latter in the absence

80. E. Fromm, Revolution of Hope, op. cit., p. 134.

of the former. It would free the labourer from forced labour, but in a system where all means of production are owned as private property, the alternative is the self-exclusion of the worker from production altogether.

It is true that the bargaining position of the worker as holder of labour-power would be improved, and it is possible that this might result in better conditions for labour. However, labour unions have already partially effected these reforms. But, such reforms in no way alter the basic reason for alienation of labour, that is, the domination of labour by private property that makes labour into a means for the production of capital.

Proposal Five - Political reform -

The proposal to bring politics to the people is appealing but untenable because it presumes that consensus can exist among people whose class interests, depending on their relation to production, contradict each other. The reason for alienated political life is found in alienated social life, or more precisely, the possessive individualism that premises the manner in which people have to produce a living under capitalism. Secondly, the proposal ignores that if the political structures formalize and legitimize social structures, then the state has been for the ruling class an instrument to serve its interests; i.e. protect property, etc. Removing this instrument would not be a reformist action. In any case, Fromm's recommendation is an utopian one as long as it does not recognize a change in the material base of society as a precondition to a changed political form.

Proposal Six - A task for education -

The essence of this proposal is that education take the lead in reviving the culture of tradition. This implies that no essential development of society has taken place that renders traditional Western ideas anachronistic in the modern setting. Collective art, the objective expression of community spirit, is not ignored; it is contradicted by capitalist relationships. The great ideas of capitalism are the laissez-faire, individualistic theories of the Industrial Revolution, to which collectivization of any sort is anathema. The schools, if they are to mold the characters necessary for functioning in today's society, would have to indoctrinate towards competitive production and material consumption.

Proposal Seven - Communitarian Socialism -

In the section of his Communist Manifesto entitled "Critical Utopian Socialism and Communism" Marx heaps disdain on that class of social critics that "still dream of experimental realization of their social utopias, of founding isolated "phalanstares", of establishing "home colonies", of setting up a "Little Icaria" -- duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem ..."⁸¹ They suffer, according to Marx, from a disenchantment with economic conditions as they find them. They desire radical change, but "the proletariat, as yet in its infancy, offers to them the spectacle of a class without any historical initiative or any independent political movement."⁸² As a result, not finding historical conditions to their

81. K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 73.

82. Ibid., p. 72.

liking, they reject all political and revolutionary action, placing their plans for social change outside of the sphere of class antagonisms.

They wish to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavour, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to failure, and by force of example, to pave the way for a new social gospel.⁸³

In his proposal for the replacement of alienated society by a federation of communities of work, Fromm appears as a clear-cut utopian critic. That is, in his social theory, he has neatly divided society into two irresolvable worlds, rejected reality (alienated, technological society) and the ideal solution (happy communities of work). He then bridges the abyss between the two with the only theoretical tool left him, the arbitrary transcendental "ought". Echoing Marx's First Thesis on Feuerbach, the lack of any real unity or resolution implies a reactionary resignation to dirty reality.

Paul Goodman - An Exercise in Futility

Paul Goodman's strength is his ability to present analysis in polemical clothing. As a social critic he is valuable, therefore, not only because he has produced certain points of marxian criticism is the here and now, but because he has done it in a popular format. The recommendations for change he offers seem to fall short of the pattern set by his social criticism. He describes the North American way of life as abominably dehumanized, and then offers piecemeal reforms, changes in the structure that seem quite inadequate, making him

83. Ibid.

appear as a likely candidate for the same criticisms as those levelled against Fromm.

A. General Qualities

Goodman's proposals cannot be dismissed because they are so well-thought out, so simple, and interesting. In fact, if the economic reality of American society could be ignored, there would be no obstacle to their immediate implementation as they all share these central characteristics:

- (1) They possess a rationale or commonsense that should not escape anyone. If nothing else, they illustrate how down-to-earth was the Hegelian ideal of actualizing Reason in our existences.
- (2) As prescriptions, they are small, humble, and easily implemented, and could, therefore, be accepted immediately.
- (3) They are specific, designated exactly the institutions or officials that need to be changed.
- (4) They are all humanitarian to the core, not espousing any lofty ideals or greater good, but aimed merely at bettering immediately the lot of some concrete people.
- (5) They are especially difficult for Americans to dismiss because they are all premised on the pursuit of real goals and ideals which have been at one time or another a part of the American Dream.
- (6) They are all decentralist in nature, a decentralism which Paul Goodman explains does not imply "a lack of order or planning, but a kind of coordination which rules on different

motives from top-down direction, standard rules and extrinsic rewards like salary or status . . . It is not anarchy.⁸⁴ Goodman's decentralism implies a faith in people which may be due to an optimism in their capabilities, or at least a resignation to the fact that we lack superhumans or angels apart from human beings upon whom to depend. The only functions which Goodman would reserve for central control would be those related to purely mechanical administration, or to emergencies.

(7) Finally, his recommendations are all based on structural models that are actually operating with a certain degree of success. The proposals he brings forth, in other words, have all been tried and tested at one time or another.

B. Some Proposals For the School

(1) "Two Simple Proposals" from Compulsory Mis-education.⁸⁵

The largest existing obstacle to good education at all levels are the American universities and colleges, which have not only destroyed their own viability as centres for learning by catering to business and professional interests, but are also aiding in the spiritual destruction of the public schools. Most universities and colleges are autonomous. They can do more than any other institution to break the stranglehold of the national economy which makes them into nothing more than social engineering centres when they should be educating the young to be free citizens. Following are two modest proposals that in Goodman's words

84. P.Goodman, People or Personnel and Like A Conquered Province (New York: Random House, Inc., 1968) p. 6.

85. P. Goodman, Comulsory Miseducation (New York: Horizon Press, 1964) Chapter X, pp. 149-159.

are feasible almost immediately, that would entail no risks whatever, and yet would immensely improve these academic communities, and importantly liberate them in relation to society.⁸⁶

Proposal One - "First suppose that half a dozen of the more prestigious liberal arts colleges - say Amherst, Swarthmore, Connecticut, Wesleyan, Carleton, etc. - would announce that beginning in 1960, they required for admission a two year period after high school spent in some maturing activity."⁸⁷

This would effectively:

- (a) produce students with enough life-experience to be educable on the college level, especially in the social sciences and humanities.
- (b) break the lock-step of twelve years of assigned lessons for grades so that the student may approach college students with some intrinsic motivations.
- (c) relieve the colleges of their onerous in loco parentis status in matters of morality.

Proposal Two - "My other proposal is even simpler and not at all novel. Let half a dozen of the more prestigious Universities - Chicago, Stanford, and the Ivy League abolish grading, and use testing only and entirely for pedagogic purposes as teachers see fit."⁸⁸

86. Ibid., p. 151.

87. Ibid., p. 152.

88. Ibid., p. 155.

The grade is at the centre of our large universities because they are essentially a competition for the top positions in the job world and graduate school. The effect of the abolition would be to free the student, and make him responsible only to himself, colleagues, and veterans.

"For the students, it seems to be that a primary duty of the university is to deprive them of their props, their dependence on extrinsic valuation and motivation, and to force them to confront the difficult enterprise itself and finally to lose themselves in it.⁸⁹

Parental objections to the abolition of grading can be ignored; parents have caused enough anxiety. Neither should the laziness of students be accepted as a reason. Students are lazy as a character defense, and balking at work could just mean that for one reason or another it is unsuitable.

(2) "A Simple Proposal" from The Community of Scholars.⁹⁰

At present the bond that clinches the community of scholars to the demands of the power structure of American society is the administrator. Reforms which are most needed; decentralization of control, grading and admissions, splitting up rather than expanding, are those which in Goodman's view the administration would most resist, because they would curtail their reason for being.

The simpler alternative to reform in the present university is

89. Ibid., p. 157.

90. Paul Goodman, The Community of Scholars (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962) Chapter VIII, pp. 159-175.

to go outside the structure,

"for bands of scholars ~~to~~ secede and set up where they can teach and learn on their own simple conditions . . . proving that there is a viable social alternative to what we have . . ."⁹¹ This very change is occurring at the present, but is occurring wrongly, because the experiments "include few serious scholars who know something and few veterans who undertake to teach professions in an objective and systematic way."⁹²

As historical precedent, Goodman cites the dissenting Academies which sprang up out of Oxford and Cambridge after the Act of Uniformity in 1662, the New School for Social Research in America in 1919 with Beard, Veblen, and Robinson, and just recently, Black Mountain College which lasted for twenty-five years without administrators or trustees.

I propose that a core faculty of about five professors secede from a school taking some of their students with them; attach themselves to an equal number of like-minded professionals in the region; collect a few more students, and set up a small unchartered university that would be nothing but an association for teaching and learning.⁹³

The faculty would be sufficient to compose a studium generale, the professionals would insure attachment to the world of real practice, and one hundred and fifty students would ensure classes of optimum size. Primarily such a plan would retain teaching and learning to its own "entirely dispensing with the external control, administration, bureau-

91. Ibid., p. 160.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid., pp. 166-7.

cratic machinery, and other excrescences that have swamped our community of scholars".⁹⁴ It would be the academic administration, not the rest of society that the dissenting community would withdraw from.

- (a) The economics of the community would be handled by each student paying a total of \$685.10 a year each, \$300. - \$500. less than the cost of liberal arts colleges.⁹⁵
- (b) A possibility for providing books and physical plant would be to situate the university next to a large university which extends its friendly services because it is necessary experiment and the source of graduate students.⁹⁶
- (c) Since students must find a career in society, Goodman suggests either
 - (i) that they matriculate for one year and write comprehensives in an accredited school
 - (ii) that arrangements exist with graduate and professional schools whereby these students are accepted to merit and allowed to work for graduate degrees.

(3) A Proposal for Vocational Guidance.

In the clash between the school counsellor and the employer, the former interested (theoretically) in the happiness of the student and the

94. Ibid., p. 168.

95. Ibid., p. 170.

96. Ibid., p. 171.

latter in his job-aptitudes, the employers with the help of the social engineers have won. Students are fitted not to vocations, but to jobs. Goodman makes three impractical proposals "that would facilitate the flowing relationship of nature, culture and work".⁹⁷

(a) The school counsellor, as educator, must demand that the work the employers offer must be worth doing; the product must be good for something.

Objective utility must be the chief structure and the chief motivation for work. Wherever simple utility is absent, naturally everything degenerates to status - seeking and emphasis on methods rather than goals.⁹⁸

(b) Reduce the fragmentation of work (and the worker) that results from a division of labour and its demand that a person function as a cog in a big machine. In order for a person to find meaning in his job, he must understand the meaning of his work in terms of the whole enterprise.

Our present minute subdivision of labour is not inevitable; indeed, in very many cases, it is demonstrably inefficiently centralized.⁹⁹

(c) The emphasis must be taken off the necessity for the school dropout to find himself a job, as this is more often than not a response to the "internalized superego demand to support oneself to be looked upon as socially acceptable."¹⁰⁰ It results in

97. Paul Goodman, Utopian Essays & Practical Proposals (New York: Random House, Inc., 1951) p. 259.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid., p. 260.

100. Ibid., p. 261.

youth getting jobs that stifle growth and breed only resentment. The only antidote that Goodman sees for this illness is a better community, one that supports poor youth instead of condemning them to a life of frustrating work.

(4) A Proposal for Youth Work Camps

For modern urban youth, there is no opportunity to enjoy a healthy period of normal adolescent activity. The urban family environment is totally unsuited to the period of middle adolescence and its need for activity of sexual and self-affirmation. Thus, the need for work camps for youth, with the justification, that "there is an intrinsic relationship among middle adolescence living in camps, and the need for work, and a certain kind of work".¹⁰¹ These camps have been used in the past only as emergency devices, but they should be a natural institution in a society such as ours where, in order to grow up, it is essential that youth be isolated from the massive adult world. Needed is:

(a) space for the wildness and in-grouping intrinsic in this stage.

(b) a mean size of about sixty members - "a face-to-face community where everybody knows everybody; and yet there is a complexity of social relations beyond cliques or even gangs so that a youth must learn to take himself also as a public person".¹⁰²

(c) and, most importantly, "a chance for the community members to form their own structures, replacing that of parental authority,

101. Ibid., p. 264.

102. Ibid., p. 265.

through objective work, leading to the discovery of unique vocation and career.¹⁰³ If it is truly a community of peers, and if the work is constructive and useful, a simply understood division of labour can be set up quickly.

C. Communitas - A Proposal for Community

In Communitas, a book that Paul Goodman wrote in conjunction with Percival Goodman, attention is paid particularly to the physical setting of human community:

The background of the physical plant and the foreground of human activity are profoundly and intimately dependent on one another.¹⁰⁴

Existing physical plants in the United States suffer from two major weaknesses; lack of planning, or poor planning. And, anyone seriously attempting to rectify this will encounter:

- (a) the pre-emption in that sphere by vested interest groups that are not so much interested in community planning as in quick profits.
- (b) the justified conservative attitude of the common people who are very leary of any physical change that would affect their way of life drastically.
- (c) the omnipresent threat of war.

103. Ibid., p. 266.

104. Percival Goodman and Paul Goodman, Communitas (New York: Random House, Inc., 1947) p. 3.

People feel- that they are bang right- that there is not much point in initiating large-scale and long-range improvements in the physical environment, when we are uncertain about the existence of any physical environment the day after tomorrow.¹⁰⁵

- (d) the anomaly of modern technology and its ability to baffle people and make them leary of any changes which it would make possible.

But, modern technology is the key to success of any massive change in community planning that we may decide on.

Various Plans: Goodman surveys various schemes, both theoretical and practically attempted, and asks of each one, "What is socially implied in any such scheme as a way of life, and how (does) each scheme express some tendency of modern mankind?"¹⁰⁶ He classifies these plans according to the manner in which they related living and working: green belts, garden cities, suburbs, satellite towns, industrial plans, and integrated plans.

Goodman then offers three community paradigms of his own, with each paradigm centred around one of three typical value-choices made by community planners:

- (a) The city of efficient consumption, or, the city as department store that guarantees the wish-fulfillment of its consumer-residents.
- (b) the community that eliminates the difference between consum-

105. Ibid., p. 15.

106. Ibid., p. 20.

sumption and production.

(c) the city of planned security with minimum regulation. The understanding is that the model that people choose will be a conglomerate of all three paradigms, corresponding to their peculiar needs. Interestingly, as a substitute for everything else. Goodman envisions a fourth possible 'paradigm'.

This is to put the surplus into combustibles and, igniting these, to destroy a more or less (it is hard to be sure) regulated part of production and consumption goods, and the producers and the consumers. Recent studies on this mode of thinking have hit on techniques for the dislocation of industry into mountain fastnesses, the non-illumination of streets, the quickest way to hasten to the most deadly spot . . . an efficient schedule for returning from the Sixth to before the First Day.¹⁰⁷

D. A. Brief Appraisal:

It would be too easy and superficial to criticize Paul Goodman, novelist, poet, critic, playwright, and living proof to so many American youth for so long that "one doesn't have to get old", for formulating utopian, impractical, and simplistic proposals. However, the truth is evidently that his proposals are, in line with his criticisms of American society, ultimately polemical. That is, within the context of the perverted American society which he has so painstakingly censored, his proposals must be rejected, precisely because they are so commensensical and easily implementable. In short, they all run afoul of the chief motive forces in modern day American life; the drive for prestige and

107. Ibid., p. 221. One's faith in Paul Goodman is re-affirmed.

power, the desire for superficial grandeur (conspicuous consumption), the respect for large, complex organizations, the propensity to do violence, and, of course, the omnipresent profit motive. Goodman, unlike Marx, has not analyzed the relationship of these 'evils' to one another, but he has very nicely catalogued them.

These proposals then, are more like illustrations of the perversion of American society than they are recommendations for change, a suspicion reinforced by his conclusion to the educational proposals he makes in the book, Compulsory Miseducation:

To be candid, I do not think that we will change along these lines. Who is for it? The suburbs must think I am joking, I understand so little of status and salary. Negroes will say I am down-grading them. The big corporations like the system as it is, only more so. The labour unions don't want kids doing jobs. And the new major class of school-monks has entirely different ideas of social engineering. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the present system is not viable; it is leading straight to 1984, which is not viable. The change, when it comes, will not be practical and orderly.¹⁰⁸

As the conclusion of his book on educational and social change, the implications of the above for his apparent agreement with social engineers and utopian thinkers are clear.

108. P. Goodman, Compulsory Miseducation, op. cit., p. 189.

CHAPTER FIVE

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Marx's concept of alienation means the separation of man from the essence of his human-ness, the activity of self-mediation whereby man, an objective part of nature, distinguishes himself from the rest of nature. In the context of Marxian theory, alienation is to be seen, not as an aberration in man's historical self-development, but as an integral part of history. That is, it occurs in the process of self-mediation that men establish relations of production that become reified, i.e., come to stand over and above the productive activity that produced them. Because these relations mediate between man and his labour, itself a mediation (between man and his nature), they can be called "second-order mediations"; their perpetuation is the mark of alienated labour as well as the cause of increasing alienation of man, his labour, and his nature.

Capitalism is the most advanced of the many historical-specific forms which the totality of second-order mediations take. That is, under the capitalist system of production, man produces the alienation of his labour through the relations of private property, exchange, money, rent, profit, value, etc. in such a way as to become completely alienated from a hostile nature, an unfulfilling labour, and from himself. In order to study alienation according to Marxian theory then, we examine the dominant relations that people enter into in the sphere of production, as a primary area of research; then we look at the political and legal order that has arisen in conjunction with social

production, and, only finally, do we proceed into the cloudier realm of ideology to gain an understanding of the alienated existence.¹

To avoid criticizing the manner in which political economy and jurisprudence dealt with the manifestations of alienation in an aphoristic style that would have given the impression of arbitrary systematization, Marx determined to study the institutionalizations of alienated labour under capitalism in the form of separate critiques of law, morals, politics, etc., and, only finally, endeavour "to present the interconnected whole, to show the relationships between the parts, and to provide a critique of the speculative treatment of this material."² Marx adds:

It is hardly necessary to assure the reader who is familiar with political economy that my conclusions are the fruit of an entirely empirical analysis based upon a careful critical study of political economy.³

In spite of the fact that the gargantuan task the young Marx was proposing was never completed, we have here the proof that Marx considered enquiries into separate capitalist institutions viable endeavours.

1. See "Theory as a Guide to the Study of Society" in I. Zeitlin, Marxism: A Re-Examination (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967) pp. 121-155.

2. K. Marx, "Preface to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" in T.B. Bottomore, Karl Marx: Early Writings (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963) p. 63.

3. Ibid.

It was the shock of leaving the neo-Hegelian ideological womb of the German university and discovering the reality of class struggle in France that transformed Marx from a critical theologian into an empirical social scientist. At least this is the view of the French marxologue, L. Althusser, who explains:

This retreat from ideology towards reality came to coincide with the discovery of a radically new reality of which Marx and Engels could find no echo in the writings of "German philosophy". In France, Marx discovered the organized working class, in England, Engels discovered developed capitalism and a class struggle obeying its own laws and ignoring philosophy and philosophers.⁴

The shock-value of retreating from the ideological terrain of Hegelian speculation to the reality of socio-economic struggles can be applied, it seems, to a discovery of the institutionalization of education under capitalism, a discovery of both the reality that is deformed by the ideology of education and the reality that study with an ideological base could not even know existed. It is quite possible, that is, that most of the reality of education, once uncovered might have very little to do with the ruminations of the ideologues, i.e., with teaching, learning, aiding development, etc. Such an attempt to reproduce Marx's intention for jurisprudence, religion, and politics in the area of education would have the twofold purpose of clarifying the relationships between the various parts of the real process identified as education, and to attack its speculative treatment.

4. L. Althusser, "On the Young Marx" in For Marx (trans. by B. Brewster) (Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1969) p. 81.

Such a study was in fact, the original intention for this essay. It was to produce an explication of Marx's concept of alienation that could be applied in the form of a radical criticism of the system of formal education in Canadian society. However, as research into Marxian theory progressed, the immensity of the task of placing education in the system of alienation of a society became evident. And, even more seriously, the original intention, to examine alienation in formal education was abandoned because of its non-Marxian bases. Alienation has been described as the key factor in a whole system of reciprocally-related social relations; an attempt to produce Marx's concept as a characteristic of the educational institution alone would probably distort this understanding.

However, the study of education's place in the system of alienation does not have to be abandoned, only ordered in different terms. Of course, an attempt to find the place formal education occupies in the social and economic reality of Canadian society would only consider a small part of the total system of production of education. However, insofar as it can be accepted that schooling or formal education is one of the major concrete-historical forms which education has taken in our society, this proposal will be justified in using the two terms, 'education' and 'schooling' more or less interchangeably for the purposes of this discussion. It need only be added that schooling will refer to the whole range offered by the formal structure, from the first grade in school to post-graduate and adult education.

A. The study of alienation and schooling in Canadian society could take the following forms:

(a) It would be possible to study the symptoms of alienation in Canadian schools to discover, in one form or another, how that segment of our society called students are alienated from the product and activity of their labour, their species-being, and other members of their society by the reified relations of production of education in the schools. Such a study could proceed either along the course of theory-building, or it could be the province of empirical sociology or political science.⁵ It could either attempt to elucidate the operation of the reified relations of the school and the manner in which the students' labour is alienated by these, or it could deviate from the form of Marxian analysis to provide a discursive and polemical account of school life along the models provided by Paul Goodman,⁶ Jerry Farber,⁷ and others.⁸ Such a study would tend to become un-Marxian insofar as it did not attempt to see these evils of alienation in the context of the relations of capitalism, and essentially conjoined to private property.

5. Studies of this sort often appear in the periodical This Magazine Is About Schools.

6. For example, Compulsory Miseducation and The Community of Scholars (Random House, Inc., 1962).

7. For example, Student As Nigger.

8. For example, D. Dvorky (ed.), How Old Will You Be in 1984? (New York: Avon Press, 1969).

(b) It would be possible to study the connection between the alienation which the student undergoes during his incarceration in school, and the alienation of the rest of society. Such a study could result in a Canadian version of Ivan Illich's theory, for instance, as he shows schooling to be the key to the alienation basic to consumer society.⁹ Such a study would not be Marxian insofar as it attempted to show how the educational institution was basic to, and not reciprocally-related with, the rest of the social relations and forms of thought in Canadian society.

(c) A study could be made with a view to isolating the objective possibilities for the supercession of alienation that exist in our system of schooling. This would be a survey of the social relations in the school which, though alienating in their present form, could contribute to a broad socialist program of supercession of alienation in society through the freeing of education.

Affiliated with such a study could be the formulation of a proposal for a socialist education, one that combines education with industrial production, in which the students would learn through productive labour.¹⁰

9. Ivan Illich, "Why We Must Abolish Schooling" in The New York Review of Books, July 2, 1970. Further, Prof. Illich is in the process of publishing a book called De-Schooling Society.

10. For further discussion see R. Cohen, "On the Marxist Philosophy of Education" in Modern Philosophies and Education: The Fifty-Fourth Yearbook For the National Society for the Study of Education, Pt. I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955) pp. 175-214

Part of the task involved here would be to probe the implications of the statements made by Marx to this effect, like this one from his Critique of the Gotha Program.

A general prohibition of child labour is incompatible with the existence of large-scale industry and hence an empty, pious wish. ...an early combination of productive labour with education is one of the most potent means for the transformation of present-day society.¹¹

(d) A study which attempted to criticize accepted theory of education would have to recognize that educational theory can be on the one hand a rationalization of existing practice, or on the other, an ideological construction that, even though it is commonly accepted, bears little or no relationship to existing practice. Such a critical study might examine a body of theory for the manner in which it contradicts existing practice, or for its academic dissociation from practice altogether, or, perhaps, for the way in which it accepts as primordial those relations of production of education which it should be explaining.¹²

11. K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme" in L. Feuer (ed.), Marx & Engels: Basic Writings (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959)

12. K. Marx, "Alienated Labour", in T.B. Bottomore (ed.), Karl Marx: Early Writings, op. cit., p. 121.

(e) Closely related to (d), and perhaps the more crucial study, would be the criticism of some of the more popular proposals for the supercession of alienation in Canadian society that would employ the schools as the mechanisms for social change. Take, for example, this incredible statement from E.P. Cubberly's History of Education, the intention of which lies at the basis of many bourgeois proposals.

In establishing intelligent and interested government, and molding and shaping the destinies of people, general education has become the great constructive tool of modern civilization ... Today general education is an instrument of government, and is rightfully regarded as a prime essential to good government and national progress.¹³

Particularly in North America have people taken seriously proposals that would correct society's ills by revamping the formal education system. The spirit of John Dewey still lives in the minds of many educational missionaries, though it is probably true that his proposals were never seriously implemented.¹⁴

13. E.P. Cubberly, The History of Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1920) p. 839.

14. This is the lament of Paul Goodman in Chapter III of Compulsory Mis-Education, op. cit., pp. 46-62.

Apart from ignoring the cleavage in society that Marx pointed out in his Third Thesis on Feuerbach, these proposals for social change all share the defect of wishing to produce the desired human effect in place of, and not through, the necessary social changes. Ignoring the real educational influences of the society they wish to change, they bridge the gap between the desired psychological or aesthetic change and the dominant mode of social production with a utopian "ought". Marx says:

What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual production changes in character in proportion as material production is changed?¹⁵

Social engineering of the type that would employ the schools to bring about the desired new man, by isolating one social phenomenon, does not recognize the dialectical reciprocity of them all. It is therefore utopian; (1) hoping to employ a particularistic measure to bring about overall change, or (2) seeking to effect a radical change gradually, without at any point seriously challenging the dominant system of production that produces the undesirable man. Finally, by axiomatically taking the foundations of the present system for granted, social engineering is forced ultimately to seek transcendence of practical problems in theory, using "ought" statements instead of practical activity.

15. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto, (trans. by S. Moore) (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954) p.52.

It thereby employs a negative normativity, presupposing the present system, plus a few minor adjustment, as the final frame of reference for all that is good and true.¹⁶

III

B. It appears that in order to get to the point of proposing a Marxian analysis of our system of education, one would have to forsake particularistic studies of alienation in the schools as well as criticisms of bourgeois proposals for change. A study of the relationship between formal education and the whole system of alienation, in order to be fruitful, should be a historical-specific study of Canadian schools in the modern Canadian political economy with a view to gaining a clearer understanding of one of the complex processes with the whole system, not as an academic end in itself, but as a means of quickening the process whereby the whole system of private property is annulled. Specifically, the purpose of the theoretical study being proposed would be to add to the theoretical base of a movement that is already in progress.

(a) This study would have to distinguish at the outset between 'real' and 'ideological' reasons for the schools' existence in the Canadian political economy. It would then not only provide the real, i.e., economic basis of the system of education, but recognize that the ideology arising out of existing practice must itself be explained ultimately in the same real terms.

16. István Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (London: The Merlin Press, Ltd., 1970) pp. 297-8.

Furthermore, the ideology-based reasons, though easily expressed as mythology, cannot be ignored insofar as they provide the purpose for social action, and therefore constitute a social force.

(b) That the study of the real function of the schools would be largely an economic one is best illustrated by posing the question, "What are the vested interests that would lead people to oppose any plan for the abolition of the schools? The possibility that some would rise to seriously contend that the schools do educate would obviously have to be entertained as an ideological reason, unless of course they are referring to the capitalist function that such education would serve, in which case, a real explanation has been given. Again, people sufficiently imbued with the ideology of schooling would have to be seen as a social force that would partially explain the schools continued existence.

(c) One of the largest obstacles to the study being proposed would be the impoverished, elementary state of the study of the Canadian political economy, without which this study could not proceed. In our analysis of the Canadian political economy there would be many considerations that would have to be accounted for.

First, the whole concept of a Canadian society is very probably a myth describing nothing much more than a federation of geographically proximate societies held together by economic ties such as tariff and trade agreements, the legal-political residue of the joint-stock agreement of 1867 between the bourgeoisie of Upper and Lower Canada and the Maritime territories. Lately, however, this economic union has been gaining reinforcement from an anti-imperialist, nationalist movement

which has as some of its theory the literature provided by Melville Watkins,¹⁷ Walter Gordon,¹⁸ and A. E. Safarian¹⁹, and finding its para-political expression in such organizations as the Committee for an Independent Canada and the Waffle Caucus of the New Democratic Party. These movements, founded largely on the myths of Canadian national identity, may well result in even more closely-knit economic unity.

Literature that recognizes the peculiar character of the Canadian political economy, as distinct from that of the United States, is still in the foundling stages. I.-D. Pal, Canadian Economic Issues: Introductory Readings²⁰ is about the most comprehensive anthology available on the subject, and includes studies from people of such diverse political backgrounds as Mel Watkins and the Hon. E. J. Benson. Much of the other exploratory literature produced in this area in the last four years is very popular in tone, and quite elementary. A partial list would include: E. Broadbent, The Liberal Rip-off: Trudeauism vs. The Politics of Equality; J. Laxer, The Energy Poker Game: The Politics of the Continental Resources Deal; K. Leavitt, The Silent Surrender: The Multi-National Corporation in Canada; I. Lumsden (ed.), Close the 49th Parallel, etc.: The Americanization of Canada; R. Cook, The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays on Nationalism and Politics; S. Clarkson (ed.), An

17. The Report of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry (Ottawa: The Privy Council Office, 1968).

18. Walter Gordon, A Choice For Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited; 1966).

19. A. E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry (Toronto: McGraw-Hill of Canada Limited, 1966).

20. I.-D. Pal, (ed.), Canadian Economic Issues: Introductory Readings (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971).

Independent Foreign Policy For Canada: D. Godfrey and M. Watkins, (ed.), Gordon to Watkins to You: A Documentary: The Battle For the Control of Our Economy; J. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada; S. Clarkson, (ed.) Visions 2020: Fifty Canadians in Search of a Future; and, L. LaPierre (ed.), Essays on the Left.

These studies, despite their shortcomings, at least provide some justification for holding the following general opinions about the state of the Canadian political economy:

(1) it is capitalist.

(2) it is predominantly, and increasingly, urbanized, but is, however,

(3) a hinterland urban society. That is, the Canadian urban centres are not themselves the capitalist metropolis' that exploit the surrounding countryside, but are themselves only 'branch-plants' of the American metropolis.²¹ A study of the Canadian political economy would therefore, in order to be complete, have to include at least a cursory examination of the American economy. Towards this end, at least two books that recognize the corporate capitalist structure of the American economy are G. W. Domhoff, Who Rules America? and P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay On the American Economic and Social Order.

21. "Branch-plant" is the widely accepted term first employed by Mel Watkins and the Waffle caucus of the NDP. "The Shoot-out At Edmonton U" in D. Godfrey (ed.), Gordon To Watkins To You (Toronto: The New Press, 1970) pp. 125-129. This term refers to a mode of industrial development in Canada consequent on the National Policy first formulated by J. A. Macdonald's government. Briefly, to capitalize on the protection afforded plants in Canada by high tariff walls, American industry became "Canadian".

(4) A small segment of the Canadian population are, in the strictest sense, proletarian, though many of those who are completely estranged from production, 'lumpenproletariat', are gaining a clear understanding of the nature of their aggravation, and are amongst the most active of those members of Canadian society who are striving to change the established order of things. Read I. Adams, The Poverty Wall and H. Cardinal, The Unjust Society for two accounts of Canada's disadvantaged.

C. With the preceding qualifications in mind, it should be possible to proceed with a study the purpose of which would be isolate the function of the formal education institution in the Canadian political economy, the specific role it fulfills in our peculiar system of private property. The following five 'functions' are proposed.

First Function: Schooling insures the perpetuation of the existing capitalist order in Canada by; (a) providing the necessary program of indoctrination or initiation into the dominant mode of production and its corresponding forms of thought; (b) providing the skills that are necessary to run and reproduce the economy. Practically all of the teaching and testing in the schools can be understood in terms of these two categories.

(a) Capitalism only perpetuates itself insofar as the individual members of society accept its aims and values as their own, and then proceed to reproduce these relations and the corresponding forms of thought. In this respect, schools provide a large part of the explanation as to how it is that "the ruling ideas of each age have ever been

the ideas of the ruling class".²² Marx states:

The communists have not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.²³

The government of Canadian bourgeois interests dictates a content and method of formal education that negates the formation of a proletarian class consciousness by imposing instead on all of the school-children in Canadian society a bourgeois ideology.²⁴ That is, Canadian children at an early age are impressed with the sanctity of private property, the omnipotence of money, the desirability of material progress (expansion of capital), the eternal necessity of bourgeois legal-political institutions, as well as all of the niceties of the possessively-individualistic view of man, including of course, his natural depravity. As a few sub-categories, consider:

22. K. Marx, The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 52.

23. Ibid., pp. 48-9.

24. For an examination of "bourgeois ideology" see Robin Blackburn, "A Brief Guide to Bourgeois Ideology" in A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn (ed.), Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books Limited, 1969) pp. 163-213.

(i) the bourgeois myth of the 'value-free' study of society, politics, psychology, sociology, physical science, etc. that in reality masks the production of these disciplines for bourgeois ends.²⁵ As R. Blackburn points out:

bourgeois social science tries to mystify social consciousness by imbuing it with fatalism and by blunting any critical impulse. Those aspects of this social science which are not directly aimed at consecrating the social order are concerned with the techniques of running it.²⁶

(ii) the ideology of the consumer society which I. Illich deals with at length.²⁷

(iii) the formation, on a small scale, of a branch-plant intellectual group in Canada, and, on a larger scale, of a mentality suited to the perpetuation of American interests in Canada.

(iv) the production of totally reliable cadres, amongst them, of course, future teachers.

(v) the interiorization in those who must be content to serve bourgeois interests of the criteria for success and failure.²⁸

25. See Lynn Trainor, "Science In Canada-American Style" in I. Lumsden (ed.), Close the 49th Parallel, Etc., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) pp. 241-56.

26. R. Blackburn, op. cit., p. 164.

27. I. Illich, "Why We Must Abolish Schooling", op. cit.

28. I borrow the term "interiorization" from István Mészáros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, op. cit., p. 289.

(b) The continuation of productive activity in a highly-complex technological economic system requires the production of people with the necessary skills. In Canada this has become largely the province of the schools, keeping in mind of course the branch-plant nature of the Canadian political economy. Success in school is largely based on this function, as the student is 'taught' and tested to see how well he is producing himself as the future self-conscious commodity-man. Or, in a more advanced, post-secondary stage', success refers to the student's ability to serve the ruling interests through research and rationalization of bourgeois ideology. In the study of this function, these sub-categories may prove fruitful.

(i) the Canadian and Provincial governments have provided this job-training at public expense, with the result that the graduate-commodities may be purchased by the corporations that control production at a fraction of the cost of their production. The proliferation of commercial and vocational programs, the setting up of composite high schools, technical schools and community colleges, and the increasing production in the universities of 'job-training' may all be seen as manifestations of this.

(ii) this job-training must be understood to include the inculcation of the appropriate attitudes to work and non-work, employee-loyalty, etc. Hence the incarceration of trainees in the schools. It is safer from the point of view of those who control production to have trusted cadres tell the initiants about the world of work than to have the initiants suffer the disillusionment of experiencing it first-hand.

(iii) it is necessary to study the exact and changing demands of advanced American monopoly capitalism on the Canadian schools. For instance, the fact of increasing need in production of skilled management personnel accompanies the trend towards larger corporations.²⁹

(iv) in advanced capitalism, increasing research is a necessity; it not only produces efficient techniques, but products with which to expand the market as well. In Canada, research is done largely by post-secondary institutions, financed largely at the public expense, and destined for private expropriation.³⁰

(v) Under this category would have to be included the very important co-option of select students from the ranks of the working class families into the bourgeoisie, a function which the presently existing educational institutions are well suited for.

Second Function: Schooling provides the arena for a massive and expanding industry with connections in almost all areas of the political economy. A partial list of the areas of production directly involved in the existence of the schools would include:

(a) teachers, personnel in teacher-training institutes, educational specialists, officials in teacher associations, aides, librarians, secretaries, etc.

29. P. Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

30. For one compilation of such research see Mel Walkins, "Education In the Branch Plant Economy" in Canadian Dimension, May 1969, p. 38. See also D. Goldstick, "The University Student and Canadian Society" in Horizons Autumn, 1966, pp. 3-9; and R. Mathews and J. Steele (ed.), The Struggle For the Canadian University (Toronto: The New Press, 1969).

(b) administrative personnel at all levels of the educational bureaucracy, as well as those whose job it is to train them, supervisors, consultants, superintendents, as well as all of those who supervise the special services like departmental examinations, correspondance school, etc..

(c) those directly involved with the physical plant

(i) architects, contractors, carpenters, and of course parts of the larger building materials industry.

(ii) janitors, maintenance men, service men, and of course, parts of the whole service materials industry.

(iii) technicians involved with such technological apparatus as audio-visual aids and computers, that part of industry whose special business is supplying the technological components of modern education.

(iv) the school supply and furnishings industry.

(v) bus-drivers and the bus industry.

(vi) the peripheral industries and services that have attached themselves to the schools, eg., the school photographers, school nurses, and counselling services.

(d) the vast textbook and reading materials industry which has attached itself to the school, including of course, the writers, retailers, editors and censors, and processors (binders and printers).

The above list is by no means exhaustive. It is meant only to provide an indication of the possibilities for finding vested interests in this area of the schools' operation. Finally, to be complete, our list would have to include those activities which depend, though not so totally on the existence of the schools. In this group, we would have to

include all of those people who study the school, as well as all of the research that is connected with those industries that are intimately implicated in the schools.

Third Function: An examination of the school's objective role in the Canadian political economy would have to include a study of its function as the major mechanism of control of a major segment of Canada's population which has not achieved a proletarian status and therefore are not affected by the normal methods of worker-control. Students, like welfare recipients, unemployed, insane, retarded, convicts, and many Indians and women because they play no part in social production (or, are expected not to), are very strictly controlled, as evidenced by the provision of special physical plants in which they are incarcerated, and expected to remain.

Outside of the school, very little place is provided for students', therefore, the smooth functioning of the economy depends on their absence, and they are coerced into attending school by a variety of authoritarian measures, some cloaked in liberal garb. In the educational institution itself, the delineation of control becomes an easily perfectible system of schedules, supervisions, detentions, study halls, assignments, tests, and privileges. There are, of course, hundreds of polemics and studies on this topic alone, amongst them; Jerry Farber, Student As Nigger; Presidential Committee at York University, Freedom and Responsibility In the University; and D. M. Roussopoulos (ed.) The New Left in Canada. Probably more informative than any of these would be a school calendar from any Canadian University or any elementary edu-

cational administration text-book.

The result of the system of control through schools is that from the ages of six to sixteen years the biggest fact in the Canadian youngster's life is the school that his parents have provided. For twelve years, and usually more, he is either inside of its walls or walking in its shadow. It becomes not only the major determinant of his way of life, but becomes for the student the meaning of the adult community. From the student's point of view, studying the connection between the school and society is a fatuous exercise; the school is that society. One of the more obvious results of universal, compulsory education is the generation gap, the other is the completely emasculated young adult.

Finally, one of the widely publicized tests of the success of the Communist Revolution in mainland China was the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guard Movement, of 1966 that saw at its peak, approximately three million students in the streets of Peking. A similar freeing of the students in any large Canadian city, though, they would constitute only a fraction of that number, would be unthinkable, and would probably exhibit very quickly that control is one of the real functions of the schools corresponding to the dominant mode of economic activity in our country.

Fourth Function: As the contradictions inherent in the Canadian economy become more intolerable with the maturation of capitalism, schooling is increasingly resorted to as the universal panacea for the ills of our branch-plant society. As the Canadian alternative to the American war machine, schooling is a useful device whereby contradictions are kept

in suspension and prevented from reaching crisis proportions.³¹ Two possible sub-categories in this study would include:

(a) a study of the manner in which the crises related to the unemployment and underemployment endemic in the Canadian branch-plant economy are pacified by make-work programs involving the schools. Here, it would be possible to analyze the jobs created for students and graduates, the extension of schooling corresponding to the flooding of the labour market, and the retraining programs for those who have become unemployed due to advances in the technology of production.

(b) a study of the manner in which schooling aids in the pacification of the crises related to overproduction and underconsumption by:

(i) providing a dumping ground, at public expense, for the surplus of goods created by industry.

(ii) providing heightened forms of consumer indoctrination reaching the proportions of folk-heroism, whereby people will purchase useless goods for the 'good of the economy'.

Fifth Function: The ideology arising out of capitalism, conventional market theory, holds that maximum amount of social good is possible, in fact arises naturally, out of individualized economic activity. Like parks, recreation centres, community centres, and other public projects, schooling exists as objective proof, cloaked in the proper 'ideological raiment', that capitalism can hold true to its promises, that faith in capitalism is justified. A study of this particular aspect of the schools' function would be fruitful insofar as it could convincingly destroy that myth.

31. See M. Watkins, "Education In the Branch-Plant Economy", op. cit., p. 39.

BOOKS:

Adler-Karlsson, Gunnar, Reclaiming the Canadian Economy: A Swedish Approach Through Functional Socialism (Toronto: House of Anansi Press Limited, 1967 and 1970).

Aiken, Henry D. (ed.), The Age of Ideology, The 19th Century Philosophers (New York: The New American Library, 1956).

Ali, Tariq, (ed.), The New Revolutionaries: A Handbook of the International Radical Left (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1969).

Althusser, Louis, For Marx (trans. by B. Brewster), (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1965).

Avineri, Shlomo, (ed.), Karl Marx On Colonialism and Modernization (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969).

, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx (London: Cambridge At the University Press, 1968).

Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital: An Essay On The American Economic and Social Order (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

Barzun, Jacques, Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of A Heritage (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958).

Berle, Adolph A., The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1954).

Berlin, Isaiah, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963).

Blauner, Robert, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory and Industry (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964).

Bober, M. M., Karl Marx's Interpretation of History: A Study of the Central Theses of the Marx-Engels Doctrine of Social Evolution (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1927).

Bottomore, T. B., Classes in Modern Society (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1965).

, Elites and Society (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1964).

, (ed. trans.), Karl Marx: Early Writings (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963).

, (ed. trans.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology & Social Philosophy (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1956).

, Social Criticism In North America: CBC Talks (Toronto: The Hunter Rose Company, 1966).

Boyer, William W., Bureaucracy On Trial: Policy Making By Government Agencies (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964).

Broadbent, Ed, The Liberal Rip-Off: Trudeauism vs. The Politics of Equality (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

Brown, J. A. C., Freud and the Post-Freudians (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1961 and 1964).

Brown, Norman, Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History (New York: Random House Inc., 1959).

Burnham, James, The Managerial Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960).

Camus, Albert, The Rebel: An Essay On Man In Revolt (trans. by A. Bower) (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956).

Cantrill, Hadley, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1941).

Casey, R. D. and Harold D. Lasswell, Propoganda and Promotional Activities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

Chomsky, N., American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays (New York: Random House, Inc., 1964).

Clarkson, Stephen, (ed.), An Independent Foreign Policy For Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1968).

, (ed.), Visions 2020: Fifty Canadians In Search of a Future (Edmonton: M. G. Hurtig Ltd., 1970).

Cleaver, E., Soul On Ice (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1968).

Cohen, Carl, (ed.), Communism, Fascism, and Democracy: The Theoretical Foundations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

Cook, Ramsay, The Maple Leaf Forever: Essays On Nationalism and Politics In Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971).

Cooper, David, (ed.) The Dialectics of Liberation (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1968).

Cockburn, A. and R. Blackburn, (ed.), Student Power: Problems, Diagnosis, Action (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1969).

Cornforth, Maurice, The Open Philosophy and the Open Society (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968).

Cornu, Auguste, The Origins of Marxian Thought (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1957).

Cox, Robert, (ed.), Ideology, Politics, and Political Theory (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1969).

Crosson, F. J. and K. M. Sayre, Philosophy and Cybernetics (New York: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

Cubberly, E. P., The History of Education

Desan, Wilfred, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1965).

Deutscher, Isaac, (ed.), The Age of Permanent Revolution: A Trotsky Anthology (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1964).

Dodge, Richard A. with the Editors of Ramparts, Divided We Stand (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1970).

Domhoff, G. W., Who Rules America? (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).

- Dupre, Louis, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966).
- Dvorky, Dianne, (ed.), How Old Will You Be In 1984? (New York: Avon Books, 1969).
- Ebon, Martin, Che: The Making of a Legend (Toronto: The New American Library of Canada Limited, 1969).
- Ellul, Jacques, The Technological Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).
- Elau, Heinz, The Behavioral Persuasion In Politics (New York: Random House, Inc., 1967).
- Etzioni, Amatai, Modern Organizations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964).
- Evans, Richard I., Dialogue With Erich Fromm (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966).
- Fall, B. B., (ed.), Ho Chi Minh On Revolution: Selected Writings (New York: The American Library, Inc., 1967).
- Fanon, Franz, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1963).
- Feuer, Lewis, (ed.), Marx & Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959).
- _____, Marx and the Intellectuals: A Set of Post-Ideological Essays (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1969).
- Freud, Sigmund, Civilization and Its Discontents (trans. and ed. by J. Strachey) (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1961).
- Fromm, Erich, The Art of Loving (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers Inc., 1956).
- _____, Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter With Marx and Freud (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1962).
- _____, The Crisis of Psychoanalysis: Essays on Freud, Marx, and Social Psychology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1970).

, The Dogma of Christ (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955).

, Escape From Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1941).

, Man For Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1947).

, May Man Prevail: An Inquiry Into the Facts And Fictions of Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961, 1964).

, The Revolution of Hope Toward a Humanized Technology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1968).

, The Sane Society (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1955).

, Sigmund Freud's Mission: An Analysis of His Personality and Influence (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1959).

, (ed.), Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966).

Garaudy, Roger, Karl Marx: The Evolution of His Thought (trans. by N. Apotheker) (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1967).

Garstein, L. H., Each Age Is A Dream: A Study in Ideologies (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1953).

Gay, Peter, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Edward Bernstein's Challenge To Marx (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953, 1962).

Godfrey, D. and M. Watkins, Gordon To Watkins To You: Documentary: The Battle For the Control of Our Economy (Toronto: New Press, 1970).

Goodman, Paul, Compulsory Mis-education and the Community of Scholars (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

, The Community of Scholars (New York: Random House, Inc., 1962).

, Compulsory Mis-education (New York: Horizon Press, 1964).

, Five Years: Thoughts During A Useless Time (New York: Random House, Inc., 1969).

, Growing Up Absurd (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956).

, New Reformation: Notes of A Neolithic Conservative (New York: Random House, Inc., 1970).

, People or Personnel and Like a Conquered Province (New York: Random House, Inc., 1968).

, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals (New York: Random House, Inc., 1951).

Goodman, Percival and Paul Goodman, Communitas: Means of Livelihood and Ways of Life (New York: Random House, Inc., 1960).

Gordon, Walter, A Choice for Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1966).

Grant, George, Lament For a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Capitalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Limited, 1965).

Guevara, Che, Guerilla Warfare (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Inc., 1961).

Harrington, Michael, The Accidental Century (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1965).

Henry, Jules, Culture Against Man (New York: Random House, Inc., 1963).

Hoopes, N. E. and R. Peck, Edge of Awareness (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1966).

Howe, Irving, The Radical Papers (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966).

Hunt, R. N. C., The Theory and Practice of Communism (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1950).

Jalee, P., The Pillage of the Third World (trans. by M. Klopper) (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968).

- Josephson, Eric and Mary, (ed.), Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962).
- Kahn, Hans, Living in a World Revolution: My Encounter With History (ed. by R. N. Anshen), (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1964).
- Kamenka, Eugene, Marxism and Ethics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969).
- Kaplan, C. E., Power and Society (New Haven: Vanguard Press, 1950).
- Kenniston, K., The Uncommitted: Alienated Youth In American Society (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1960).
- Kautsky, John H., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962).
- Koren, H. J., Marx and Authentic Man (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1967).
- Kolakowski, Leszak, Toward A Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today (trans. by J. Z. Peel) (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968).
- Lanternari, V., The Religions of the Oppressed: A Study of the Modern Messianic Cults (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1963).
- LaPierre, Laurier, (ed.), Essays on the Left (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1971).
- Laxer, James, The Energy Poker Game: The Politics of the Continental Resources Deal (Toronto: New Press, 1970).
- Leavitt, Kari, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970).
- Lefebvre, Henri, The Sociology of Marx (trans. by N. Guterman) (New York: Random House, Inc., 1969).
- Leider, C. and K. M. Schmidt, The Politics of Violent Revolution in the Modern World (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).

Lewin, L., Report From Iron Mountain on the Possibility and Desirability of Peace (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1967).

Levitsky, Serge, Karl Marx: Das Kapital (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1967).

Lichteim, George, The Origins of Socialism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969).

, Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1961).

Lindner, R. M., Rebel Without A Cause: The Story of a Criminal Psychopath (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1944).

Lipset, S. M., Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1960).

Lockwood, L., Conversation With Eldridge Cleaver: Algiers (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1970).

Lumsden, Ian, (ed.), Close The 49th Parallel, etc.: The Americanization of Canada (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1970).

MacIntyre, A., Marcuse (London: Fontana/Collins, 1970).

MacKinnon, F., The Politics of Education (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960).

Macpherson, C. B., The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (London: Oxford University Press, 1962).

McGuigan, G. F., The Student Protest (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968).

Magdoff, H., The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U. S. Foreign Policy (New York: Modern Reader Paperbacks, 1969).

Mandel, E., Marxist Theory of the State (New York: Pathfinder Press, Inc., 1970).

Mannheim, Karl, Ideology and Utopia, An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (trans. by E. Shils) (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1936).

Marcuse, Herbert, with Robert P. Wolff, and Barrington Moore, Jr., A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965).

, An Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Enquiry Into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955).

, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1941).

Marx, Karl, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (ed. by F. Engels) (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1919).

, The Communist Manifesto (Trans. by S. Moore) (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954).

, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (New York: The International Publishers Co., Inc., 1963).

, with F. Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I and III (ed. by R. Pascal) (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1959).

, with F. Engels, The Holy Family of Critique of Critical Critique (trans. by R. Dixon) (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956).

, Selected Works in Two Volumes, Vol. I and II (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951).

, Selected Correspondence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953).

Mathews, Robin and James Steele, (ed.) The Struggle for the Canadian Universities (Toronto: The New Press, 1969).

May, Rollo, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (Princeton D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967).

Mayer, Martin, Madison Avenue, U. S. A.: The Inside Story of American Advertising (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1958).

Merriam, Charles, Political Power (London: Collier-Macmillan, Ltd., 1967).

Meyer, A. G., Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970).

Mills, C. Wright, The Marxists (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1962).

_____, The Power Elite (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

_____, White Collar: The American Middle Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951).

Moffat, Gary, History of the Canadian Peace Movement Until 1969 (St. Catherine's: Grape Vine Press, 1969).

Montagu, Ashley, The Human Revolution (New York: Bantam Books, 1967).

Mumford, Lewis, The Transformations of Man (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965).

_____, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934).

Oestreicher, Paul, (ed.), The Christian Marxist Dialogue (London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1969).

Packard, Vance, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1957).

_____, The Pyramid Climbers (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1962).

_____, The Status Seekers (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1956).

_____, The Sexual Wilderness (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc.,).

- Pappenheim, Fritz, The Alienation of Modern Man (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959).
- Parkinson, Cyril, Parkinson's Law and Other Studies in Administration (New York: Ballantine Books, 1964).
- Payne, Robert, Marx (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968).
- Pal, I.-D., Canadian Economic Issues: Introductory Readings (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1971).
- Perucci, Robert, (ed.), The Triple Revolution: Social Problems in Depth (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968).
- Peter, Laurence, The Peter Principle: Why Things Always Go Wrong (with R. Hull) (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1969).
- Petrovic, Gajo, Marx in the Mid-twentieth Century (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1967).
- Plamanatz, John, Man and Society, Vol. II (London: Longman's, Green and Company, Ltd., 1963).
- Pollock, Frederick, An Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics (Boston: Beacon Press, 1890).
- Popper, Karl, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II (London: George Routledge & Sons, Ltd., 1945).
- _____, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957).
- Raison, Timothy, (ed.), The Founding Fathers of Social Science (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1963).
- Rand, Ayn, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal (Toronto: The New American Library of Canada, Ltd., 1946).
- Reid, Tim and Julian, (ed.), Student Power and the Canadian Campus (Toronto: Peter Martin Associates Limited, 1969).
- Reich, Wilhelm, Listen, Little Man! (trans. by T. P. Wolfe) (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1948).
- Rourke, F. E., (ed.), Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1965).

- Roussopoulos, D. J., (ed.), The New Left in Canada (Montreal: Our Generation Press-Black Rose Books, 1970).
- Royce, J. R., The Encapsulated Man: An Interdisciplinary Essay on the Search For Meaning (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964).
- Russell, Bertrand, History of Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1946).
- Ryerson, Stanley, The Open Society: Paradox and Challenge (New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1965).
- Safarian, A. E., Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Co., of Canada, Ltd., 1966).
- Schaff, Adam, Marxism and the Human Individual (ed. by R. S. Cohen) (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970).
- Schwartz, Benjamin I., Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1951).
- Scott, A. M., (ed.), Politics, U. S. A.: Cases on the American Democratic Process (Third Ed.) (Toronto: Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., 1969).
- Seeley, Charles S., Modern Materialism (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1960).
- Shklar, Judith, (ed.), Political Theory and Ideology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966).
- Shonfield, Andrew, Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Political Power (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1963).
- Somerville, John, The Philosophy of Marxism: An Exposition (New York: Random House, 1967).
- Stoessinger, J. G., The United Nations and the Superpowers: United States-Soviet Interaction at the United Nations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965).
- Suzuki, D. T., E. Fromm, and R. DeMartino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1960).

- Tawney, R. H., The Acquisitive Society (London: The Fontana Library, 1921, 1961).
- _____, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1926).
- Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (trans. by R. Crawley) (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1910).
- Toffler, Alvin, The Culture Consumers: Art and Affluence in America (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1965).
- Townsend, Robert, Up the Organization (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970).
- Trotsky, L., The Defence of Terrorism: A Reply to K. Kautsky (London: The Labour Publishing Company, 1921).
- Tucker, Robert C., The Marxist Revolutionary Idea: Essays On Marxist Thought and Its Impact on Radical Movements (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1969).
- Ulam, Adam B., The Unfinished Revolution: An Essay on the Sources of Influence of Marxism and Communism (New York: Random House, Inc., 1960).
- Walker, C. R. and A. G. Walker, Technology, Industry and Man: The Age of Acceleration (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1968).
- Warnock, John, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: The New Press, 1970).
- Weiner, N., The Human Use of Human Beings (New York: Avon Books, 1950, 1954).
- White, Morton, (ed.), The Age of Analysis (New York: The New American Library, 1955).
- Whyte, William H., The Organization Man (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957).
- Wolfe, Bertram, D., Marxism: 100 Years in the Life of a Doctrine (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1965).
- Zeitlin, Irving, Marxism: A Re-Examination (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967).

Karl Marx and Modern Philosophy: Collection of Articles
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968).

PERIODICALS:

Adamiak, R., "The Withering Away of the State" in Journal of Politics, Vol. XXXII, No. 6, pp. 3-18.

Bell, Daniel, "The Rediscovery of Alienation" in American Sociological Review, Vol. LVI, No. 24, pp. 933-952.

Dowd, Doug, "Economist: Unbalanced Gurus for the Powers-that-Be" in The Chevron, The University of Waterloo Press, Vol. II, No. 47, March, 1971, pp. 12-13.

Etzioni, Amatai, "Basic Human Needs, Alienation, and Inauthenticity" in The American Sociological Review, Vol. XXXIII, pp. 870-885.

Goodman, Paul, "High School is Too Much" in Psychology Today, Vol. IV, No. 5, pp. 25-37.

Heilbroner, Robert, "Multinational Corporations and the Nation-State" in The New York Review of Books, Vol. XVI, No. 2, pp. 20-25.

Huxley, Julian, "The Crisis in Man's Destiny" in Playboy Magazine, Vol. XIV, No. 10, pp. 93-217.

Illich, Ivan, "Why We Must Abolish Schooling" in The New York Review of Books, Vol. XV, No. 10, pp. 28-33.

_____, "Education Without School: How It Can Be Done" in The New York Review of Books, Vol. XV, No. 12, pp. 25-31.

McLellan, D., "Marx's View of Un-alienated Society" in Review of Politics, Vol. XXXI, pp. 459-465.

Moore, Terry, "You're Damn Rights You're Poor If You Don't Have An Income" in The Chevron, University of Waterloo Press, Vol. XI, No. 46, pp. 14-15.

O'Malley, J., "Methodology in Karl Marx" in Review of Politics, Vol. XXXII, pp. 219-30.

Seeman, Melvin, "On the Meaning of Alienation" in The American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 6, pp. 355-361.

Watkins, Melville, "Education In the Branch Plant Economy"
in Canadian Dimension, Kit No. 3, pp. 39-40.

Winthrop, H., "Alienation of Post-industrial Man" in
Midwest Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 121-37.

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS:

Brook, J. A., Marx: Essence and the Problem of Social Determinism, M. A. Thesis, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1966.

Massaro, Vincent, Divergent Views on Marx's Increasing Misery Doctrine, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 1963.

B29991